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THE RECENT AIMS AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN

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THE RECENT AIMS AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN

BY

RIKITARO FUJISAWA, PH.D.

NEW HAVEN
PUBLISHED FOR THE INSTITUTE OF POLITICS
BY YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS
MDCCCCXXIII

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Printed in the United States of America.

To the Beloved Memory

of

THE MIGHTY CHAMPION

of

RIGHT, JUSTICE, AND FAIR-PLAY,

THE TRUE FRIEND

NOT ONLY OF HIS OWN COUNTRY,

BUT OF ALL MANKIND,

THEODORE ROOSEVELT

Oyster Bay, September 2, 1922.

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PREFACE

After accepting in May last the cordial invitation of the Institute of Politics to deliver a course of lectures in Williamstown, I fell ill, and after all there was left less than four weeks for preparing my lecture notes. The altogether inadequate time at my disposal and my poor health will partly account for many defects and shortcomings of which I myself am fully conscious.

Although some of the points of view are the result of mature reflections, it is with the greatest diffidence that I submit them to the judgment of those who may peruse these pages of hasty compilation. Were I able to contribute, however meagerly, toward that ennobling effort so happily personified by Secretary Hughes on this side of the Pacific and by Viscount Shibusawa on the other side, for the creation of an atmosphere in which an appeal to prejudice will fall on deaf ears, I might not have risked in vain the danger of breaking down on my journey to, and during my stay in Williamstown.

As there seems to be no reason why I, like one born in an English-speaking country, cannot coin new words, I have taken the liberty of using such words as *tammanic*, *Americo*, and the like, not to be found in any English Dictionary.

I take this opportunity of thanking President Harry

Augustus Garfield, Chairman of the Institute of Politics, and his associates for all the courtesy and hospitality lavishly bestowed upon me. I shall always recall my stay in Williamstown as one of the most pleasant incidents of my whole life.

Lastly, but not least, I wish to thank Mr. Earl Count from the core of my heart for all he did for me while I was arranging my lecture notes, in whose hand I am going to leave everything connected with the printing of the same.

R. Fujisawa

Williamstown, August 23d, 1922

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RECENT AIMS AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN

Lecture I

August 2, 1922

Chairman of the Institute of Politics, Ladies and Gentlemen:

First of all, let me thank you for the honor and pleasure of addressing this distinguished gathering consisting of persons who are all high-grade amateurs in a general way, and, at the same time, high-grade professionals each in his or her own specialty.

Craving your indulgence, I wish to be allowed to say a few words on casual impressions of a personal character. That Williams College holds firmly to the old New England ideal of a broad, liberal education for training citizens for citizenship, and that Presidents and others connected with the College have, ever since its foundation, been characterized by an unusual spirit of loyalty and service, appeal to my most profound respect and sincere admiration, and, indeed, so much so that I dare to trespass on the short, precious time at my disposal. In speaking of citizenship, I agree with M. Clémenceau, who said only about two months ago that there is courage as great as that of the soldier who

dies for his country, and that is civil courage for which there is seldom any glory. I confine myself to saying that I am one of those who are old-fashioned enough to stick stubbornly to the notion of holding cultural education the highest ideal and aim of colleges and universities, and that I have been all through my life fighting, and am ever ready to fight, against going to the extreme in stressing too much the so-called practical or vocational subjects under cover of the high-sounding phrase "modern tendencies." Now, what is culture? I believe, with Goethe, that to know the world and not to despise it is the end and aim of culture.

As I was told, there have been two distinct and notable contributions to the progress and educational thought not only of the United States, but of the whole world, which owe their inception to the institution whose hospitality we are now enjoying. I mean to refer to the Haystack Gathering of some one hundred and fifteen years ago, of which the shower which greeted me on my arrival in Williamstown was a happy reminder, and which may be looked upon as the origin of the world-wide foreign-mission movement having for its object the spread of civilization into the far corners of the earth; and this International Institute of Politics, so happily and ably inaugurated last year by the untiring efforts of the present illustrious President of the College and his associates. I believe it is not only just, but I am meeting halfway what they would have liked to say, to recall in this connection that the original conception of the Institute, in which, as Lord Bryce tells us, Secretary Hughes took great interest, was given complete fruition through the gen-

erosity of Mr. Bernard M. Baruch, the loftiness of whose character is such as is rarely met with in these times, which keeps him away from Williamstown in order to avoid being thanked for all he has done for this noble enterprise, harboring immeasurable good for the cause of international amity and world peace.

The name of an American most familiar to an average man in the street in Japan is, needless to say, that of Commodore Perry. The name of an American which touches the very depth of heart of the more thoughtful of my countrymen and which arouses a feeling akin to gratitude in their bosom is that of Townsend Harris, America's first diplomatic representative in Japan, whom we Japanese are proud to call "the nation's friend." The invaluable services and good will which Townsend Harris lavishly bestowed on the country to which he was accredited, were more than supplemented by the disinterested labors of America's unofficial representatives, the three missionaries whom America sent to Japan in his day. They were Guido F. Verbeck, S. R. Brown and J. C. Hepburn, whose sincerity and patience never failed to inspire those of my countrymen who were fortunate enough to have been brought into contact with them, even in these days of mutual ignorance. I need hardly add that the fact that these benefactors were sent to my country is mainly due to the movement in America which had its start at the Haystack Gathering of bygone days in this very place where we are gathered together to-day.

One of the missionaries, Dr. S. R. Brown, happened to be for a while in a town called Niigata, where I was born in 1861. My father used to go in the evening to

where Dr. Brown lived to learn some English. I, then a boy about ten years old, often accompanied him to Dr. Brown's house. Now, there was an American lady who was staying with Dr. Brown. Her name was Miss Kidder. Afterwards, she became Mrs. Rothsay Miller and devoted her whole noble life to the evangelistic work in Japan, where she died about ten years ago. Somehow, Miss Kidder, then a very young lady, took interest in me and taught me the English alphabet. I remember even to this day as vividly as if it were but yesterday that, on rare occasions when I was able to repeat *a, b, c,* and so on down to *x, y, z,* without making a single mistake, I was rewarded with something sweet. The reflection that a man whose first knowing of the English alphabet may ultimately be traced to the Haystack Gathering, Williams' first contribution of world-wide significance more than a century ago, should happen to be invited to give lectures in the International Institute of Politics, Williams' second and up-to-date contribution to the twentieth-century world, arouses in the bosom of my heart something which I can only feel but cannot describe. And I do firmly believe that it is that something or something like it which forms more than anything else the nucleus of truly international friendship and genuine good will.

For a Japanese it is hard to retain American names except, perhaps, those which are very common, like Smith and Jones, and those which are as illustrious as Lincoln and Roosevelt. I presume, it is even harder for an American to familiarize himself with Japanese names. On that account, I have taken the liberty of

appealing both to your eyes as well as to your ears in trying to familiarize you with the names of three men, of whom I am going to speak presently. You see those names written in big letters on the chart behind me.

All of my American friends whose counsel I sought in my anxiety as to whether my audience could understand me—perhaps it would be more proper to say, whether I could make myself intelligible to my audience—one and all, kindly advised me to speak very slowly. So I shall speak slowly, and, indeed, very slowly, even at the risk of making you weary. For me, this means, that, while I am lecturing, time will fly on wings—on aëroplanes. I have in mind to have recourse to the simple expedient of omitting altogether some parts of my lecture, referring you for those parts which I shall omit to the copies of my notes which were distributed this morning to the members of the Institute. In this connection, I wish to add that next time, however desirable it might be, I shall not be able to do the same, simply because my manuscript is not as yet ready for being multigraphed. Next time I shall have to encroach further on your kindness and sympathy by asking you for more patience and leniency.

Lastly, I wish to be permitted to make a remark which is even more of personal nature than those which I have just made. For this, I once more crave your indulgence. I am sorry to say that I am an invalid. The fear of my breaking down on my journey necessitated my taking a physician with me. Fortunately, however, I am here without having had anything worth mentioning in coming over to this place. Only I have

to say that I am still weak and exhausted. My illness is what I believe is known by the name of hyperacidity, an after-effect of gastrohelcosis, or ulceration of the stomach, coupled with insomnia, or sleeplessness, which I got while overworking previous to my departure. I am more than content with two meals a day, while I have to sleep three times during twenty-four hours. Usually I sleep from 10 or 11 P.M. to 2 or 3 A.M. next morning, enjoy a nap of about half an hour after breakfast, and then sleep after lunch from 2 to 4. Thus you will see that my bodily condition just now is such that I can only sleep, so to speak, piecemeal. Thus, to my great regret, I have to deny myself the pleasure of participating in many of the activities of the Institute. For this, for the third time, I crave your sympathetic indulgence.

So much being premised, I now go on to the main subject of my lecture.

HARA, OKUMA, YAMAGATA

Within a short span of less than three months from November 4, 1921, to February 1, 1922, Japan lost three of her foremost, if not her three foremost, statesmen, Premier Hara, Marquis Okuma, and Prince Yamagata. The removal of these men, sudden and unexpected in the case of the first-mentioned, from the arena of practical politics of Japan, leaves an irrevocable gap of pregnant possibilities and far-reaching significance. As to the exact nature of the consequences we are still in the twilight, if not entirely in the dark. The present political situations may perhaps be described as a lull which usually occurs in the wake of any catas-

trophic event. This much, however, we can say with assurance that these were the three prominent figures who did most, either by the work they achieved or by the example they set, to make Japan what it was in the beginning of 1922. These three typify in a striking manner the divers tendencies that have been at work during the last decade, and the irreparable loss now being so acutely felt shows how personality affects the course of events in this world.

A vital consideration which, in importance, far transcends any happenings of the hour may be mentioned in passing. Marquis Okuma and Prince Yamagata, both in their eighty-fourth year, died within twenty-two days of each other. That Marquis Okuma retained all his juvenile spirit, vigor and activity to his last days is well known and has become almost proverbial. There was, at one time, even some talk of the possibility of his becoming Premier for the third time as Hara's successor. It is true that Prince Yamagata of late years was physically weak, but all those who were privileged to come into personal contact with him, one and all, wondered at his mental activity, which was in striking contrast to his bodily frailties. Hara was in his sixty-sixth year. Ever since he became Premier, he had been the very personification of vigor and activity. He worked day and night and never showed the slightest sign of fatigue, much to the discomposure of his subordinates. Had he lived to the age of Prince Yamagata and Marquis Okuma, there seems to be no doubt that he would have shown the same retentiveness of mental faculties as these elders. Japan is to be pitied for having been deprived through Hara's un-

timely death of the example of one of her people who, like Gladstone, occupied no less than four times the most responsible position in a constitutional monarchy. To this category of men, I may perhaps add the venerable Viscount Shibusawa, who is only two years the junior of Marquis Okuma. Viscount Shibusawa, who towers high in the Japanese firmament of correct thinking and of true visions of the times, visited the United States last year and is as ever working for the cause of international amity and friendship. His vigorous activity, which shows no sign of abatement as years roll by, is the marvel of all those who enjoy the privilege of knowing him for any length of time.

In days long gone by, there was a time when fear and apprehension were entertained as regards the supposed precocity and attendant premature decay of the Japanese people as a race. Very many reasons might be given for this fear, but, the truth is, it was merely a vague impression which had no substantial ground. Now, when we, in August, 1892, saw Gladstone, then eighty-three years old, at the head of the British Government for the fourth time, we felt a sensation akin to humiliation based on the tacit assumption, that we, the Japanese race, would never produce such a statesman. The careers of these men provided instances which dispelled our fear and emboldened us to the consciousness of being in this respect nowise inferior to any other race.

The career of Takashi Hara will now be briefly reviewed. He was born in Morioka as the second son of a humble retainer of the *daimyo* of Nambu, on February 2, 1856. He was born a commoner and remained

a commoner all through his life, although titles and honors might have been his for less than the asking. It was in the early seventies, when Japan had no public schools, and his education as a boy was from private teachers in the neighborhood of his home under the only conditions which the limited means of his family allowed. He came to Tokyo as a young man to seek his fortune, and soon his youthful mind turned to the wider world. He came to see that intellectual progress in those days was possible only through the study of some European language and he entered the government school of French law. While there he showed signs of the indomitable spirit of a political warrior and of the gift of leadership. In the law school there was a student riot over the so-called *caterer chastisement* which was very much in vogue among students of those days, and from which my conscience forces me to confess that I myself was not entirely free. Hara headed the rioters and fought brilliantly, so brilliantly indeed, that in the sequel he, together with his confederates, was dismissed from the school.

Driven out into the cold world, Hara had to seek a livelihood by becoming a teacher in a primary school. While teaching, he turned to journalism at a date when journalism was still in its infancy in Japan. Eventually he joined the staff of the *Hochi* as a French translator. Hara's activity in the political world of Japan may be said to have begun in 1882, when he followed Marquis Inouye to Korea as a newspaper correspondent, to which country the Marquis was sent as special envoy. Later he became an official in the Foreign Office, consul in Tientsin, and in 1886 secretary and chargé

d'affaires in Paris. The last service was brief and constituted his entire diplomatic experience in Europe.

In 1888 when Marquis Inouye was Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, Hara became the Minister's personal secretary, acted in the same capacity under Count Mutsu, who replaced Marquis Inouye as Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, and followed his chief to the Foreign Office, to become Director of the Commercial Bureau. In the last mentioned capacity, he had as his colleague Viscount Kato, the present leader of the Opposition, who was then Chief of the Political Bureau in the same department. In 1895 Hara was promoted to the post of Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs. In the following year he was Minister to Korea, and in 1897 he left official life to return to journalism as chief editor of the Osaka *Mainichi.*

Count Munemitsu Mutsu, whose bronze statue adorns the entrance to the Foreign Office building in Kasumigaseki, and under whose able administration of foreign affairs the nation's fervent desire for the abolition of extraterritoriality was finally fulfilled, was often called the "razor-keen" minister. Our hero Hara seems, while serving under Count Mutsu, to have imbibed all the shrewdness of his chief, and between these two men there existed a mutually confiding friendship which lasted till the death of the Count.

When Prince Ito launched the Seiyukai party in 1900, Hara was one of his right-hand men. The leadership of the party fell to Prince Saionji after it was relinquished by Ito, but the most arduous work of the party fell on the shoulders of Hara and Matsuda. These two men had characters which were complemen-

tary to each other. Hara was shrewd and aggressive, while Matsuda was calm and dignified. The two taken together constituted the actual chief of the party, under the titular leadership of Prince Saionji, for more than a decade. Upon the death of Matsuda, which occurred in 1914, the whole responsibility fell to Hara.

Hara filled his first cabinet post in 1900, when he was called to succeed Hoshi as Minister of Communications. There was another interlude of journalism, as editor of the Osaka *Shimpo,* and then a return to the cabinet as Minister of Home Affairs, leaving it with the fall of the first Saionji Ministry in 1908. In that year and the following he visited the United States and Europe. For the next few years his career was uneventful, but he reëntered the Cabinet in 1913 and again in 1914 as Minister of Home Affairs. In 1918, after the fall of the Terauchi Ministry, he succeeded to the Premiership and thus reached the highest dignity attainable by a Japanese subject. After having been at the helm of the state for more than three years, Hara was assassinated by an unbalanced and demented youth at Tokyo Central Station on November 4, 1921. The Premier died almost immediately after the assassin's knife had been driven into his left breast, touching the heart.

It is an unavoidable necessity that a man placed in Hara's position should be exposed to the danger of assassination. There are many previous instances. Indeed, Prince Ito, Hara's former chief, to whose mantle he succeeded, fell a victim to a Korean assassin at Harbin in 1909. In September, 1901, I was traveling in a railway car, where there were gath-

ered a few persons including Prince Katsura, then Premier of Japan. When the train stopped at a station there were men to be seen running outside selling newspaper extras. We all bought extras, which gave the news of the assassination of President McKinley. I happened to watch Katsura as his eyes fell on the lines of the extra. Instantly I observed a change of color in Katsura's look, which I interpreted as revealing his consciousness of the danger of sharing the same fate as President McKinley. Hara was a man who knew well that one cannot get beyond danger without going through danger. Not only did Hara realize at times that his life was in danger, but his good friends often warned him against possible assassination. However, Hara believed that bodyguards could never prevent his assassination if such an attempt was made. It was his firm conviction that if any person decided to take his life at the expense of his own, no human power could prevent it. He accepted the situation always as a matter of the will of Providence.

Hara, the Great Commoner, lived and died a plain man. It was his instruction contained in his will, that after death no title whatsoever should be conferred upon him and that no title or court rank should mark his tomb. The funeral ceremonies were all private, simple, and unostentatious, in accordance with his wishes contained in the will. His remains rest under a tombstone on which are written the four Chinese characters for "Takashi Hara's Grave" in the Hara family cemetery attached to the Daiji-ji temple in Morioka.

With his position and environment in society he

would have been able to amass a fortune, if a fortune he desired. But he never looked to wealth, and returned to the Mother Earth in a condition not very much better than when he was born. However, while denying himself anything approaching to luxury, he did everything in his power for his friends and relatives. There was something approaching to gentleness in the core of his heart, which was veiled while he was fighting political battles and was only made clear after his death.

I need not pretend to know what posterity will say of Hara as a statesman. Events are still too near, and, amidst the confused cries that are ringing from friend and foe, it would be well-nigh impossible to pass any common judgment of the man. But this much is certain, that he has played, and was about to play, a great part. His greatness transcends the passion of love and hatred he has stirred up. His personality, whether greater or less, is peculiarly his own, and stands unique in the history of the political development of modern Japan.

History shows that there are bold men to whom nothing seems impossible; the impossible attracts them as fire attracts a moth. They are men born to the conviction that, as Napoleon said, where there is a will, there is a way. It seems to me that both Hara and his senior in party politics, Hoshi, belong to this category of men. The difference between the two consists in that Hara was more tactful and consequently appeared more conciliatory than Hoshi. At the same time Hara was a personification of the indomitable spirit, he was a fighting general endowed both with wisdom

and courage. Hara knew how to wait for an opportunity and also how to make opportunity present itself. In the doings of men like Hara, it is always difficult to demarcate the boundary between the means and the end. Perchance, as a party man, Hara's invincible disposition to win at whatever cost may have, at times, carried him a little too far in the direction of tolerating both the pure and the impure.

Hara had still his greatest work before him. He died just when it seemed that he was likely to bring that work to fruition. Viewed in this light, his career was only beginning. However, as the first commoner to be called to the highest political office of the realm, not through birth but solely through the sheer strength of his character and ability, he lived long enough to provide a valuable and pregnant asset to the cause of the political development of modern Japan.

Hara was a man of few words, and those words calm and modest, typifying in a remarkable way the inherent taciturnity of the Japanese people, of which I shall have to say a few words on some occasion. An outstanding feature of Hara's character was his ability to remain cool and calm in the face of any attack, however vehement. Throughout his long political career he never allowed himself to be betrayed into showing temper, and that was one of the secrets of his success. Stanch to his party friends, he received their ardent loyalty in return. His wonderful memory coupled with his indefatigable diligence enabled him to know personally almost every one of his followers. These were his secrets which kept his party together with such compactness as deserves the designation of "*not a*

single thread out of order." Within his own party, he was an autocrat. He was a consummate master of the technique of practical politics, and, at the same time a great despotic party leader. These considerations may partly account for the views which regard Hara as rather selfish in the bestowal of his affections, endeavoring to turn every influence to his own advantage as a party man.

Hara's views on international relations were sound and enlightened, as is amply testified by what the Japanese delegates to the Washington Conference, acting as his proxies, actually accomplished; and by the foreign policy of the continuation Ministry under Viscount Takahashi as Premier which followed his own and which followed closely the lines laid down by its lamented chief. His services in steering the Japanese Ship of State entrusted to his care through the perfidious undercurrents of the war, during the anxious days of the Paris Conference, through the idle fog hanging over the calling of the Washington Conference, while at the same time combating the dangerous gales that blew from China, Korea, Siberia, and even from California, deserve surely the gratitude and the tears of the whole nation. Harmonious coöperation with the other powers was the keynote of his foreign policy, and he knew better than anybody else that by this policy he was serving the cause of his country. There are two articles written in Japanese by Hara, published within one year of the time of his passing away. One entitled: "Harmony between East and West" appeared in the *Gaikō-Jihō* (Diplomatic Review) for December, 1920, and the other with the heading: "The Pre-

requisite Conditions of Permanent Peace," in the same monthly magazine for September, 1921. Of these articles I shall have to speak on the occasion of my endeavor to explain and elucidate the aims of Japan.

There is one point in the life of Hara, which is only known to a select few a fingers' count on one hand, and which, so far as I am aware of, has never been noticed before. In the session of the Imperial Diet of 1920, Hara had in the Lower House only a working majority, consisting of men of his own party and those who are usually found backing any Government party. A measure demanding manhood suffrage was introduced by the Opposition. The Government justified the rejection of the proposed measure by the fact that a recent law lowering the income-tax requirement for the suffrage to three yen per annum was just being put into effect, and would go far toward meeting, for the time being, the demand for manhood suffrage. The measure was defeated by a bare majority. On the heels of this victory Hara dissolved the Lower House. The dissolution struck both the Government party and the Opposition like a bolt from the blue. The reason for the dissolution was stated to be the desire on the part of the Government that, although the Government had secured a victory, such a vital issue should be referred to the judgment of the whole people. This dissolution was subsequently much commented upon, and it was made a charge against Hara that he had abused his power and adroitly availed himself of the futile suffrage agitation to hold a general election which promised to give him an invincible majority. Indeed he secured

the overwhelmingly large majority of 282 votes out of a total of 464, which remains a potent factor in the politics of present-day Japan even now when Hara is no more. All these are well-known facts. What is not as yet fully recognized in its true significance is the date of Hara's will, which claims our closest attention. The will was written a few days before the dissolution of 1920, on the eve of this most momentous decision which Hara, after profound reflection and mature deliberation, ever made during his whole life. Hara staked his life in order to get possession of an efficient weapon with which he was determined to fight the bureaucracy in the open. (It may be observed that in Japan one does not usually make his will unless there is a special motive for so doing.)

Particularly among the *intelligentsia* belonging to the younger generation it has been often debated whether Hara was a politician or a statesman, in which connection the word *politician* is given its worst significance. In Japan, as elsewhere, the days when we could boast of so many statesmen like Okubo, Kido, and Ito, who measure up to the real implications of the word, seems to have long gone by. Now the consensus of opinion seems to converge toward giving Hara a position perhaps midway between the two extremes. Were I permitted to trespass upon the authority of the future verdict, I venture to suggest that Hara was rather a statesman than a politician. I say this on the ground of the nobleness of mind and the purity of character to be discerned in his will, which is destined to become a source of inspiration to generations yet to come and which will be bequeathed to posterity as a

precious inheritance of the nation, deserving comparison with Washington's Farewell Address or Lincoln's Gettysburg Address.

Ambition plays an important part, perchance the most important part, in the formation of strong personality. Without ambition, there would have been no Hara. But the crowning ambition of Hara was circumscribed by his still higher aspiration to be loyal and devoted to the Emperor and to his country. Hara was often blamed for his being too much a party man. Well, that was the means but not the end. His political ideal was the realization of a popular representative rule under the sovereign and the elevation of the sovereign ever higher far above the plane of practical politics and political strife. The Great Commoner Hara's name will go down in the pages of the world's annals as well as in those of Japanese history, and it will be remembered of him that although he attained to the highest position his country could offer, he remained from first to last the same genial, upright, and courageous man; the same warm-hearted and unchanging friend; the same loyal and devoted servant of his Emperor and his country.

Leaving Hara for the present, before I go on to speak of Okuma and Yamagata, I beg to be allowed to make a slight digression which refers to a distinguished foreigner who, by a curious coincidence, was born in the same year as Okuma and Yamagata and passed away within the brief interim which separated the death of these two men, on January 22, 1922. This foreigner is no other than James, Viscount Bryce, who just a year ago was giving his learned and illuminat-

ing lectures on "International Relations" in this hall where we are now assembled together. That Bryce knew America better than most Americans, and that he was a man who went straight to the bottom of every problem and was not satisfied with anything less than the whole truth is a matter of common knowledge, but that he was a disinterested and valuable friend of Japan and did very much, not only for Japan, but also for Americo-Japanese relations, is perhaps known to only a few.

Viscount Bryce, to whom Ito's English translation of the Japanese Constitution and commentaries thereon was submitted for criticisms, gave advice and suggestions maturely thought out, which proved to be of invaluable service to the Japanese statesmen of the day at the dawn of constitutional government in Japan. Soon afterwards even greater service to the interests of Japan was done by Viscount Bryce. Throughout the early days of the Meiji era, Japan felt that the existence of extraterritorial jurisdiction was a disgrace to the nation, and wholly incompatible with that scrupulous regard for the integrity of territorial sovereignty which ought to characterize the intercourse of independent friendly nations. Attempts were repeatedly made to revise the treaties and to expunge from them the abominable extraterritorial clause. Several times these attempts failed, which, however, had the passive merit of hastening the revision and codification of our laws. In the last resort we sought the advice and sympathy of Viscount Bryce. It was while Viscount Bryce was a member of the fourth Gladstone Ministry that Great Britain, in 1894, led the way for the world in

revising the treaties and renouncing the privileges of extraterritoriality as applied to Japan.

Viscount Bryce, on his retirement in April, 1913, from the Ambassadorship at Washington, leaving a record of conspicuous success, did not return to England by the Atlantic route, but sailed from the Pacific coast and made an extended tour round the world. It was on that occasion that he made his only visit to Japan. At that time the negotiations protesting against the enactment of the so-called Land Act in the State Legislature of California were going on between the Washington Government and the Tokyo Government. Lord Bryce told one or two of our statesmen of his experience in the United States, and, if I am rightly informed, of his experience in connection with the complications arising out of the Panama Canal tolls. He said that sometimes in America popular feeling rises very high, that England can never go to war with America, and, so, nothing is left but to remain silent and patiently wait till the clamor subsides. He further added that it is an enviable feature of American conditions that meanwhile we never wait in vain for the arrival in due course of time of some one whose sense of justice and fair play leads to an amicable and equitable settlement of the complications which might at a certain stage or moment have appeared almost insuperable. An aspect of a somewhat similar feature of American mentality viewed from an entirely different angle seems to be embodied in the following lines to be found in his "American Commonwealth":

It is natural for them (the Americans) to believe in their star. And this sanguine temper makes them tolerant of

evils which they regard as transitory, removable as soon as time can be found to root them up.[1]

I have reason to believe that the experience of Lord Bryce laid at the disposal of our statesmen served as a useful reference and guide in urging them to steer the most conciliatory course possible through the troublous waters of the delicate California problem.

On the occasion of his visit to Japan, Lord Bryce had the intention of making a study of our municipal autonomy. The aggressive abruptness of the newspaper interviewers who met him immediately on his landing at Yokahama seems to have displeased him. This deplorable episode may partly account for his not having carried his intention into effect. This incident is so much the more to be regretted, as otherwise "Modern Democracies," published last year, one of his master-works, the fruit of many years' inquiry, travel, reflection, and experience, might have contained an illuminating chapter on the municipal self-government in Japan.

That Lord Bryce was a wonderfully keen observer whose sagacity penetrated deep below the surface, is attested by his address which he delivered in November, 1913, very soon after his return home from his tour through the Orient. In part, he said:

The thoughtful, earnest, and patriotic men in China and Japan felt the same truth which forced itself upon the attention of all who traveled through those countries, that what China and Japan wanted now in the period of transition—the disappearance of the old and the slowness of the emergence of the new—through which they were passing,

[1] Vol. II, p. 287 (1919 edition).

was a moral basis and foundation for their life. Some might have come to believe that that basis was to be found in Christianity; others might not be satisfied where it was to be found, but all felt that it was wanted.

Lastly, it may be mentioned that some of the pioneer law students which Japan sent to England in early days and which included among others N. (now Baron) Hozumi, the late Viscount G. Nagaoka and the late T. Okamura, attended the course of lectures on Roman law given by Lord Bryce at the Middle Temple. Viscount Bryce and Baron Hozumi met again in America on the occasion of the St. Louis Exposition of 1904. When Lord Bryce visited Japan in 1913, he was greatly disappointed in not being able to see Baron Hozumi, a foremost authority on jurisprudence in Japan and his one-time pupil, who was then seriously ill.

Reverting to Okuma and Yamagata, I have no idea of giving you biographies, however short, or even obituary notices of these men, which are to be found in a large number of printed publications, easily accessible to any one who takes interest in such matters. Suffice it to say that Marquis Okuma was born at Saga on February 16, 1838, and died at Tokyo on January 10, 1922, and that Prince Yamagata was born at Hagi, on April 22, 1838, and died at Odawara on February 1, 1922. Their remains lie near each other within the compound attached to the Gokokuji Temple at Otowa, Tokyo. The contrast apparent in the remains of the Prince resting beside those of the one man who exercised appreciable weight in political opposition to him in life and typified liberalism as opposed to the conservatism of the Prince is merely superficial. The two

men were after all one at heart, and had the common instinct and aspiration of serving their Emperor and their country, though following different courses of thought and action.

The actual progress of Japan in recent times may be fitly characterized as a compromise or average of the two different policies of Yamagata and Okuma, the one conservative and the other progressive. Let me now quote a few sentences from an article written by myself immediately after the Paris Peace Conference.

During the World War our ears were almost deafened by the exclamation "safe for democracy." The time has now arrived when we may profitably make a slight transposition and cry out "for safe democracy." It would not be superfluous at any rate to ponder over the misconstrued democracy which is flagrantly rampant, with no restrictions upon its own caprices and pervaded by *tammanic* corruption in full swing. At the same time that we think of liberty, equality and fraternity, we must not forget the possibility of arrogant liberty, undeserved equality and dissipated fraternity. We may also notice that the angels and demons of the multitude are very often the demons and angels respectively of the verdict of history and that the right and wrong of a cursory impression are not seldom the wrong and right of a matured judgment. Let us be clearly cognizant of the existence of some people who insist on paying no tax while enjoying all the benefit accruing therefrom, and of certain other people who will accept no service except by their own consent, thereby leaving the choice, pro or con, of their consent to the random instigation of what they call liberty. Finally, it may not be out of place to add, that, here and there, in a far-off corner of the globe, there are workmen who, having heard of the triumph of Labor at the Peace Conference, are now outrageously demanding wages without working.

I have to add that, in speaking of democracy, I had in mind not such a highly and wholesomely developed democracy as we see in the United States and Great Britain, but the fair average of the various democracies described in Bryce's work, not excluding those of Central and South America. Now I was most agreeably surprised to find my apprehensions anticipated by no less a person than Governor McCall of Massachusetts, the "Cradle of American Liberty." When President Wilson, in 1917, issued his world-famous cry, "Make the world safe for democracy," it was at once pointed out by the Governor that it was equally important to make *democracy safe for the world.* He pointed out that the great shortcoming of young men born and reared in a democratic country is in their lack of appreciation of the meaning and uses of obedience and the recognition of authority. I wish to add that what the Governor said is particularly true in a country like Japan, which is in a state of transition from constitutional government dominated by men reared under feudalism to the constitutionalism of ideal type. An idealism unaccompanied by counterbalancing discipline is a danger to mankind and a curse to humanity. Now, if Okuma be labeled "a safe world for democracy," Yamagata stood for "safe democracy for the world." Okuma was an idealist who sometimes showed symptoms of self-contradiction, while Yamagata was a firm believer in the strict discipline which is compatible with any form whatever of democracy. Such is the only difference; the lives of both had been devoted absolutely and unreservedly to their Emperor and his people, and it was very fortunate for modern Japan

to have had the two men differing in their views at the helm of national progress, enabling her to follow, after all, a middle course which is always the safest course.

The career of Okuma was in no small measure, though perhaps indirectly, influenced by his early contact with Dr. Guido Verbeck, a man without nationality. Verbeck was the trusted adviser, not only of the Japanese Government, but also of the Japanese people, in the early days of the Meiji era. His wise counsel was very often carried into effect through the medium of Okuma. Verbeck did more for Japan than is recorded in his biographies. I should have liked to say some more of him, but for fear of going too far astray, I have to give it up, though reluctantly.

With all its lack of coherence, the fecundity of Okuma's mind was marvelous. His wonderful memory, stored with facts and figures on the most varied subjects, made his conversation versatile and attractive, and adorned his innumerable orations, which he made whenever there was the slightest opportunity for speaking. On his favorite topics he had such a firm grasp of every detail that even experts wondered at his versatility. Viewed from a different angle, again, Okuma had a marvelous genius for swallowing and digesting whatever he heard from the miscellaneous variety of people who were constantly flocking around him, and in making whatever they told him his own theme for learned discourse. Failing such a theme, he was in the habit of pouring out fragments of reminiscence of his own long past, of which his audience had but meager means of verification. Although the scope of his discourse was as wide as the universe, he knew everything

in an indefinite and irresponsible way. There is no denying the fact that after all he was the most irrefutable man on this planet.

Okuma fancied that the people sincerely looked up to him, and he believed in his own ability to help them. He set himself to interpret Japan to herself and to the world at large. He stood up for his doctrine of the equal standing of the Oriental and Occidental civilizations and for his belief that Western civilization had no right to trample upon the civilization of the East. Okuma was often looked upon by men of nationalities other than his own as the champion of the cause of the East. It is true that his openness encouraged the tendency that all dreamy fancies, novel ideas, and discontented spirits should incline to seek refuge under his big *furoshiki* (cloth-wrapper) and should set him up as the hero of tumid outpourings and unfulfilled ambitions. But, contrary to all expectations, his advice to this category of men was singularly sound and wise. For instance, he never spoke ill or unkindly of the British rule in India, and he counseled his Indian visitors to work out their destiny under British guidance. Okuma's deep appreciation of America's ultimate sense of justice and fair play seems to have taken root in his contact with Townsend Harris, "the nation's friend," with whom he had so much to do in the early days of Japan's foreign intercourse. This may serve as an illustration of the proverbial truth that the impression which takes strong hold of one's mind during his juvenile days endures until he breathes his last. Despite certain chauvinistic-sounding remarks credited to him in his older days he

was at the core of his heart consistently a friend and admirer of the United States.

It may be observed in passing that during his lifetime the itinerary of foreign visitors habitually included a visit to Marquis Okuma side by side with visits to Nikko and Miyanoshita. They usually marveled at his sound common sense and the vast extent of his general knowledge. He had something to say on every subject, and they went away, to all appearances fully satisfied with hearing him and with the impression he made on them. But on their return to their temporary home, they might seek in vain for anything tangible, beyond what they already knew beforehand, except that they had seen the Grand Old Man of Waseda.

For all that may be said against him, Okuma was still a great figure in the public life of Japan. There are two achievements carried out by Okuma, which will be remembered as long as he is in the memory of the nation. The one is the fusion under the charm of his magnetic personality of various small political groups into the Kaishinto Party which may all in all be looked upon as the nucleus of the present Kenseikai Party led by Viscount Kato, who is generally looked upon as Okuma's successor in a broad sense, although Kato inherited the leadership of the party from Prince Katsura. The other achievement, which is by far the greater of the two is the founding of the Waseda University.

The great latent influence which Okuma had at his command through men educated at the Waseda University remained hidden from the superficial observer

until it was brought into the full light of day during his second tenure of the Premiership, which coincided with the outbreak of the World War. That he was able to lead his country with all the energy, enthusiasm, and hope of a young man of thirty, during that critical period of tense international strife, is largely due to the mighty potentiality generated and accumulated in the power-house of the Waseda University. Ever since its foundation, in 1882, the Waseda University has been turning out journalists year after year in great numbers. Among those who have or had anything to do with journalism both in the past and at present, there are more men who have passed through the gate of Waseda University than have gone through the course of any other institute of learning. Okuma dominated the press influence of Japan, and this influence is now transmitted to those who, in a broad sense, may be looked upon as his followers.

The greatest service which Okuma rendered his Sovereign and his country and one which outshines all other of his achievements is, however, his prompt decision in response to the call of honor and duty to the nation, which led to Japan's declaration of war against Germany. However hazardous this may have appeared at the moment of decision, viewed in the light of *faits accomplis*, certainly, it defies parallel in the whole course of Japanese history.

Okuma used to say that he would live to be one hundred and twenty-five, which is somewhat less than the one hundred and fifty of Wu Ting-fang,[1] at one

[1] Wu Ting-fang, born in 1842, died in his eightieth year a few days after this note was written, at Canton on June 22, 1922.

time Chinese Minister to the United States. So, at eighty-five Okuma was still forty years away from his goal. Although no one believed that his prophecy would turn out true, Okuma's "one hundred and twenty-five" coupled with his unabated activity and splendid optimism served as comfort and consolation to all those who passed far beyond the palmy days of manhood.

Okuma's name will live in the world's annals as one of the makers of modern Japan. The memory of his long and useful life is well perpetuated in the flourishing Waseda University, of which he was the president till his dying day. He has been an influence for good, the charm of his personality reaching out far beyond the limit of his native country.

I now turn to speak of Prince Yamagata, who guided and molded the forms of regenerated Japan as no other man did, excepting, perhaps, Prince Ito. For the last ten years or thereabouts Yamagata was the most potent subject in the realm, wielding an influence which has never been surpassed and will, most likely, never be surpassed. During the last decade or so, as the President of the Privy Council and the senior Genro, his figure towered above all others in the political world of Japan. At the same time he was the most misunderstood, not only by foreigners, but also by his own countrymen, of all the statesmen who are known as the makers of modern Japan. This misunderstanding is due partly to a cause embodied in the saying that a half-truth is very often more mischievous than a clear falsehood. For years Yamagata had been regarded by foreign writers as the representative *par excellence* of

Japanese militarism and the head of what they have often referred to as "Japan's black curtain government." This is a half-truth which should be carefully weighed and analyzed by constant reference to facts, in order to avoid misunderstanding. The other cause is to be found in the taciturnity and reticence, of which he was a typical representative, and which are the national inborn characteristics of the Japanese people, as will be explained more fully later on. It is well known to a select few, a fingers' count on one hand, and simple soldier." This was no more or less than like writing "yours most respectfully" at the end of a letter addressed to some one to whom the writer may not pay any particular respect. However, to an oversuspicious observer who is predisposed to see in Yamagata a crafty meddler in politics, all this would sound like a hollow mockery. In this respect, Yamagata is the most to be pitied of all his countrymen whose names are known beyond the confines of his own land. The world is apt to take Yamagata as militaristic in everything, inclusive of politics, as he started his career as a soldier. But the truth is, he was very far from that.

It was the aggressive militarism of the West, knocking roughly at the closed gates of a land which for nearly three centuries had minded her own business, that made a deep impression in the mind of young Yamagata, whose second name then was Kyosuke. In spite of this, paradoxical as it may sound on first hearing, Yamagata, viewed in an unbiased perspective, really devoted himself to the defense of his people against militarism. He advocated his system of conscription against the great opposition which insisted on

the far more militaristic system of the privileged professional fighting caste. That men raised by conscription proved more than a match for Saigo's *samurai* forces, in the civil war of 1877, may perhaps serve as a precedent for the contradiction of the anticipated superiority of the German army over the French in the late war. That such was the eventual result was no fault of Yamagata's. It is also a cause for regret that little attention has been given by the outside world to the great moral victory for peace that he won in controlling those who were infuriated at the intrusive European intervention on the occasion of the retrocession of the Liaotung Peninsula. Again, strenuous efforts were made by Yamagata in the cause of peace with the aim of avoiding a future armed conflict with Russia, on the occasion of his attending the coronation of Czar Nicholas II in March, 1896,—a function also attended by Li Hun Chun. Unfortunately the negotiations failed in spite of his unimpeachable motives and, after three months' stay in the Russian capital he returned home, bringing the Yamagata-Lobanoff convention, which was a very unsatisfactory instrument.

The first idea of the formation of the modern Japanese army may be traced to Yoshida Shoin, the famous patriot and great scholar of the closing days of the Tokugawa Shogunate, an account of whose interesting life has been made accessible to the English-speaking world through the pen of Robert Louis Stevenson. There is also a short story of this remarkable man to be found in J. Morris' "Makers of Modern Japan." Although Yamagata was one of his pupils only for a short while, Shoin's moral influence seems to have

made a lasting impression on the juvenile mind of his gifted pupil. The actual establishment of the modern Japanese army fell to the work of Masujiro Omura, whose bronze statue adorns the avenue leading to the Shokonsha shrine on the Kudan hill, and who is always regarded as the father of the Japanese army. After Omura fell a victim to an assassin in Tokyo, his position was taken up by Yamagata and his clansman Akiyoshi Yamada (afterwards Count Yamada). Yamagata's influence and popularity in the army were far inferior to those of Yamada, who was looked upon as the successor of the great Omura and fondly called in his day the "Little Napoleon." That Yamagata lived longer than most of his coworkers, accounts for his being put forward as if he were the sole founder of the Japanese army. The honor is shared by men like Yamada, General Kawakami, General Kodama, and very many others.

In military matters, Yamagata was an early and ardent admirer of France. Although he had subsequently to accede to the proposal, made by others, to adopt German models for the army, his faith in the efficiency of French arms survived to his last days. His sentiment was more or less known in the French army, and seems to have intensified Marshal Joffre's disappointment at not being able to see Prince Yamagata on account of his illness during the Marshal's visit to Japan in January, 1922.

In accrediting Yamagata with having been the pioneer advocate of popular government in Japan, we have to go back to 1869, when he went to Europe to investigate military, as well as political, institutions

abroad. His keen foresight led him on that occasion to the conviction that the popular government which is destined to come sooner or later in Japan must be based on the sound and rational development of municipal autonomy. What Heinrich Friedrich Karl Freiherr von Stein did for Prussia seems to have caught his appreciation and admiration. (This Stein is often confounded in Japan with another Stein, Professor Lorentz von Stein of the Vienna University, whom Ito consulted while he was occupying himself abroad in the comparative study of the constitutions of various European countries.) On his return home, Yamagata ordered the translation of Seeley's "Life of Stein" to be prepared which was published in 1887 and distributed among high government officials, men of learning and others. I have a copy of his translation, now extremely rare, an heirloom bequeathed by my father, who was at that time an official in the Department of Home Affairs. Yamagata constantly emphasized the importance of preparing a solid foundation on which popular government is to be built, just as in the case of building a house.

During the six years from 1883 to 1889, when he was Minister of Home Affairs, Yamagata devoted himself to the improvement and reform of local administration, the most notable achievement being the fulfillment of the local self-government system. It is due to Yamagata's energetic and daring efforts that, notwithstanding strong opposition raised by not a few influential men, both in official circles and among the general public, the great innovation of the establishment of municipal and suburban district self-govern-

ment was effected and put into force before the promulgation of the Constitution and the opening of the Imperial Diet.

As before observed, there seems to be no man who has so often and so glaringly been misunderstood as Yamagata. His modesty was often interpreted as hypocrisy. He was thoroughly consistent all through his life, and his consistency was regarded in the light of selfishness and egotism. It is said that he achieved most of his success through the willing toil of his loyal followers, who were prepared to stick to him through thick and thin. And on that account he was called astute and crafty. The second Yamagata Ministry entered into friendly relations with the Liberal party, the forerunners of the present Seiyukai, and by dint of compromise the Ministry was able to tide over a particularly pressing difficulty. Viewed from the standpoint of the present day, it can be seen that this was the only and inevitable course left open for any one placed in his position during the experimental period of the constitutional government. And yet not only was he blamed then but he is blamed even now for his act, which was alleged to have furnished an undesirable precedent. As Yamagata grew older and older, ever more was he made the object of hostile criticism both by his own countrymen and foreign observers. Where power resides, is the target for censure.

Not long before his death he was even charged with disloyalty. The only reply he deigned to make in response was a poem headed "A Firefly on the Water," the English rendering of which by an anonymous translator follows:

A firefly on its slender wings,
  Flitting about to gleam the night,
May meet its fate, struck down by cruel hand!
  But with the stream it floats alone,
Its glow cast o'er the water calm;
  The stream flows on and bears the gleaming dead.

In this poem loyalty is personified by a firefly, that may be crushed by slander but which will continue to glow even in death. Yamagata revered and loved the Emperor with the trembling veneration of the humblest subject and served his master with unqualified loyalty and absolute submission.

A shrewd observer once remarked that Yamagata certainly lacked the moral courage of Roosevelt, the idealism of Wilson and had just a little of the dexterity of Lloyd George; but he possessed more than all the stern sense of duty that made up Lord Kitchener's personality, and had as strong a nationalism as Clémenceau's. This description would, on the whole, give a vivid picture of what sort of man Yamagata was.

For some years before his death the dark spot in the recesses of his heart was the anxiety which he felt on the trend of the relations of the two countries facing each other across the Pacific. Yamagata addressed a public utterance to America last September (1921). This was the only occasion throughout his long life when he resorted to such a course. His utterance took the form of a letter addressed to Mr. Poultney Bigelow.

I have been watching with profound apprehension the trend of Japanese-American relations during the last few years. No honest publicist can deny that the two nations,

which should be on the best of terms, have been drifting apart. I have been so deeply concerned at this unhappy situation that I sometimes forget that I am living on borrowed years, and begin to entertain impossible wishes that I might cross the Pacific and certify myself to the American people what I believe to be the real motives and intentions of the Japanese nation. This I would hope might serve as a way of adding one small cornerstone to the foundations of an ample peace between Japan and America.

Some Americans seem to think that Japan is scheming in the hope of becoming a law unto herself. They seem to fancy that we are playing the rôle of overlord in the management of the affairs of the Far East. Japan entertains no such ambition, which is as quixotic as it is anachronistic. Our actions in Siberia and Shantung may give occasion for misinterpretation, but I feel that here time will tell that misunderstandings will be cleared away, and that the world will appreciate the fact that Japan has never entertained sinister ambitions in those quarters.

Had Yamagata lived a few months longer, he would have had the satisfaction and joy of feeling that all his anxieties had been dispelled, like a mist clearing up before the rising sun, through the happy result of the Washington Conference, and he could have passed away with his mind at ease.

I now return once more to the comparative study of Yamagata and Okuma. As regards the question of taciturnity versus garrulity, on one side, Yamagata was the representative of a large majority of the Japanese *intelligentsia*, while, on the other side, Okuma was an extremely rare exception, the like of which one seeks in vain throughout the length and breadth of the whole Empire. Besides, Yamagata was ever since 1865 almost continuously employed in positions of the

greatest responsibility, a circumstance which made it impossible to do much speaking even if he had tried to conquer his natural disposition. On the other hand, Okuma was popular because he was out of office most of time and so could assume the rôle of critic, attack the government and attract large audiences to his sonorous and high-flown oratory. Yamagata shrunk from exposing himself to the limelight of the public gaze, as the mole does from the light of day, while Okuma was ever ready to thrust himself forward, acting openly and blatantly and apparently with a view to aggressive self-advertisement. Yamagata was not exactly pessimistic, but he could not stand the least taint of failure or reproach cast on his deed or character. Okuma was esentially an optimist and he was not even afraid of making a mess of anything.

Okuma was seemingly brilliant and even showed flashes of genius, but he was essentially passive in the sphere of action. On the other hand, there was something approaching to mediocrity, not to be confounded with vulgarity, in the doings of Yamagata, but his action was prompted by complete singleness of purpose. Yamagata was a strenuous worker while the other was not entirely devoid of tendency to let things drift except on rare occasions. Yamagata stood for efficiency and for the achievement of tangible results. Okuma's mind was often volatile and readily turned from one thing to another. He is often said to have had a peculiar gift of absorbing all contradictions and irrelevancies and reducing them to a rhetorical harmony.

I should like to avoid the use of the cant terms "bureaucracy" and "democracy," but for want of any

suitable substitutes which I can think of, I shall have to make use of them. Lest it may lead to misunderstanding, I have to premise a brief explanation. Firstly, I believe that democracy based on majority votes is neither more nor less than the embodiment of a process which has for its avowed object the averaging of the will and inclination of the voters. If so, why not average the very conception of the various democracies themselves as they actually exist in different countries? Moreover, the party system seems to be an inevitable outcome of democracy on a large scale, and very often a party is dominated by an oligarchy which in some cases may not unfitly be regarded as a bureaucracy within a democracy. Such considerations would seem to show that every country may have a conception of democracy peculiar to itself. I have it in mind to devote a special lecture to the subject of democracy as seen from a Japanese point of view. In the next place, as to bureaucracy, I shall confine myself, for the present, to saying that bureaucracy, as it now exists in Japan, represents, in the main, the public opinion of the country and, paradoxical as it may sound, is less bureaucratic than would warrant the prejudice of outsiders. It may be added that among the influential members of the political parties there are by no means an inconsiderable number of men drawn from the camp of bureaucracy. After these remarks by way of caution, it might be said without risk of misunderstanding that Yamagata represented bureaucracy while Okuma stood for democracy.

Some may say that I have given too favorable an aspect of Yamagata's character and not so favorable a

view of Okuma's. Perchance it may be true, though, if so, it was unintentional. Even if it be true, however, it will at least have the passive merit of bringing nearer to the real truth the views of most foreign observers, who seem to have hitherto erred by going too far astray in the contrary direction.

The short account of the life of the late Premier Hara and the comparative study of the character and achievements of Marquis Okuma and Prince Yamagata which I have just given, is intended to serve as a prelude to my exposition of recent political developments in Japan, which will form the subject of my next lecture.

Lecture II

August 9, 1922

Ladies and Gentlemen:

I beg your pardon for asking you for a few minutes. I wish to be allowed to pay in the name of my country my humble tribute to the memory of Alexander Graham Bell, who, as you all know, died at Baddeck exactly a week ago. He came to Japan a few years after he invented what has since become one of our daily necessaries and is now known by the name of telephone. I had a talk with him of some precious ten minutes or so. He told me his pet idea of utilizing kite-flying for scientific as well as practical purposes. This idea, I believe, has since been made use of in very many ways and particularly in the field of modern aëronautics. He was a man so modest as to say that the developments in the annihilation of distance and space in the transmission of sound, whose latest product we see in the radio-amplifier here in this hall, is due to others rather than to himself. However brief I do wish to be, I feel bound not to omit saying that the humane side of his noble character manifested itself in his endeavor bequeathed by his distinguished father, Alexander Melville Bell of the University of Edinburgh, to mitigate the miseries of the deaf and mute. I wish

his remains rest covered with wreaths of gratitude which mankind owes to one of its greatest benefactors.

I now go on to my lecture proper on the recent political development of Japan.

The Recent Political Development of Japan

Before I go on to speak of the recent political development of Japan, I deem it desirable, if not necessary, to premise a certain consideration which would greatly facilitate the true understanding of what I have to say.

It is often said to those who are known to be predisposed to misunderstand some one: Put yourself in his place, try to see things as they might appear to him, and then, only then, you can form a correct and impartial view of his act. This is more easily said than done. Even with best intentions they are unconsciously prone to fall back to their original position subject to prejudice and misunderstanding. This is particularly true when they and he belong to different nationalities speaking different languages, living in dissimilar environments and possessing history and associations of totally different kinds. To think internationally is as difficult as to find men without nationality like Dr. Verbeck. Men are liable to become either pro or con. To think over anything with perfect composure, all the time taking care of becoming neither pro nor con, requires supreme efforts.

In the course of modern history, I believe there was a period, when in Occidental countries there reigned supreme the spirit of *not words but deeds.*

Secretary Denby, when on his arrival in Yokohama on July 2 last he was welcomed by what he called

glorious news that the Privy Council of Japan had passed the ratification of the last of the Washington treaties on the previous day, issued a message of good will in which he said: "Less of the flowers of speech and more of the fruits of labor are now the fashion." For me, it was comforting to be told two days prior to my own departure that the spirit of *not words but deeds* so picturesquely described by the Secretary of the Navy is now the fashion in the neighboring countries across the Pacific.

The growth of representative government seems to have necessitated a radical change in this respect. The tendency which necessitated speaking for the very sake of acting has been growing for many a generation in Western countries till the present day, when it has reached such a stage that all this is taken as a matter of course and no one even thinks of it. It seems to me that, in this respect, Westerners unwittingly go even so far as not to make any distinction between themselves and those who, in addition to the difference of racial characteristics, have not gone through their experience and gradual development of so many generations. I need not pretend to know how far the Western loquacity is the result of gradual growth forced by the necessity of circumstances and how far it is due to the natural disposition of racial origin. I know only that the long experience of popular government must have had significant influence, not only in stimulating political oratory and public speaking, but also in promoting the general tendency of pushing and exposing oneself to public view by either speaking or writing.

I wish to lay special emphasis upon a characteristic

which, I believe, is a unique possession of the Japanese people, and which, except in rare cases, seems to have hitherto escaped the notice of even those Westerners who are otherwise well informed about things Japanese and are often looked upon as authorities on matters pertaining to Japan, including among others, the editors of foreign newspapers published in Japan. Even among our own countrymen, there are some, though not many, who have had so much contact with Western loquacity that they have themselves become fond of talking, with the consequence of becoming unconsciously blind to the aspect of our national characteristics, which will be presently explained.

Just as silence may either mean consent or not, so silence may be due to absent-mindedness or it may cover deep meditation in the sense that still waters run deep, or, in the words of Shakespeare, "Smooth runs the water where the brook is deep." Now decided inclination to silence and stoical repugnance to talk, which may be called taciturnity in absence of any more suitable name, was a conspicuous trait of the Japanese people of pre-Constitution days.

With the world-wide tendencies, the mentality of the Japanese people as a whole has been passing through various stages and evolutions, ever since Japan came into contact with Western nations and particularly since the opening of the Diet in 1890. However, the traditional inertia in this subtle quality of the Japanese mind is far greater than the apparent Occidentalization in materialistic aspect may suggest to a casual observer. Changes in this respect have been necessarily slow. Perhaps we have reached that stage where we talk only

when there is a real pressing necessity and, even then, as little as possible. Hara of the days prior to his Premiership was a typical representative of this stage of Japanese taciturnity. The late Prince Yamagata, Prince Saionji, and Admiral Togo, each in a way peculiarly his own, represent various aspects of one and the same taciturnity. Perhaps the most typical representative who stands for an overwhelmingly large silent majority of the Japanese *intelligentsia,* is Admiral Baron Kato, Japan's chief delegate to the Washington Conference, who, I believe, is now well known in the United States. Mr. Okazaki, often called the brain of the Seiyukai, the largest majority party; Mr. Adachi, the pillar of the Kenseikai, the party second in size, and Mr. Kojima, who personifies the wisdom of the Kokuminto, are all men of silence. The first and last have never spoken a word and the other spoke only once in the Diet during their long parliamentary careers. Viscount Hamao, honorary LL.D. of Cambridge University, now vice-president of the Privy Council, and Baron Yamakawa, a Yale man, are the two men to whom Japan owes most for the development of her higher education. The former has never spoken in public and the latter very rarely. Such examples may be multiplied to any extent. Suffice it to say that the progress and destiny of Japan are being worked out mostly by men of silence, many of whose names remain unknown to the outside world. A conspicuous, and in a certain sense solitary, exception is Marquis Okuma, who, in spite of his great services, might have possibly done a harm to his country by giving a false impression to his foreign visitors and

interviewers, as if there were many talkative men like himself in Japan.

In Western countries, too, there are men of few words. I know that there are men of taciturnity in America. When Lord Bryce said: "But the Congress has not enough either of that high statesmanship which only the few attain, or of those sensible men, mostly silent, who listen with open yet critical minds, and reach sound conclusions upon arguments presented," [1] he was evidently thinking of such men in the legislative body of the United States. Broadly speaking, however, I believe, in Western countries men of few words are exceptions, while in Japan men of many words are extremely rare exceptions. Men who are wont to speak promiscuously and write profusely, though they form only a small minority, stand prominently in the eyes of those Westerners who are endeavoring to know and understand Japan but whose judgment is handicapped by their preconception of pushing these men on the same level as men of a similar category in their own countries. In Japan, so far, these men have had but little influence upon the doings of Japan as a nation. They are only exercising some influence upon a certain group of the younger generation. Although no one can prophesy what the future has in store, at any rate, to this day there dominates the spirit which scorns talkativeness and, particularly, that which underlies intense self-advertisement and unrepentant irrepressibleness.

With the growth of representative institutions, changes in this respect are going on in Japan just as

[1] "Modern Democracies," Vol. II, p. 55.

was the case in Occidental countries of bygone days, but the change, or metamorphosis, from taciturnity to garrulity in the national characteristics of a country obviously cannot take place by leaps and bounds. Whether Japan would ever overtake Western countries in loquacity or, her taciturnity being deep-rooted in the inherent racial characteristic, the transition to loquacity can never pass a certain limit, is an open question, which I shall not dare to discuss. In any case, the major part of the constructive work of modern Japan has been done thus far, and is being still done, by men of deeds and not by men of words. That a man of few words, like Admiral Kato, was called to the Premiership but recently, that he, in becoming Premier, sacrificed his own inclination in response to the nation's call and that this choice, in spite of dissentient voices in some quarter, is on the whole hailed as a wise one in our country as well as abroad, is an eloquent testimony to what I have been trying to explain. The dogged, obdurate, and aggressive perseverence on the part of foreign critics who unconsciously insist on things happening in Japan in precisely the same manner as these things would happen in their own countries, is not conducive to the true understanding of things Japanese. To make people talk, who do not like to talk, is as tyrannical as to force men bent on a hunger strike to eat. Foreign critics are perfectly at liberty to dislike or even blame Japanese taciturnity. Moreover, changes in this respect will come by and by. But for the present, there it is, and, whether they like it or not, it cannot be driven out from the mental attitude of the Japanese people. These considerations

should not be lost sight of in following the course of political development in Japan.

This characteristic of the Japanese people seems to have been revealed to the keen insight of Roosevelt, to whom Japan owes unbounded and unqualified gratitude for all he did for her. Soon after the conclusion of the Portsmouth peace negotiations, Roosevelt wrote in a private letter:

> I am bound to say that the Japs have impressed me most favorably, not only during these three months but during the four years I have been president. They have always told the truth. They are a very *secretive* people, and I speedily learned that I must never read into anything they said one word more than was actually down in black and white; but so far, whenever they have actually committed themselves I have been able to count absolutely on their doing what they said they would.

It is interesting to observe that what I have been in the habit of calling taciturnity is no more or less than what he calls secretiveness, thus illustrating in a most striking manner the difference of the angles from which one and the same mental characteristic is viewed.

Taciturnity, which is the quintessence of our national character, should not be confounded with secrecy and, particularly, with that kind of secrecy which is a cover for something evil. Secrecy which underlies the motive of an anonymous donation for public good is ennobling and is yet intentional. Secrecy which covered the doings of the Philadelphia Convention for half a century until the publication of Madison's Journal at the express wish of its author, the "Father of the Constitution," was wholesome but intentional.

Secrecy which was vigilantly kept till the last minute for Secretary Hughes' drastic proposal contributed in no small measure to the success of the Washington Conference. Nevertheless it was again intentional. Now, if taciturnity has anything to do with secrecy, that secrecy is spontaneous and absolutely unintentional.

Taciturnity, perhaps not absolute, but as long as there does not occur dire necessity for breaking it, which lies so deeply imbedded in the national traits of the Japanese people, is mainly due to self-denial in the most sacred sense, vying with the spirit and fate of one who paid supreme sacrifice for his country and can speak no more. It is the spontaneous resultant of absolute sincerity and singleness of purpose and overwhelming sense of duty which makes complete sacrifice of personal consideration unintentionally a real pleasure. In spite of all apparent incongruities, incompatibilities and absurdities, this national characteristic of the Japanese people still reigns supreme, and any one who wishes to prognosticate the future national policy of Japan should take due cognizance of this unique and precious characteristic. If any foreigner has doubt on this point, let him be reminded of the puzzle which the foreign war correspondents who accompanied the Japanese army in the Russo-Japanese War were unable to solve. "Why! The Japanese are making history and they seem not to wish their brilliant achievements made known to the outside world!" An ideal Japanese wishes, and is ever ready, to do anything good for his country. Once that something good has been done, he wishes not to take slightest care of

who has done it, and hopes that such a question may be blown off to the wind of oblivion. At this juncture it would be hardly necessary to comment that I am discoursing, so to speak, academically or theoretically. As a matter of course, in the present day there are, among my countrymen, but a few—some might say none—who come up to this brave ideal.

It is on such an occasion as during the Russo-Japanese War that the national characteristic manifests itself in its most naked aspect. I have every reason for believing that taciturnity due to self-denial and utter indifference, but not contempt, for reward or compensation, which we inherited from our fathers and forefathers, was then intact. In a short time of less than two decades since the Peace Treaty of Portsmouth, even taking into due account the intervening of the World War, no great change which permeates the whole mass of the Japanese people could possibly have taken place in such a subtle matter. Nevertheless, it is a fact not to be denied, that, meanwhile, sensational and irresponsible publications of all sorts and kinds which disturb the mind of the reader without instructing have multiplied to an amazing degree; but their hold upon the intellectual majority of the Japanese people is fortunately not so great as foreign observers are apt to believe. This consideration would explain many enigmas pertaining to Japan, which appear so puzzling and paradoxical to those who become cognizant of such publications through fragmentary translations in foreign dailies published in Japan.

In Japan we seek in vain for prominent men who, as in England, are wont to write letters to the news-

paper. Men who do this belong mostly to that category which is usually designated by the name of newspaper heroes.

On the other hand, there are some prominent men who are not averse to confiding their views to an interviewer, but the circle of such men is as yet comparatively small, although there has lately been a marked tendency to the gradual widening of this circle. The mentality of the average reader of newspapers, which is prone to fancying that a statement is true because he has seen it in print, is perhaps more marked in Japan than elsewhere. Men who have the nation's welfare at heart are being alarmed by, and are feeling grave anxiety for, the abnormal influence which the press and the seasonal playing-to-the-gallery publications are exercising upon the credulous mind of the public. It is this anxiety which is knocking at the half-opened door of taciturnity, just as Commodore Perry was knocking at the closed door of feudal Japan some seventy-odd years ago.

Craving your indulgence for having detained you so long on introductory considerations, I now pass on to the main topic of this lecture. Although it is a matter beyond all telling, I cannot do better than begin with giving the Charter Oath of 1868, as, to this day, it is frequently referred to. On March 14 (lunar calendar) of the year 1868, Emperor Meiji swore the following oath at the sanctuary dedicated to the worship of his Imperial ancestors:

1. Deliberative assemblies shall be established and all measures of government decided in accordance with public opinion.

2. All classes, high and low, shall unite in vigorously carrying out the affairs of state.

3. All common people, no less than the civil and the military officials, shall be allowed to fulfill their just desires, so that there may not be any discontent among them.

4. All the absurd usages of old should be broken through, and the equity and justice to be found in the workings of nature shall serve as the basis of action.

5. *Wisdom and knowledge shall be sought throughout the world* for the purpose of promoting the welfare of the Empire.

In giving the above English translation of the memorable oath which is sometimes known as the "Coronation Oath," but more commonly called the "Imperial Oath of the Five Articles," I have tried to do my best to be true to the literal wording of the original as far as it seemed to me at all possible without making its meaning obscure to those who have not access to the original. Wherefore I made a comparative study of various English translations by Baron N. Hozumi, Mr. T. Miyaoka, and others.

An English translation made by Baron D. Kikuchi and followed by Baron N. Hozumi of the epilogue to this oath follows:

> Desiring to carry out a reform without parallel in the annals of Our country, We Ourselves here take the initiative and swear to the Deities of Heaven and Earth to adapt these fundamental principles of national government, so as to establish thereby the security and prosperity of the people. We call upon you all to make combined and strenuous efforts to carry them out.

That this oath came to occupy an important place in political appreciation, and to be interpreted as a promise of a national assembly, is a matter of common

knowledge. Thus, paradoxical as it may seem, the democratization of Japan commenced with the Throne as the center of the movement.

In passing, it may be observed that from December 3, 1872, of the lunar calendar, which was January 1, 1873, Japan adopted the Gregorian calendar, so that the days and the months of dates usually given prior to that day are those of the lunar calendar.

It was in 1874, the year following the split of men in power over the Korean question, that the regular constitutional movement first made its appearance in Japan. The second landmark on the path toward constitutional monarchy is the Imperial Edict of April 14, 1875, known as the Edict of Constitutional Government, by which a Senate was organized for legislative purposes, the members of which were appointed by the Emperor. The third and the definite step was taken by the Proclamation on October 12, 1881, in which the Emperor declared that he would call a national assembly in 1890, and that he would himself determine its organization and make the result public in due course of time.

In 1882, Ito was sent to Europe on a special mission to study the constitutions of different states, and to investigate their practical working. On his return, a commission was appointed to make a draft of the Constitution and subsidiary laws under his presidency. This draft was submitted to the Privy Council, first organized in 1880, and finally received the approval of the Emperor. On February 11, 1889, which, according to the "Chronicles," happened to be the two thousand five hundred forty-ninth anniversary of the coro-

nation of the first Emperor, Jimmu, a day kept as an annual national holiday, the Constitution was promulgated amid signs of universal rejoicing. The political developments which followed during a period covering a little more than two decades from this date to the demise of Emperor Meiji in 1912, have been told by several able writers in a far more judicious form and attractive style than I could ever do. The course before me is perfectly clear. I shall simply leave them out altogether.

The eleventh of February of the year 1889, when the Constitution was promulgated, is still vivid in my memory as if it were but yesterday. I was among a group of the students of the Imperial University of Tokyo, who lined one side of the road through which the Emperor was to pass in state. While waiting there, we were shocked by the news of the assassination of Viscount Mori, then Minister of Education, who was Japan's first diplomatic representative at Washington from 1870 to 1873 during the Administration of President Grant, and who published, while in Washington, a book written in English entitled: "Life and Resources in America." As Minister of Education, Mori was at that time insisting on abruptly raising the university tuition fee, from a merely nominal amount to 100 yen, while an agitation strongly opposing this measure was going on among the students of the Imperial University of Tokyo. So the first impression produced by the shock was that the horrid deed might have been perpetrated by one of those turbulent students. Very soon, however, it turned up that the assassin was a religious fanatic.

An English translation by Miyoji Ito (now Viscount Ito) of Prince Ito's "Commentaries on the Constitution of the Empire" was published in the same year as the promulgation of the Constitution. It has been often said of Japan's Constitution that it is elastic so as to develop from a very conservative constitutional monarchy to a very liberal one, without necessitating a change in the wording of the Constitution itself. Inded, such is actually the case. Our Constitution is a very concise document, expressed in very general terms which are subject to interpretations. The theory and the letter of the Constitution give the Throne a prerogative which may look to an outsider like autocratic power. Nevertheless, the Japanese conception of rulership has never involved personal intervention in the government. Even in pre-Constitution days, the Emperors of Japan have never been autocratic monarchs. In the whole history of Japan since time immemorial, it does not appear that the exercise of personal authority has ever been claimed by, or for, the Throne. Truly, Japan has been in a certain aspect and in a certain sense democratic even since primitive times.

Whatever may be the wording of the Constitution, the accumulative traditions of the long past have caused the sovereignty of Japan in its modernized form to approximate more closely to the English constitutional monarchy than to anything else. Both monarchs stand aside from the actual work of government. Both of them are the symbol of national unity —the link that keeps the oneness of the whole nation. In both of them, the foundation of the Throne is the will of the people. Both of them are symbolical of

the complete identification with the people's interest echoed by the peerless loyal affection of the nation. Both of them, in spite of the heroic achievements of their armies and navies, stand for peace and humanity. Both of them have the point in common that nothing concerning mankind is alien to their sympathy. The Emperor of Japan reigns but does not rule, just as the King of England reigns but does not rule.

To be more concrete, the English constitutional principle that the "King can do no wrong" finds its parallel in a somewhat sterner form in Article 3 of the Constitution, which says the "Emperor is sacred and inviolable." Much comment has been heaped upon Article 55, which says:

> The respective Ministers of State shall give their advice to the Emperor, and be responsible for it.
>
> All laws, Imperial Ordinances, and Imperial Rescript of whatever kind that relate to the affairs of State require the counter-signature of a Minister of State.

For all the acts of the Government, the Ministers of State are responsible and the responsibility remains there and goes nowhere else. This is perfectly clear, but as to whom the Ministers of State are held accountable the Constitution is as silent as a sphinx. It is true that thus far it has been maintained in practice that the responsibility of the Ministers of State is one owing to the Sovereign and not to the Diet. However, the most vital consideration is that on this point the Constitution is as void and blank as white paper.

No doubt many things were thought and said at the council table when the draft of the Constitution was examined, discussed, and finally adopted. Whether the

proceedings and debates of this council will ever come to light or whether its historiography is preserved somewhere to be published like "Madison's Journal" at some future date, defies my imagination. Perhaps the Article in question is more significant for what it does not say than for what it says explicitly. In this connection, I cannot help recalling what I heard many a year ago, that the possible omission of the word "thereof" at the end of the last article of the ten original amendments to the Constitution of the United States seems significant. It may be added that I was told on that occasion that the exact location of the sovereignty in the system of the United States is still a question possessing a margin of mooting.

The transition of Japan from an absolute monarchy which emerged from feudalism only a comparatively short time ago to a constitutional form of monarchy was as a matter of course attended by many dangers and difficulties. In view of the probability, if not certainty, of the acute internal political struggle at the initial stage of the constitutional development of Japan, I believe, we are only doing justice to those who contributed most toward the framing of the Constitution if we support the view that the first paragraph of Article 55 was purposely left a political Sphinx. Some of the changes of the form of government which arose from the ruin wrought by the World War are but reminders of a political wisdom which the world has known for ages. No vital change in the form of government can take place without risking the demolition of the reign of law. There is always a hazard of the people running out of their own control in

the rapture of new-fangled liberty and in the ecstasy of a newly vested power. Indeed, it seems conceivable that those wise statesmen who were responsible for drafting the Constitution purposely left some things unsaid with the firm conviction that the Japanese nation, in its wisdom and in its own time, will solve its constitutional problems in a manner best suiting the requirements of the age and to its aptitude which would develop itself with the accumulation of experiences.

Without any change whatsoever in the wording of the Constitution, it is quite possible that the Ministers of State, collectively called the Cabinet, according to the usage, become responsible to the Diet, at least in substance, even if not in name and form. And I believe such will take place as soon as the Diet shall prove itself worthy of truly representing the will of the nation. In this respect we are still living in the days of transition. How the Constitution is working during this period of transition cannot be told in a summary way. The only completely satisfactory answer to this query is the whole course of the political development in Japan, which forbids abridgment. In form, the Cabinet Ministers are responsible to the Sovereign. The Sovereign can do no wrong. To raise the Throne ever higher, far above the level of practical politics and political struggles is the will, as one man, of the whole people.

In giving an account of the recent political development in Japan, I take for my starting point the demise of Emperor Meiji. On July 30, 1912, our beloved Sovereign, whose personal name was Mutsuhito, passed

away in his sixtieth year. His Majesty witnessed greater changes and saw greater progress made in his Island Empire than any other ruler in any other land within a similar period. He had seen his realm rise from comparative unimportance at a bound to the front rank of States, to be counted as one of the Great Powers of the world. Throughout the whole process of evolution and progress, his Majesty, as Father of his people, guided it aright and will be remembered by posterity as the most farsighted monarch that has ever ruled the destinies of the Empire.

Yet never was a great sovereign more scrupulous in the practice of dignified self-effacement. His Majesty possessed a marvelous insight of judging character, and where his confidence had once been given, occasion to recall it never occurred. At the time when a council of his most trusted statesmen, headed by Prince Ito, were engaged in drafting the Constitution, his Majesty never absented himself from so much as one meeting. Day by day he attended the long conferences, not suffering himself to be deterred even by the death of his three-year-old son. This question of a constitutional system and its practical results caused his Majesty profound concern. The Constitution was his Majesty's great gift to his people, and though he seems to have thought little of thus divesting himself of an important part of his prerogatives, he may well have had anxiety as to whether such a signal innovation would inure to the nation's benefit. Thus his Majesty awaited the issue of the first session of the Diet with deep concern; yet, when it ended satisfactorily, his impulse was, not to congratulate himself,

but to recall the memory of the statesmen who had died before the consummation of their work, to conjecture how deep would have been their joy had they lived to witness the final outcome and to order that the facts should be announced at their graves. The constant care which his Majesty bestowed on the welfare of his people is well illustrated by one of his verses which runs:

> When I look into the ancient writings,
> The only thing to which my thoughts ever turn
> Is, How fares the nation that I rule?

His Majesty's stern sense of duty seems to have contributed to his inborn strong personality which reflected itself in the nervousness which the ablest of his Ministers is said to have felt in the presence of their august Master. There is an amusing current story, the accuracy of which, however, I cannot vouchsafe. Marquis Matsukata is said to have been used to saying to his Majesty: "I will have careful investigation made." On a certain occasion, his Majesty, after giving the Marquis instructions, asked him: "How many children have you in all, Marquis?" to which came the prompt reply: "I will have careful investigation made, your Majesty," which is said to have caused His Majesty intense amusement.

It was during my brief sojourn in London in the summer of 1912, that the report informing of the serious illness of his Majesty which was instantly followed by the saddest of all news, was transmitted by telegraph to the furtherest extremities of the globe. Far away from one's home land, shocked by the greatest calamity that could befall his fatherland, every one

of the small Japanese community then in London felt as if an overhanging ceiling was about to come down to crush his poor self. One comfort was, however, that we were far removed from the influence of the intense excitement which, as we were told afterward, prevailed throughout the length and breadth of the Empire, so that we were, comparatively speaking, more able to think over the future of Japan, now that the greatest pillar which supported her during her most critical days was gone forever.

In the melancholy solitude within the very heart of noisy London, I set myself to ponder over Japan's future just as many placed in such a predicament as mine might have done. It seemed highly probable that, due to the force of inertia, things would continue for a few years to go on as heretofore. At that time I had no idea of the world's greatest conflagration which was fated to burst out only two years thence. Nor was I disposed to think of the remote future, of which one may think in any vein and can say anything he likes. The points on which I interrogated myself had reference mostly to the decade under review and its immediate sequel.

The conditions then existing in Japan, if compared with those of half a century ago, show a transformation that is no doubt very conspicuous; but if they are compared with those obtaining, for example, in England where I was, or in America, through which I passed on my way home, I could not help feeling that Japan had still a long way to go before she reached the level of the most up-to-date nations in the West, which level itself does not remain stationary but is ever mov-

ing onward. At the same time I was fully conscious of the stern fact that Japan's ultimate success or failure as a nation will be measured by her ability to retain the best of her old traditions unchanged beneath the innovations she introduces from the West. It was clear from the outset that the problems which the new era of Taisho was to face would be far more difficult and dangerous than those which were tackled so resolutely and so successfully in the era of Meiji.

Looking back a little into the past, many sweet and benignant ideals have been mercilessly trampled under foot, and the fragrance and simplicity of Japanese life and spirit, so eloquently sung by Motoori,

> Lo! The Yamato spirit of beloved Nippon!
> In response to strangers' query,
> Glittering with rays of the rising sun,
> Blows the cherry wild in full glory,[1]

seemed to have gone forever. The old habits of thrift and sobriety were weakening under the seduction of an apparent prosperity and, worst of all, the old ideals of devotion and self-denial seemed to be on the decline in the chase for wealth and ease. Naturally I was, then, in a mood to see things rather pessimistically. That was one consolation. The other consolation was

[1] In this English translation, I followed the literal wording of the original. The following translation by an English friend of mine might make the meaning of the verse clearer:

> The Yamato Spirit, O querist,
> Come hither from over the sea
> To Nippon, the brightest and dearest,
> How shall I describe it to thee?
> 'Tis the fragrance the sun breathes at rising,
> When in its wild glory full blown,
> The cherry, by no man's devising,
> Its gifts to the breezes has thrown.

that the inner mind of mankind is, after all, not so swiftly transformed as external appearances might suggest. Taciturnity, of which I have spoken at length, might furnish an illustrative example.

There is no doubt that the strong personality of the Emperor Meiji was the guiding spirit which enabled Japan to retain the moral discipline embodying the spirit of patriotism, of unity, of devotion to the Throne, the country, and the family. Now that this guiding spirit has been taken away by the will of Providence, what will happen to Japan? Will the wholesome evolution of the past continue into the future? What of the evolution of the spirit of Japan? Is not something slipping away from the foundation of Japanese character? With the passing of the old culture, is not there a risk of the old moral discipline relaxing? Is not the younger generation deteriorating under the impact of new and unaccustomed ideas submerged beneath a flood of Western literature which declaims much about rights and speaks little of duties? Is there no fear of the mind of the Japanese people plunging into a whirlpool of thought which undermines the traditional ideas of chivalric conduct? Is there no danger of the wholesome development of Japan's political institutions which was so dear to the innermost heart of his Majesty suffering a check by his untimely death? Will statesmen turn up who are equal to the herculean task of building a foundation for strong conviction and high ideals which assure victory from within? A thousand and one questions like these presented themselves to my bewildered mind. One thing, however, seemed to me certain at the time, and that was, with the death of

Emperor Meiji, an era having a peculiarity of its own had passed away in fact as well as in name.

In speaking of the recent political development in Japan, as I have already said before I have no idea of going back into the Meiji era. However, I wish to be allowed to say just a few words about Prince Ito, because, as it seems to me, some writers on the subject have scarcely done justice to Ito's great services rendered to his country. It is even amusing to find Ito blamed for introducing a bureaucracy into Japan at the instigation of Prince Bismarck. Ito was the man who knew his countrymen best, and he saw that they were not yet ripe for a full enjoyment of self-government. Ito was for steady and wholesome progress. The nation's welfare in the long run was his ultimate object. It cannot be helped that there are some men who are ever wont hastily to immerse themselves in all the confidence of half-instructed ignorance, and are rashly ready to give forth second-hand platitudes about the sovereignty of the people and like phrases culled from Western authors. Their shallow sophistries will, however, disappear like a mist before the rising sun, while Prince Ito's immortal work remains and will be appreciated ever more as years roll by.

A notable incident within the interval between the demise of his Majesty the Emperor Meiji and the outbreak of the World War is the death of Prince Taro Katsura, which occurred in October, 1913. As a man who can justly claim credit for the two greatest events in the history of modern Japan, namely, the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the war with Russia, Katsura had more than enough of the background

which would have pushed him into the rank of Genro, or so-called "Elder Statesmen," had he lived longer. It may be observed that Katsura, born in 1847, was nine years younger than Yamagata or Okuma. Thus Katsura's comparatively premature death has an important bearing on the question of whether or not that peculiar institution called the Council of Genro, of which I shall have to speak later on, will continue to exist.

Katsura visited St. Petersburg in 1912, and though not entrusted with any official mission, he had conversations with Russian statesmen on an understanding between Russia and Japan with regard to their respective interests in the regions where the two countries had been brought into contact. From St. Petersburg his tour was to have extended to other European capitals, and especially to London, where he was particularly anxious to make the personal acquaintance of leading British statesmen. At that time I was in London, and my collegemate Viscount Kato who was fated to become afterwards Katsura's successor as a party leader, was the Japanese Ambassador to the Court of St. James. We were expecting Katsura's coming to London when we received the news of the death of the Emperor. Katsura was obliged to return to Japan direct from St. Petersburg.

Katsura's short-lived third Ministry, which lasted only two months, from December, 1912, to February, 1913, was marked by an incident which merits our profound meditation. In the past, during his first Ministry, from June, 1901, to January, 1906, and during his second Ministry, from July, 1908, to August, 1911,

he was used to going on a wind recalling smooth sailing through the Inland Sea. In contradiction of the saying that things which happen twice occur for the third time, his third Ministry was beset with almost insuperable difficulties. To Katsura himself, he might have appeared supreme and majestic as of yore, then and ever onward without end to eternity. But that was not to be. In the last resort, he had to have recourse to a certain fatal act which showed a slight tinge of something not in accord with the nation's strongest and most precious will of the elevation of the Throne high above the horizon of practical politics and political strife. In this instance, not only the press but also the taciturn majority, in whose heart lies the nation's lasting welfare, rose as one man in denouncing Katsura's conduct, which led to the speedy overthrow of the Ministry. The amnesic press might pass over but the taciturn majority would never forgive such an act. And although Katsura might have not seen the cause of his downfall in its true significance, it seems highly probable, if not certain, that his chance of retaking to active politics had been sealed forever, even if he had lived longer.

The formation of a political party, or perhaps it would be more appropriate to say, the amalgamation of various political elements, under the leadership of Katsura, took place in February, 1913. Katsura died without seeing the bright days of his party which were reserved for Okuma. The party consisted at first of 93 members of the Lower House and was called the *Doshikai.* The party emerged out of the twelfth general election held in March, 1915, with 151 members,

which, as may be observed, was a big leap. In the following year, that is, in November, 1916, the party was augmented by a certain number drawn from sundry organizations, and the name of the party was changed to the present one, namely, the Kenseikai. As the result of the thirteenth general election of April, 1917, the numerical strength of the party was reduced to 117, which was further diminished to 108 by the fourteenth general election of May, 1920.

Although the Kenseikai, the present Opposition party, was founded by Katsura, and, ever since his death, has been under the able leadership of Viscount Kato, and albeit Okuma had throughout no formal connection with the party, it requires no extraordinary sagacity to perceive beneath the surface of name and form, that the party was indirectly under the leadership of Okuma as long as he lived. Most of the members of the party had some connection or other with Okuma, and it was only natural that they looked up to Okuma in the hour of urgency. Due to the circumstances explained in my previous lecture, Okuma was the lucky man who captivated the press influence in Japan under his enchanting spell, and this influence was transfused to the party of which he was the spiritual leader. This fact should be carefully borne in mind in order to shield oneself against a possible illusory impression which the big letter headings in the daily press might make on an unguarded mind, in understanding the real nature of the political development in Japan.

Katsura's ephemeral Ministry was succeeded by that headed by Admiral Gonbei Yamamoto and included,

among others, Hara and Matsuda, the heart and soul of the Seiyukai, which lasted from February, 1913, to April, 1914. In a letter written by Roosevelt to Secretary Root on July 13, 1907, there is a brief reference to Yamamoto. It says in part: "Aoki and Admiral Yamamoto were out here (Oyster Bay) yesterday at lunch. Yamamoto, an ex-Cabinet Minister and a man of importance, evidently had completely misunderstood the situation here and what the possibilities were. I had a long talk with him through an interpreter." Then follows an account of the conversation which took place between Roosevelt and Yamamoto, and which is closed by the remark: "How much impression I made upon him I cannot say." This incident occurred about six years before Yamamoto became the Premier.

The Yamamoto Ministry, which lasted a little over one year, left no mark worth noticing in the history of the political development, except the ignominious cause of its abrupt downfall, which is sometimes called the "Navy Scandal," but more commonly known by the name of "Siemens' affair." Whenever I am reminded of Siemens' affair, I cannot help recalling Andrew M. Pooley, the editor of the interesting publication "The Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi," published in 1915. Concerning him, with whom an unexpected chance led me to exchange a few words at Reuter's Tokyo office, I wish to be allowed to make a few observations. He came to Japan as Reuter's correspondent and stayed in Tokyo only a short time. He left Tokyo abruptly owing to an incident connected with Siemens' affair, which was to be regretted for the

sake of his honor. The unfortunate circumstances which led to his abrupt departure from Japan are responsible for the assertion that he is a man who can never err on the side of leniency in speaking of Japan and the Japanese people. That his feeling towards Japan and the Japanese is invariably critical, often hostile, and not seldom venomous, was only to be expected. His book, "Japan at the Cross Roads," is a masterpiece of outburst into virulent ill-feeling. The consensus of opinion among all the thoughtful Japanese regrets that the memoirs of the amiable Count should have been edited by a man of diametrically opposite disposition, fearfully hostile to Japan. Our regret is, however, at least partially compensated for by the comfort and satisfaction we feel in noticing that the invidiously revengeful personality of this profuse writer is not entirely unknown in his home country. The London *Morning Post,* in reviewing Mr. Pooley's third book on Japanese affairs entitled "Japan's Foreign Policies," said:

> His bitter and at times virulent attacks on Japan—it is surely going rather far to warn the West that Japan may use assassination as a weapon of diplomatic procedure—will meet with considerable criticism here.

The reason why I have allowed myself to dilate on a topic which has no direct connection with the subject of the lecture is because of the acute pain we, living farthest from the center of Western civilization, particularly feel on seeing such a man among those whose business it is to inform the West of our doings and on whom the unguarded public of the West reposes implicit confidence.

The outbreak of the World War found Japan under the Premiership of Okuma, whose Ministry took office about four months earlier, on April 16, 1914. That Okuma did the most signal service to his country by unhesitatingly declaring war against Germany, that he stood for avowed democratic spirit in apparent contrast to Yamagata's bureaucratic mood, and that the latent power silently brought up and accumulated in the nursery of the Waseda University came to his assistance in the hour of need, have been already told.

One thing may be here mentioned once for all, and that is the fact that the Government has no control over the Japanese press. Even keeping in view the truth of the adage that prepossessed suspicion will raise phantoms, I am totally at sea to know why so much to the contrary has been said and written by foreign tourist-writers. Publication of matters, such as the details of the preliminary examination of a criminal case before the case comes up for public trial, the proceedings of law cases which are heard in camera, and the like are not allowed, but the censorship is strictly confined to the limit prescribed by public welfare. Even in time of emergency, the censorship in Japan never exceeded the limit which we saw in the Allied countries during the World War. The best proof of the nonexistence of the government control of the press is the invariably hostile attitude of the Japanese press against any Ministry whatever, except perhaps the Okuma Ministry now under review. However, even in this case of the Okuma Ministry, the friendly attitude of the press was due not to control but to spontaneous genuine sympathy born of the

causes explained in my previous lecture and of Okuma's magnetic personality which seems to have had a miraculous charm, particularly for the press circle.

As has been said, March of 1915 saw a general election, in which Okuma won against the Seiyukai, the party then in opposition. Seen in the historical perspective, this was the moment when the Kenseikai was at the zenith of its power, giving an appearance as if its influence almost swept the country. The prospect of Okuma at that instant was a smooth sailing at least for some time to come, but fate decreed that it should be otherwise. About five months later, the Home Minister, Viscount Oura was found to have resorted to flagrant bribery to secure the passage, in the preceding session of the Diet, of a bill which had for its object the addition of two divisions to the army. The question arose as to whether the responsibility rests solely with the particular Minister accountable for the deed or whether the Ministry *en bloc* should be held responsible. The storm was, however, somehow weathered by reconstructing the Cabinet, Okuma continuing to retain the Premiership. Significant was the feebleness of the press attack against this act which was construed in some quarters as unconstitutional. This incident has received a revived interest in view of the reconstruction controversy in the last Takahashi Ministry, which ultimately led to the fall of the Ministry in June of this year (1922).

In the whole course of the political development in Japan, nothing seems to have been misunderstood more glaringly than the true feature of the change from the Okuma Ministry to that of Count Masakata (com-

monly pronounced Seigi) Terauchi, which occurred on October 4, 1916. Before I speak of this change I beg to be allowed to make a slight digression.

Inaccuracies in daily papers, where things must be done quickly at all costs, may be tolerated, but the reading public, I believe, has the right of demanding, of the publications appearing in book form, the accuracy which cannot be expected of daily papers. Unfortunately, some of the books on the Far East do not even come up to the standard of mediocre dailies in this respect, not to say of best dailies. As a notorious example, which is almost amusing, I should like to quote the following phrase from one of such books:

> Baron Makino was a *Choshu* clansman like Count Terauchi, and when Terauchi became Premier of Japan seven men out of every ten in Tokyo predicted that Makino would be Terauchi's Home Minister.

Now, to begin with, Baron (now Viscount) Makino whom I am privileged to know not only personally but very closely, is not a *Choshu* clansman but a *Satsuma* clansman. Although he is a man free from clan spirit, it cannot be helped that he was born a Satsuma clansman. So far it may, however, be leniently overlooked as a casual error which might have been unavoidable in spite of best intentions. But the inferences and fabrications based upon this error and the seventy per cent estimation are positive falsehood, from which there is no way of escape or of being excused. This single example would be enough for showing the spirit in which such a book was written. For the sake of right, justice, fair play, and all that

are sacred and precious in the possessions of mankind, I cannot help exclaiming: "Preserve us from men of the type of the author who depicts Viscount Makino as a *Choshu* clansman."

Lecture III

August 14, 1922

THE RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN
(Continued)

First of all, I shall try to depict how the change of Ministry of October, 1916, is usually misinterpreted to the credulous outside world. As an ostensible reason for his handing over the Premiership, Okuma wrote in his letter of resignation to the Emperor: "Now that I have to think of my advanced age and failing physical powers, I deem it not right to stand in the way of abler and better men." And, to all appearance, this seemed to be quite plausible for a man of seventy-eight years. Further on, Okuma said in his letter of resignation: "I firmly believe that Viscount Kato is a man of ample experience and unusual ability, and, moreover, he is backed by the confidence of Your Majesty's people. I, therefore, humbly beseech Your Majesty to accept my resignation and to appoint Viscount Kato Minister President of State." In spite of this, the Genro intervened, and recommended to the Throne Count Terauchi for Premiership. Such is an oily picture in essential outline of the Cabinet change of 1916, which was welcomed by those prejudiced foreign critics who are wont to see political conditions in Japan solely in the light of the

happening of the hour. Analogy is sometimes sought in the change of the British Cabinet of 1894, when Lord Rosebery succeeded Gladstone as Premier, and violent attacks were mercilessly heaped upon Japanese constitutionalism. All this is a mere illusion arising out of the superficial views, as I shall presently explain.

Firstly, among Okuma's following there was a large number of men who have been long deprived of the salubrity of office. That was at least one of the reasons why they rallied to the banner of Katsura, their arch-enemy of old in 1913. On that occasion, there was a minority of Okuma's men who, loath to rush to the standard of converted bureaucracy, remained where they were, and formed the Kokuminto under the leadership of Mr. Inukai, which party exists to this day, although there has lately been talk of its dissolution. Okuma's party, which has been out of power for a long, long time, was then seeing its bright days. Now, thirst and hunger long endured, on being suddenly quelled and gratified, very often lead to abnormal conditions of morbidity. That Okuma's Ministry appeared to foreign observers less free of faults in internal affairs than it really was, is due to the veil of the press influence so bountifully enjoyed by Okuma. The sudden sprouting forth of such an organization as the Okuma Supporters' League, among which there was a large number of the most influential men of the press, speaks far more eloquently than I could ever do. The taciturn majority of the Japanese *intelligensia* were pretty strongly opposed to some of the acts committed by the Okuma Ministry.

Secondly, why the reconstruction of the Okuma Cabinet in August, 1915, came off without much noise, if not smoothly, must be told. The coronation of the Emperor which should have taken place in 1914 was delayed owing to the death of the Empress Dowager. The nation was impatiently waiting for the coronation which was to take place in the fall of 1915. Under this circumstance, the change of the Cabinet in August, only a few months in advance of the coronation date, was thought extremely undesirable. This accounts for the deceptively smooth course of the reconstruction. But, once the coronation was over, the nation was expecting the change of Ministry in no distant future.

Thirdly, and this was the most supremely important consideration, Japan had to be prepared for the critical period which is destined to come sooner or later on the heel of the termination of the World War, although we were then enjoying temporary ease and tranquility. Moreover, how the war would end, was an enigma which was baffling our most outstretched imagination. The same mentality which led to the formation of the Lloyd George Ministry in December, 1916, and to the formation of the similar wartime French ministries, was getting strong hold of the Japanese nation. What I have in mind is sometimes called a coalition cabinet, but I believe this designation is liable to misunderstanding. It will be more appropriate to call it the "whole nation cabinet." It is a cabinet in which party lines are to be obliterated as far as possible and the talents of the nation are to be mobilized to the fullest extent. At that time,

Japan was longing for such a cabinet, which was deemed to be particularly necessary in a country like Japan, where political parties are still in their infancy. That the Terauchi Cabinet fell far, and indeed very far, short of this ideal is a fact not to be denied. At the same time, that there was a strong tendency disfavoring the continuation of the Okuma Cabinet in which the school-day party spirit seemed to have reigned supreme, is also a fact by no means to be refuted. Particularly the presence of some men among the rank and file of Okuma's following, who, brave in all the confidence of half-taught ignorance, seemed to have been playing to the gallery, was making a very unfavorable impression upon the sober and taciturn elements of the public.

In the fourth place, Okuma himself was wise enough to have become conscious of the tendency just mentioned and also that his days of Premiership were numbered long before he resigned. The proof for this is to be found in the fact that Okuma set himself in communication with Terauchi who returned to Tokyo from Korea early in June, that is, four months prior to Okuma's formal resignation. In the course of negotions which were being languidly carried on between the outgoing Minister President of State and the prospective incoming Premier, Okuma advised Terauchi in the guise of a proposal to form a coalition cabinet with Viscount Kato. This proposal was flatly refused by Terauchi on the ground that a man responsible for the formation of a Ministry should have full and unfettered liberty of action. There was a period of suspense, during which Terauchi betook himself

to loitering in the hallowed monastery of the *Koyasan,* while there was a talk of a Hirata-Kato coalition cabinet, and, all the time, the resignation of Okuma in the near future was regarded not as an eventuality but as a certainty.

In the fifth place, not only the Genro alone, but very many others who had the nation's steady progress at heart, were reminding themselves of the bitter experience of bygone days of Okuma's habit, in the last resort, of letting things take care of themselves. They were on the alert for any emergency. All queries, such as why Okuma resigned while he was under no necessity to resign, why should Okuma, the lifelong fighter for constitutionalism and party government have retired without guaranties, was Okuma really in earnest in recommending Kato for his successor, why, even granting that he should have been beaten in the end, did he not make a fight and rouse the whole country to the representative principles, and the like would find answers tolerably, if not entirely, satisfactory, if what I said of him in my previous lecture and the categorical descriptions just given of the conditions under which he had to resign, are taken into unbiased consideration.

Point-blank questioning is to be welcomed by all means, but it is not always possible to answer point-blank. Very often the mentality of one who asks must be prepared for receptiveness. There are some people who are predisposed to insist on getting answers which are already in their minds before asking and which may have been derived from their own hallucination or from reading beforehand some irresponsible publi-

cations. To ask whether something is white or black is perfectly at the liberty of one who asks, but to repudiate the existence of any other color is tyrannical. Insistence on getting the summary of something which by its very nature cannot be abridged is despotic. Compressing all the backgrounds, circumstances, conditions, and what not, conducive to the true understanding of an affair into a tabloid which might be conveniently swallowed by an interviewer and which might absolve him from any further effort, is desirable but cannot be done in most cases.

Very soon after his resignation Okuma was interviewed by an editor of one of the most influential foreign dailies published in Tokyo. Okuma's optimism on that occasion was only to be expected by any one who knew him, but it was said to have been contrary to the expectation of the interviewer who was predisposed to see in him a man who was severely snubbed a few days before. This optimism rather throws a sidelight on the aspect of Okuma's letting things take care of themselves. When interrogated as to the motive of his resignation, Okuma naturally avoided answering by the simple expedient of talking about something else. Now, after the lapse of six years when Okuma is no more, the interviewer might, I hope, find a satisfactory answer in the above exposition of the circumstances, under which the Cabinet change of 1916 took place.

I happened to know Count Terauchi from old days when he was still a nonentity. He was honest, upright, wholehearted, fair and conscientious, and a typical man of taciturnity. I believe he did not wish to be-

come Premier. He seems to have been quite contented in his position as Governor of Korea. With all my sympathy for an old acquaintance, I have to say frankly that he was not a man equal to the position of the leader of a super-party whole nation Ministry. The question remains: Why was he called by Yamagata to come to Tokyo in June, 1916? Well, Terauchi was a protégé of the all-powerful Yamagata, who saw in Terauchi his successor as a Genro. There seems to be no doubt of that, but whether or not Terauchi could have become a Genro even if he had lived longer, seems to me to remain a question. I, for one, think, even granting that he became a Genro, he could have become only a second-rate Genro. Secondly, because there was no other man who not only might justly claim immunity from party associations, but would be acknowledged as immune. He had no inclination either pro or con toward both the Seiyukai and the Kenseikai, the two largest parties which dominated then, and are still dominating, the party world of Japan, although he had to affiliate himself in a loose way with the former since he took office, the latter having presented a stubbornly uncompromising attitude toward him as was naturally to be expected.

The Terauchi Ministry lasted for just a little less than two years from October, 1916, to September, 1918. As soon as Terauchi was installed as Premier, there was manifested some anti-Terauchi feeling in the press, as was to be expected. High-sounding phrases were used, such as the *coup* of the militarist party on October 4, 1916, the rushing of the Genro into the Palace, the dangerous nature of the personality

of the members of the Terauchi Ministry, the probable suppression of newspapers, and the like. Seen in the light of sober judgment of six years thence, they may be looked upon as an indirect description of the after-effect of Okuma's playing-to-the-gallery inclinations.

At that time, it was said that no matter how well-meaning the Terauchi Ministry might be in trying to give good government to the nation, it had erred at the start in view of constitutionality, and therefore no amount of good it might do would be able to atone for the sin which it had committed against constitutional progress in Japan. I do believe that there is a great deal of truth in this statement, but how much truth is contained therein is to be gauged by the amount of confidence, trust, and reliance which the nation may justly and without risk repose on the political parties actually in existence. It is interesting to observe that history was repeating itself in the case of the recent inauguration of the Admiral Kato's Ministry.

As an attempt to form a whole nation cabinet, the Terauchi Ministry was a complete failure. Terauchi himself had not the requisite capacity of leading such a cabinet except that he was a non-party man. Besides, his Ministry contained none except Baron Goto whom the nation acknowledged as worthy of being a member of the whole nation cabinet. Terauchi tried to get better men but failed. Moreover, his avowed purpose of remaining neutral in party matters was soon found to be untenable. Perchance, the Terauchi Ministry may have unconsciously done a little service

toward constitutionalism in Japan by preparing the way for the advent of the first trial of something approaching to party government under the leadership of the Commoner Hara. The main cause of the downfall of the Terauchi Ministry was the failure to meet the exigencies brought on by war conditions, especially as regards the high cost of living. The immediate cause was the occurrence here and there of the so-called rice riots brought about by the soaring price of our staple food, to which Terauchi's failing health gave an additional impulse.

Terauchi was neither so strong nor so ambitious a personality as he was represented to be, particularly in foreign countries. His martial bearing, his Billiken-like countenance, and the awkwardness of using his left hand in hand-shaking owing to the fracture of his right hand by an old bullet wound, besides being Field Marshal, might have contributed in no small measure toward making him appear to foreign visitors a formidable personage. After he became Premier I saw him but rarely. There was only one occasion when he, the highest dignitary in the realm, and I, a nonentity, spoke in the vein of old acquaintance. And that was on the occasion of a gathering of many people, about half Japanese and the rest foreigners, where there were many after-dinner speeches. After the gathering broke up, he set himself in an easy-chair in order to take a little rest before going home. He was evidently very tired. So I kept company with him. There were also a few others still remaining. I asked him what bored him most. Promptly he replied that it was speeches, both making and hearing. To this, I thought

afterward, he might have added interviews. Our conversation continued late into midnight. The impression I got on the whole was that Premier Terauchi was the same honest, gentle, and artless man whom I knew in old, old days. I felt genuine sympathy for Terauchi, who was represented to be just the contrary to what he really was, insincere, arrogant, and despotic. Many regrettable things attributed to him, like the Mason incident, are to be traced to the commingling of his tactlessness which reflects sincerity and the misunderstanding of his predisposed interviewers.

As Terauchi's name appears in print so often associated with the so-called military party in Japan, a few remarks on this subject may not be out of place. Now, I believe, in every one of the countries known as "Big Powers," there is a military party consisting of jingoes, jingoistic elements among the army and navy men and men addicted to capitalistic imperialism which is transmutable into aggressive militarism. Although the military party is on the wane in present-day Japan, it is to be frankly admitted that up to a certain epoch the party was more numerous and more influential in Japan than in some other countries. Taken all in all, however, the so-called incontrovertible truth on which are based accusations covered by such appellations as "double diplomacy," "invisible government" and the like is—I will not say a half-truth—perhaps a two-third or three-quarter or even nine-tenth truth. Estimations may differ. Maybe it is something which cannot be estimated. In any case, however, it is a truth possessing a margin whether large or small. This margin served as a refuge to which dis-

satisfaction, disagreement, discrepancy, disagreeableness, and very many other mental inclinations covered by words with the prefix, "dis," were very often relegated for uncomfortable repose. If a Japanese tries to explain and justify some doings of Japan to a foreigner without incurring the risk of falling into inconsistency or illogicalness, not seldom, he says: "Well, they are the doings of the military party." When a foreigner wishes to give a mild touch to his severe reproach of some of Japan's conduct, not seldom he says to his Japanese friend: "Well, after all, it may be the doing of the military party." That the military party has been so often made the scapegoat of irrelevancies and contradictions may partly account for the fantastic influence with which it is embellished in the eyes of the outside world.

That the simple-minded Terauchi might have stood for the military party, particularly in the later days, is not to be denied. But to say that he was all the time abusing this influence is doing a gross injustice to this veteran statesman. It was he who not seldom harnessed the military party to keep it within proper bound. The dogged insistence of a critic or an interviewer in getting a cut-and-dried view of something which cannot be cut-and-dried, particularly in cases where there is an impassable barrier of language, is, in all probability, unintentional. Yet, this mentality, coupled with predisposition, was the greatest hindrance on the path of getting a fair and correct view of things for which he was after.

As the successor to Count Terauchi in the Premiership of Japan, Takashi Hara came into office on Sep-

tember 29, 1918. That a man without title and backed by the power rooted solely in the elected Lower House was called to the highest position of the realm surely marks an epoch in the constitutional development in Japan. His talent and ability in the capacity of Minister President of State was in a certain aspect an unknown factor. There were some people who saw his rise with doubts and misgivings, but no sooner did he take the reins of government with firm grasp, than all doubts were absorbed into the air like curling smoke coming from a tiny cigarette.

A brief account of the Seiyukai of which Hara was the leader may be recapitulated here. It was in September, 1900, that Ito took a course which astonished the nation. He stepped down into the arena of party politics hitherto monopolized by Itagaki and Okuma. The peerless personality of Ito attracted a large number of politicians, among whom the old Jiyuto of Itagaki was the predominating element. Thus was formed a political party which in one jump commanded an overwhelmingly large majority in the House of Representatives and was named the Seiyukai. At that instant, Ito, as the father of the Constitution and the leader of the most powerful political party, appeared like the glorious snowclad summit of Fuji, gleaming in the dawn of the real development of constitutionalism in Japan. However, even such a brilliant prospect was powerless to contradict the truth of the adage that the the first trial is always a failure. The bright days of the party were reserved for the Hara of two decades thence.

Three years later, 1903, Ito handed over to Marquis (now Prince) Saionji the leadership of the Seiyukai.

Saionji, with the assistance of Matsuda and Hara, led the party much to his credit when he was in office as well as when he was out of office by keeping it in close touch with the man in power. In 1914 he retired from the leadership and nominated Hara as his successor. Although Saionji was despotic within his party, seen in the light of historical perspective, his long career extending over a decade as the leader of the Seiyukai shows a trace which recalls the proverb: "When the strong wind blows the tree may break, but the wavering grass will bend and recover."

Like Saionji, Hara was despotic within his party. Both were men born to lead, and they never allowed themselves to be led by the generally dissentious wisdom of a multitude of counselors. And there is no doubt that the success of the Seiyukai as a political party, which prides itself in the self-laudatory eulogy, "not a thread out of order," is due to this common character of its two leaders. However, viewed from a different angle, the two statesmen were quite different sorts of men. Saionji was frank, unaffected and ingenuous. His quietism often verged on indifference and disinterestedness. It should be observed that frankness is perfectly compatible with taciturnity. The taciturnity of Saionji was a cause of inconveniences and consequent dissatisfaction for impetuous Western newspaper correspondents who flocked to Paris on the occasion of the Peace Conference at which Saionji was Japan's chief delegate. This accounts for the unfavorable light in which he appeared to Occidental eyes and was made the target of rude and unsavory comments, which culminated in giving him such epithets

as the "Ivory Mask," the "Tired Man" of Japan and the like, and in seeing in him one of the most curious conundrums of any time. Socially, he was, contrary to the Paris impression of the *lost* year 1919, one of the most agreeable persons in Japan. I still remember the pleasant evenings that I, together with my university colleagues, was privileged to spend with him in days of old, when he, as Minister of Education, was preaching his pet doctrine of *Sekaishugi,* which is no more nor less than the internationalism of the present day. Few men nowadays seem to have been so greatly favored by fortune. Birth, position, wealth, not of his own but at his disposal, intellect, personal charm, intuition—what other gift could any fairy godmother have bestowed? No man can rise to be Prime Minister and then Genro without much *dust,* much application, much industry. In Saionji was discernible a quality of detachment which has undoubtedly created in many minds an impression of indolence, an impression which has been fostered by the apt description of him as "the tired man of the East." His sense of humor and his fair disinterestedness were perhaps too strong for him ever to become the passionately admired leader of his party as was his own successor, Hara.

On the other hand, with all his ingenuity, Hara was a man of stern sense of duty. The buoyant optimism of Saionji was not to be discerned in the character of Hara. There are men who devote themselves solely and singly to a definite object and purpose, that succeed sooner or later in doing what they set out to do. Hara was such a man. He was even stubborn and ob-

stinate, but he knew how to wait, and to make haste slowly. I often thought that the Seiyukai was fortunate not only in having possessed Saionji and Hara for its leaders but in having had them in this order. If this order had been reversed, the Seiyukai of to-day might have presented a totally different aspect. Meditating in this vein, I cannot help thinking that, had Okuma shown the constructive genius of Hara on the occasion of his heading the coalition Ministry of 1898, and if this coalition had not been so short-lived as actually was the case, the course of the history of constitutional development in Japan might have been changed. This consideration seems to follow an opinion held by Viscount Bryce; namely the view which represents general causes as everything and the individual great man as no more than some particular being in whom the general tendencies of an age find practical expression, is untenable, and the personality which gives effect to the tendencies may make all the difference. Another instructive lesson which suggests itself is that the postulate, never contradicted by history, that idealism and constructive ability do not find their common abode in one man, is so fitly illustrated by the case of Okuma. It may be added that this postulate received additional confirmation by the up-to-date downfall of Dr. Sun Yat Sen, so highly praised by an American friend of mine.

Let me now give a bird's-eye view of the evolution of the election system in Japan. The separate existence of the Election Law apart from the Constitution, thus facilitating its revision, bespeaks the foresight of the framer of the Constitution who anticipated the

gradual, steady and wholesome development of constitutionalism in Japan. The Imperial Diet consists of two houses, the House of Peers and the House of Representatives. Of the former I shall have to speak later on. For the present I confine myself to the latter.

Under the original Election Law of 1890, the members of the Lower House are elected by the people every four years by a ballot; male subjects of the Empire over thirty years of age with other qualifications not worth mentioning are eligible for membership. An elector must be over twenty-five years of age, must have resided for a year or more in the electoral district, and paid a direct State tax of not less than fifteen yen for a period of not less than one year preceding the time fixed for the making of the roster of electors. In passing, it may be remarked that in Japan any one over twenty is a major. The number of voters in 1890 was about 450,000.

In 1900, the Law was revised and the number of voters was increased to about three times their number in 1890; qualifications of a candidate, save that of age, were abolished and the property qualification of electors lowered from 15 yen to 10 yen. In 1920, the Law was revised for the second time and the Election Law now in force came into existence. The property qualification was at one jump lowered from 10 yen to 3 yen. If we take into further consideration the depreciation of money value due to the World War, it would be a safe estimation to say that 3 yen in 1920 is about equivalent to 1 yen in 1900, and, indeed, even an amount far less than 1 yen would not be a wild exaggeration. Manifestly, the lowering of the property

qualification to one-tenth of the original amount was a big leap. Long before manhood suffrage became a commonplace shibboleth, I had been advocating that manhood suffrage is the goal toward which our electoral system should strive. All the time I was confident that it would come about sooner or later. I once startled my friend of long standing, Baron Goh, by strongly upholding manhood suffrage, and that was some eight or nine years ago, when we were traveling together in a railway car. Even to such an ardent advocate of manhood suffrage as myself, the manhood-suffrage movement of 1920, which arose on the heel of the passage of the Electoral Revision Bill of the same year and which insisted on not giving even a single chance of trial of the newly revised Law, appeared at least premature, not to say that the ulterior motive of the movement was enigmatical.

By the electoral reform of 1920 the number of voters increased to a little over three million, which is about seven times the number of 1890. The number of seats now is 464 which are distributed among 374 electoral districts. A comparison of the general elections of 1912 and 1920 may be worth noticing. In 1912 the population of Japan proper was approximately 52,000,000, and the number of electors about one million and a half, of which 90 per cent voted. In 1920, the population of the same was roughly 56,000,000, and the number of electors about three millions of which 87 per cent voted.

To enter fully into the causes why the Lower House has not as yet come up to the standard which guarantees the adoption of the dogma of responsibility of the

Ministry to nowhere else than the Diet without slightest apprehension, is more than I can aspire to do in this short course of lectures. It is sometimes said that because of the lack of this dogma people do not pay much attention to the political value of the vote, but that is mistaking effect for cause and vice versa. Japanese political parties are parties only in name. They are really aggregations of personal adherents, and their leaders are not the exponents of differing creeds so much as rival aspirants for power. No concrete practical platforms excepting generalities and platitudes have ever been made as issues in any general election, except in the last, fourteenth general election of 1920, in which manhood suffrage was the vital issue put to the front. Singularly enough, very often there is not much difference in what the contesting candidates are saying or professing. The nature of struggles, often vehement yet surreptitious and not seldom fought to bitter ends, is more often personal rather than political. Meanwhile, some of the vices and corruptions connected with elections known in elder Occidental countries, seem to have crept in at some time or other. While perusing Lord Bryce's monumental work "Modern Democracies," I was struck by discovering most of the various kinds of election corruptions known in Japan, as a matter of fact, not segregated in one place, but scattered here and there on the pages of that interesting volume.

Apathy by nature toward speech-making, coupled with taciturnity, explained before, and the consciousness that election speeches seldom attract appreciative audiences; the prohibitive expense of electioneering

which in some cases is said to have surpassed a hundred thousand yen at the last general election; the mental torture of canvassing from door to door, which is said to be necessary; contact with low-grade bosses, election-parasites and other undesirables which is said to be sometimes unavoidable; the prospect of finding oneself, after all, amidst the whirlpool of passions and impulses where reasoning and argumentation are not of much use; surely all these are by no means inviting inducements to offer to those candidates who still retain some of the spirit of the makers of modern Japan. Kipling, in his latest book, quotes a letter which had been sent in 1892 to a member of the newly elected House by his constituents. Among other things they pointed out that a politician should not be "a waterweed that wobbles hither and thither according to the motion of the stream," nor should he "like a ghost without legs drift before the wind." Even more forcible a simile might be addressed to some of the members of the Diet of later years. There seems to be, however, also a bright side. I wait for some future opportunity when I hope I shall be able to depict a brighter side. One thing which has been puzzling me all the time is why foreign criticisms, typically represented by those of foreign dailies published in Japan, of Japanese political affairs, have been concentrated on the effect solely without giving even a side glance to the cause thereof.

Of late there was discernible a tendency long looked for of returning better men to the House of Representatives. This tendency should be fostered and encouraged by all means. On the one hand, some means

should be devised for facilitating the coming forward as candidates of men with high aims and unselfish motives. On the other hand, the better men who have hitherto kept themselves aloof from the so-called dirty politics should be made aware of the dire necessity of themselves plunging into the fire and flood of the political turmoil bidding farewell to their position of uneasy onlookers. A healthy sign of this tendency manifested itself on the occasion of the Tokyo municipal election of June of this year (1922). There seems to be no reason why we should not hope for a still healthier sign in the coming general election of 1924. However, we must not lose sight of another aspect, in which Japan seems to stand at the parting of ways. All the anxieties which we perceived, though dimly, on the passing of Emperor Meiji are being recalled. Who knows this very moment but that Japan may be passing through a period of crucial test! With all the confidence inspired by the past Japan looks forward for a day of victory, this time not a victory over an outside foe, but victory inside her own self.

Ever since Hara came into office in September, 1918, he has been steadily working for the cause of liberalism in Japan and by so doing he has been gradually increasing his power and prestige. He was a constructive statesman and nothing was more repulsive to him than boasts and ostentations. He was skilled in balancing himself and his political fortunes among various contending political forces which must be carefully reckoned with in their proper worth. Hara was often blamed for having made possible the Ministry of such a man as Terauchi who was simple and

straightforward enough as to assert bluntly that the Diet is a consultative and not a controlling body. But, as a matter of fact, Terauchi was correct. The Diet is not as yet anything like the British Parliament, and it is fortunate for the the people of Japan that it is not. First of all, the political parties must improve themselves by recruiting better men from all quarters, not excluding the bureaucracy. The fault with Terauchi lay in that his vision did not extend beyond the happenings and status of the hour. As a practical statesman, Hara took things as they were and did what was possible under the circumstances. Hara acted in a steady and truly statesmanlike way in the interest of his party which he identified with the interest of the majority of the nation. By investing his party's strength in support of the Terauchi Ministry when that strength was inadequate for a stronger procedure, he paved the way to the power which was destined to counterbalance the very force and inertia which put Terauchi in authority. Hara believed in representative government, but he was wise in letting, unlike Okuma, his ideals speak not with words but by deeds. By consolidating and training his party in the responsibility of power and familiarizing the nation with the thought of party government, Hara was leading the nation along the path which would sooner or later lead to his goal of constitutionalism in Japan. That his party and, perhaps, the nation too, did not come up to his expectation is no fault of Hara's.

Let me now give one or two concrete examples of how Hara actually worked. Under the political system in vogue previous to 1919 in Japan, those eli-

gible to the positions of Minister of War, Minister for the Navy and Governor-General of Korea, Formosa, or Kwangtung were confined to military or naval men on active service. This provision was the cause of peculiar phenomena which occasionally cropped up in the political world of Japan. On the downfall of the Yamamoto Ministry in 1914, Viscount Kiyoura was called to form a Cabinet. He was able to find all the Ministers except the Minister for the Navy. The only man then available was Admiral Kato, the present Premier, who happened to be away from Tokyo. On his arrival in Tokyo, Kato was offered the post of Minister for the Navy, which offer he flatly refused. So, Kiyoura's stillborn Ministry known by the name of "the only-the-scent Cabinet" did not see the light of the world. Again when the second Saionji Ministry refused in 1912 to take up the plan of adding two divisions to the army proposed by General Uyehara, then Minister of War, he resigned and Saionyi was unable to find Uyehara's substitute, and so, the Cabinet resigned *en bloc*. These examples show that, by resorting to a process which closely resembles boycotting, military or naval men at times wield the power of making a Cabinet. It was acts such as these which have given rise to the notion of the so-called military clique. It is true that this military clique was in a certain sense the dictator of the military policies of the Empire, which, up to sometime about the close of the World War, with passive popular assent in recognition of the incomparably great services rendered to the State by the army, sometimes misused its power in influencing the domestic and foreign policies of the na-

tion. That this military clique was often challenged covertly by civilian statesmen in power and more openly by the press, is a matter of common knowledge. That to-day the word carries an aroma of opprobrium with it, even among the bureaucratic elements of the political world, it being regarded by them as well as by publicists as a menace to the true interests of the country, is in the first instance due to the after-effect of the World War, but no less to the untiring efforts of the indomitable Hara.

In 1919, thanks to the exertion of Hara, the limitations as regards Governor-General of Korea, Formosa, or Kwangtung was entirely removed. In consequence of this, very soon Baron Den was appointed Governor-General of Formosa, while that of Kwangtung has been occupied since 1920 by the new Prince Yamagata who is a civilian. Indeed, on the appointment in 1919 of Admiral Saito, who is on the reserve list, to the post of Governor-General of Korea, some noise was made by an ignorant section of the press which asked why a naval man should be given this post, now that the limitation had been newly removed. Now, as a fact, Admiral Saito is both in character and environment more of a civilian than even a genuine civilian. This fact was further proved by his deeds in going through the ordeal of the critical period which followed his appointment, and is willingly acknowledged even by the most refractory of foreign missionaries in Korea.

As to the limitation regarding the Minister of War and the Minister for the Navy, it was stretched out only so far as to include men on the reserve list.

Hara was again blamed for being lukewarm in this respect, but it is the censure of those who do not cease criticizing, simply because they know nothing else than criticizing and who are by nature and temperament averse to committing themselves to the too obvious truth that a steady progress is far better than no progress. The climax of Hara's effort in this direction found its revelation in Hara, a civilian, himself holding, against some oppositions, though only temporarily, the Navy portfolio during the absence of Admiral Kato who went to the United States as Japan's chief delegate at the Washington Conference.

It has been often said by some irresponsible party politicians that the Ordinance concerning the appointment of civil officials and civil-service regulations, gives special protection to persons of bureaucratic origin, while party politicians are placed in an exceedingly awkward and invidious position. In this direction too, Hara made a slight encroachment. Had he desired, he might have gone a step further in this inroad with ease. But Hara was a man who knew when to go forward and where to stop. I wonder whether the wisdom and sagacity which Hara showed in this matter have ever been appreciated by the absent-minded public. Hara seems to have been fully aware of the danger of the civil administration suffering at the hand of democracy, experienced in Western countries and particularly in France, which country Hara, next to his home land, knew best. In France, the frequent change of Ministries does not disorganize, though it disturbs, the general course of administration, because the great machine goes steadily on its way, being

worked by a strong and competent bureaucracy which is little affected by changes at the top. This fact seems to have guided Hara in this matter. Indeed, in civil administration and various conditions connected therewith, there is a remarkable similarity between Japan and France, so much so that it appears almost marvelous.

One thing more may be noticed, which seems to have hitherto escaped the cognizance of party politicians—excepting Hara who may be, after all, not a politician but a statesman—who are so strongly advocating the access of civilians to the position of Minister of War and Minister for the Navy. And that is the absence of any restrictive qualification for the position of Minister for Foreign Affairs. In spite of this, in the whole course of the political history of Japan, there is not a single instance of a true-born party politician placed in the position of Minister for Foreign Affairs. Moreover, it was admittedly very fortunate for Japan that such was the case. Even the reckless Okuma Ministry of 1898 had, for its Minister for Foreign Affairs, Okuma himself. Similar remarks may be made of the Minister of Finance, though with less force. There are only two exceptions, namely Matsuda of the Seiyukai and Taketomi of the Kenseikai. Leaving the comment on the worth of these two men as Finance Ministers to the verdict of public opinion at the time when they were in office, I should like merely to observe that the fact that Ministries in the past having so much of party coloring and affiliation had to take in men like Mr. (now Viscount) Takahashi and Mr. (now Baron) Yamamoto for their Finance Ministers from business

circles, seems to show the lack of men qualified for the position among party politicians.

That talent, even if it could be found among party politicians, is more frequently of showy than of solid character, is, I believe, not necessarily confined to Japan, but this phenomenon is preëminently conspicuous in the present-day Japan, although, in this respect, there is a bright prospect of a better future. Like a snowball rolling over a snow-covered ground, whenever a party Ministry is formed, it goes out of office swelled by adherents drawn from bureaucracy or elsewhere, who, in due course of time, mostly become the best elements of the party. The two past Finance Ministers just mentioned, to which I might perhaps add Mr. Tokonami, the Home Minister of the late Hara Ministry, Mr. Midzuno, the present Home Minister, and Dr. Okano, the present Minister of Justice, of the Seiyukai, and Mr. Wakatsuki, at one time Finance Minister and Mr. Hamaguchi of the Kenseikai, are typical examples of men with aforesaid records of party career or, if not, with records very much alike. The prerequisite condition for the success of party government in Japan, it seems to me, consists in taking in and assimilating men like those just mentioned and drawn from whatever quarter within the parties themselves, and, at the same time, willingly giving up the spirit of so-called party clique on the part of true-born party men. I, for one, believe, it is high time to stop expecting miracles in the political world of Japan.

Lecture IV

August 16, 1922

THE RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN *(Continued)*

As regards the manhood-suffrage movement in Japan of 1920, which led to Hara's dissolution of the Lower House, there seems to have been a great deal of misunderstanding and gross misinterpretations in Occidental countries and particularly in America. In this connection, I wish to warn those who observe political affairs in Japan from a great distance across the Pacific, that they must not concentrate their attention on the happening of the hour and give undue importance to immediate and direct aspect. The manhood-suffrage movement of 1920 appears, to a large majority of thinking men in Japan, as one of the rallying cries of the Opposition parties which, long deprived of the salubrities of office, have been trying to leave no stone unturned in their desperate attempt for getting into power.

I will now cursorily speak of the House of Peers. It consists of the Imperial Princes, of the members of the two highest orders of nobility, of the representatives elected among themselves in a certain proportion of each of the three remaining orders of nobility, of

representatives coöpted respectively by the fifteen largest taxpayers in each prefecture, and of a certain number of life members nominated by the Emperor in consideration of their knowledge and experience. Members of the last category are commonly called "Imperial nominees" or "Crown members," and are in actual practice usually nominated by the Premier, though by the Emperor in form. Of late, tendencies have been almost neglecting "knowledge," which means men of learning, and giving overwhelming predominance to "experience," that is administrative experience, which means ex-officials who have been faithful to the party in power. This one-sided practice had the result of decidedly deteriorating the quality and the prestige of the Upper House.

Even foreigners, including some of the writers of the editorials of foreign dailies published in Japan, who have lived a long time in the country and who have a knowledge of its language and people often seem to be liable to fall into that kind of fallacies which consist in basing one's opinion on false premises. One and only one out of innumerable glaring mistakes into which such a foreigner has fallen may be cited. It was once said that Baron Shibusawa was not even a member of the House of Peers. And on this premise were heaped up vehement attacks against the constitutionalism of modern Japan. Now it is a real and tangible fact that Viscount Shibusawa was a member of the House of Peers and his resignation was only accepted at his own express and urgent wish. Viscount Shibusawa must have had his reason for resigning, which is tolerably clear to any thinking man of his own

country, but which the acutest and the best informed among foreigners is unable to appreciate. Such an instance is very instructive as it clearly shows how difficult it is for any one to know the innermost mind of another belonging to a different nationality.

Article 65 of the Constitution provides: "The budget shall be laid before the House of Representatives." Excepting this, in form there is no difference between the Upper and the Lower House with regard to their rights and powers. Even the value of this prior right of debate in regard to the budget was once questioned and appealed to the Throne for proper interpretation. The question was decided by the Privy Council to which the Throne refers all interpretations of constitutional matters, to the effect that the value in question is solely restricted to the order in which the budget should be introduced into the Lower and the Upper House. However, all this is merely on the surface of the matter; the time-honored saying of the British Constitution, that the House of Commons holds the purse-strings, is equally true in the case of Japan. And not only in matters relating to the budget but in all other respects predominance is enjoyed by the Lower House in actual practice, as it ought to be. However, now and then, abuse is made of the better fortified position of immunity from dissolution, and there have been occasions when the Upper House proved itself to be quite unmanageable.

There has lately been much talk of reform or reconstruction of the House of Peers. Several proposals have been put forward both from within the House itself and from the outside. The general trend of opin-

ions differing in details seems to be that the Upper House must be a real and not a sham second chamber, while the Lower House must remain the dominant Chamber.

Leaving aside the question of the reform of the House of Peers, I have to say that, ever since he came into office, Hara sems to have been doing his best in trying to consolidate his power in the Upper House by dexterously courting behind the curtain the good will of the dominant party there. With all my respect for Hara, I cannot help thinking that in this instance he acted more like a politician than like a statesman. He may have had reasons of his own. Be that as it may, in a short space of time, Hara was able to count on a substantial majority in the Upper House.

It seems to me that the fourteenth general election of May 10, 1920, marks a turning point in the history of the political development of Japan. Looking back retrospectively for a decade or thereabout with the eyes of that instant, the political world of Japan was, viewed in a broad aspect, dominated by the conflict and combat between one side consisting of bureaucrats and militarists and personified by Yamagata, and the other side embracing political parties and the press, of which Okuma was at once the exponent and the champion. Hara, as a practical statesman, had his feet in both camps. That Yamagata and Okuma differed not only in personality and character, but were opposed in their political principles and opinions, was told in my previous lecture. The course actually followed by Japan in her political development may be characterized as the midway between the two accompanied by the tendency

of gradual diminution of the gap which separated the two.

Hara, emerging out of the general election of 1920 with an invincible majority in the Lower House and backed by a strong support in the Upper House and in the vigor of life, suddenly towered above the power of the two veteran statesmen over eighty years of age of Restoration fame, whose influence had been on the wane for some time. Without making vainglorious display, Hara had been quietly and steadily working for such a day. His rise was in a certain aspect a surprise to those sections of the public whose views are fixed on the happenings of the hour.

Hara had faithful political followers who would willingly follow him even unto disaster. At the same time, he had bitter enemies who would leave no stone unturned for doing harm and injury to his career as a statesman. That a man of Hara's character and personality should have virulent foes cannot be avoided. Some of his enemies saw in him a demagogue. Now the word "demagogue" is nowadays exclusively used in a bad sense, but, I believe, anciently, it meant simply a leader who exerts great influence over the people for either good or bad purposes. In the original sense of the word Hara was certainly a demagogue.

Long before Hara came into real power, there prevailed an idea which did not appear prominently on the surface of the press, and which was, nevertheless, by no means, to be thrown right away. Its essence consists in doubting whether party government, with its large potentiality for corruption and maladministration, is a *sine qua non* for political existence. Even

in the West the personal element is by no means obliterated and there remains much to be desired in the direction of elevating political life and psychology far above the sordid and pitiful hankering for office and power. It seemed unlikely that Japanese party politicians would be found capable of giving to the world an example of perfection, in which selfish ambitions and clique jealousies should become completely subordinated to the love of country and zeal for public good. Moreover, in the early days of trial of constitutionalism in Japan, those who were in favor of party government looked toward Great Britain of the old days of Whigs and Tories for a model of two evenly balanced political parties. For them, the subsequent splitting of parties in Britain, the result of which is exceedingly puzzling to an outsider, was a sight by no means comforting. In short, that party government is a desideratum for Japan seemed to be an unsettled question. This idea or doubt has been lingering on and was potentially in existence up to the time of the rise of Hara, when it was entirely dispelled from the mind of the people.

The goal toward which constitutionalism in Japan should strive is now definitely settled. It may be summarily formulated as follows: (1) the elevation of the Throne ever higher above the plane of practical politics and political struggle; (2) the establishment sooner or later of party government accountable to the Diet.

I have now arrived at a point where I have to recall once more the sad tragedy which deprived Japan of her first "Commoner Prime Minister," Takashi Hara,

often lovingly called the "Gray-head Premier" by his admirers. Hara's personal prestige was great at the time of his death. He had brought his party to a position in which no Government could have been formed against its will, as the subsequent events have proved. That his Ministry, even leaving out of account its continuation under one of his right-hand men, Viscount Takahashi, far exceeded the average duration of the "expectation of life" of a Japanese Cabinet, bespeaks his ability as leader of men. He seemed to have had a long career before him. Had he died a natural death, it might have been possible for him to have reached the goal of his long-cherished ambition.

That Viscount Takahashi, Minister of Finance of the Hara Ministry, who incarnates peace and finance, was selected as successor to Hara, was a wise choice. For Takahashi, however, it was an extremely onerous, and at the same time an awkward, piece of work. Indeed, to him was assigned a task next to impossible. As one called to head a Ministry, it was only natural that he should have his own men to assist him. The tragic death of Hara at the critical moment of the convening of the Washington Conference, coupled with the opening of the Diet within less than two months, deprived him of the freedom of action in this vital matter. Takahashi is to be pitied for that he could never have been more than a stop-gap Premier.

I have now brought my account of the recent political development of Japan down to a point, where I may most opportunely speak of a peculiar much-commented-upon institution called the Council of Genro, which I have had all the time in my mind. Now, in

order to be able to give an intelligible explanation of this unique institution, I deem it desirable, if not necessary, to ask for, and to prepare, sympathetic receptibility on the part of a Western hearer or reader. In the first place, I wish to be allowed to warn him or her that while the phenomena of Japanese politics resemble those of the West, they have only the same face value and do not necessarily represent the same motives or same efficient causes. All this may appear strange and enigmatical, but, if one reminds oneself of the common law of England, which is the basis of jurisprudence of all the English-speaking people, and of the fact that this common law is the embodiment of the slow growth of centuries of experience, comprehension will dawn on his bewildered mind. In politics, as in almost all other things, there are forms and realities. Forms can be made in a night, but realities are the result of patience and growth. Japan's modern political forms are in very many respects artificial. Not only are they artificial, but they are essentially foreign. These forms would no doubt adapt themselves in due course of time to the unique and peculiar conditions obtaining in Japan which emerged from feudalism only just a little over half a century ago. All this requires time. Meanwhile these forms are doubly misleading. As they are Western in form they invite and engross the whole of the attention of Westerners, who naturally take them at their face value. And the attention thus monopolized makes Westerners oblivious of the old customs and spirit which persist underneath the surface of things. Nor is this confined to foreigners. Among countrymen of my own, particularly among

the younger generation, there are many who are blind to the aspect of political institutions as things of growth and very often of slow growth. The institution known as the Council of Genro which has no constitutional status is an illustrative example of the strength of long sustained usage.

Now, then, what is the Genro or so-called Elder Statesmen? There is no better answer than saying who they are or were. At the opening of this year (1922), they were Yamagata, Matsukata, Saionji and Okuma. The refractory character of the last-mentioned had placed him in a slightly different position from others, but still he was a man who had access to the Council of Genro, although he was missed in some of its conclaves. The senior Genro was Yamagata, who wielded by far greater influence than any other and who, on that account, was often called a man able to make or unmake Cabinets. In the next place, it may be asked: What are the necessary qualifications of a Genro? Firstly, a Genro must have done great service to the State, including among others that of Prime Minister not less than twice; he must have enjoyed the highest honors, privileges, and favors, so that there are left no more earthly things to covet and no more worldly desires to gratify, whereby the advanced age which quells ambition is also to be taken into account; and he must stand high above political parties and suspicions and enjoy the confidence of the nation in his endeavor to do further service on rare occasions to his Sovereign and his country. As to the confidence of the nation, it is to be observed that in this world there are recalcitrant newspapers and men hard to please who

oppose anything good or bad. The truth embodied in the saying that there are things which satisfy the whole without pleasing the individuals who compose the whole, should be appreciated in its due merit. On the other hand, it is trite to say that there is no mortal who possesses all the qualifications enumerated above. Secondly, a Genro must be a man who has done some signal service to the State on the occasion and thereabout of the Restoration of 1868. This qualification draws as a necessary consequence that all Elder Statesmen are octogenarians, and is almost satisfied in the actual case, Yamagata and Okuma being both eighty-four, Matsukata three years older and Saionji, the only exception, being seventy-four, which bespeaks his precocity. If this qualification is strictly insisted upon, obviously the institution of Genro is ordained to pass away in the no distant future.

One thing which seems to have hitherto escaped notice is this. Assuming for the present that the institution of Genro is something which should be eliminated from the political system of Japan, Yamagata and Okuma have done a great service by simply living to the age which they actually attained. By living so long, they defied others from joining their rank, thus producing a discontinuity conducive to discontinuance. Perhaps this passive merit is shared by Katsura, who died without becoming an octogenarian.

Originally, the Elder Statesmen, among whom was included Ito, were the confidential advisers of Emperor Meiji and were called Genkun, or Veteran Statesmen. As all of them had their hands in the work of the Restoration, they were frequently called the Vet-

eran Statesmen of the Restoration. Later the name was changed to Genro, following popular brogue. With diminishing number and slackening activity imposed on them by flying time, they continued to serve the Sovereign on occasions which have become rarer and rarer as years roll by. During the last few years, they have been made the target of vehement attacks by radical politicians and the press, who have resented the exercise of their peculiar powers and have gone so far as to refer to them as useless and anachronous.

In the last phase, practically, only one function was left, which called for the activity of the Council of Elder Statesmen, and that is the most important task of recommending a new Premier to the Throne on the resignation of a Ministry. In Japan, the outgoing Premier has sometimes some one to recommend as his successor and sometimes not. Such seems to be also the case in some of the European countries. Even in Great Britain, I believe, the days when there were two evenly balanced parties and the choice of the incoming Prime Minister was a foregone conclusion, are long past. Again, just imagine a case where an outgoing Premier recommended some one as his successor and this recommendation was acted upon. Further, suppose this would-be Premier failed in forming his Ministry; how is the next candidate for Premiership to be found? Still more complex cases are not only thinkable, but did actually occur in some Occidental countries, and fortunately not as yet in Japan. Moreover, cases are thinkable where the outgoing Premier does not really know whom to recommend as his successor. He does not leave any recommendation simply because

he cannot, not because he will not. It is sometimes carelessly said that a majority in the elected House should determine the choice of an incoming Premier. Nowadays when splitting of parties is the general tendency, as we see in some Occidental countries, instances may occur where there is only a relative majority, that is, a plurality, in the elected House. One might think of coalition but coalition in peace time often proves itself to be slippery, if not fickle. Moreover, there might arise cases where coalition is possible only after the choice of a prospective Premier has been made. Very many other awkward cases are thinkable where the choice of a prospective Premier is an extremely puzzling question. I wonder whether there is any one who would be bold enough to make a plausible prediction of whom the next British Premier will be. To feel the pulse of a country is very often far more formidable and dangerous a task than what physicians are accustomed to do even in the most critical cases.

My utter ignorance of the subject does not allow me to say anything definite on whether or not there is a country in the world where the detailed process of choosing a new Prime Minister is prescribed by a statutory law. Such a law, even if it does exist, is likely to prove itself to be an instrument at once unruly and annoying, and would make the procedure more difficult rather than easier. The actual practice hitherto in vogue in Japan may now be briefly told. If a Ministry resigns, the Emperor sends for the Genro to deliberate on the eligible candidates for Premiership and to report to his Majesty the final result of their deliberation. The Emperor sends for the man chosen by

the Council of Genro to form a new Ministry. Had there been no such institution, I am at a loss to know how the deadlock could be smoothed over.

An outgoing Prime Minister sends in his papers to the Throne. It is the duty of the Throne to find some one in accordance with the nation's will to form a new Ministry. The Sovereign is sacred and inviolable. Viewed from a different angle, this means that not the slightest responsibility should be forced on the Sovereign. The Council of Genro tries its best to feel the pulse of the nation and takes the whole responsibility on its shoulders, not secretly but openly in the eyes of the people. If the Genro should shirk the responsibility somebody else must take it, only not the Throne. Genro as mortals, may have weaknesses, but who has not? It is a case of lesser evil. Nor am I oblivious of the evil of the parasitic politicians who sometimes flock round the simple-minded Genro. However, politicians of all sorts of colors and shades usually have somehow access to the Genro's surroundings, so that their influence mutually counterbalances each other to a certain extent. The residual influence is in any case comparatively insignificant and is to be looked upon as an inevitable evil.

Whenever there is a change of Cabinet, it is inevitable that there is always a section of the Japanese people, which is as dissatisfied as another section is satisfied. Not only the Sovereign can do no wrong, but as the beloved Father of a great family called the Japanese people, he must be equally benevolent to every one of the family. There should not be the slightest trace of the abuse of this character of the nation's

Father. The greatest care is to be taken to guard the Head of the family from acts for which he could justly be held responsible. That, thus far, the Sovereign felt the pulse of Japan through Genro, was fortunate for the people of Japan. In a transition period of the political development of any country, political struggles and conflicts of interest are apt to become fierce and reckless. Whatever the future may have in store, the Genro served, on the whole, successfully their day and purpose; they had the brain-power, moral purpose, and physical capacity to overcome the obstacles of their day and generation. They were a great check to direct individualistic action, and, at the same time, they worked as a wonderfully efficient lubricator that had a way of smoothing things in time of crisis.

I was told that a keen American observer of wide experience in American politics, who studied Japanese politics with impartial and sympathetic eyes said not long ago: "To me the Genro seem to be the most democratic institution in the world. They help the government to know what the people want. They are our American political convention without the convention hall and the brass-band." On the other hand, there is a large number of foreign critics who are wont to make spasmodic and yet vehement attacks upon this institution which is or was a unique possession of the Japanese nation. The main cause of these attacks seems to be the simple fact that they have not such an institution in their own countries. It is quite conceivable that, to one who is accustomed to see in things Japanese imitations of his own country, any feature novel to him in the midst of an imitation might appear

repulsive. Against these unfair attacks, I have to say that Japan feels that her school days are over, and that she knows best how to manage her own affairs. The days for the Sir Edwin Arnold and Lafcadio Hearn literally petting and dandling of the baby Japan have gone by. Japan is very much like a grown-up son who feels a little uneasy at the continuance of parental inspection and exhortation after he has married and has children of his own.

I shall have to speak some more of the Genro later. For the present I give it up and return to the Takahashi Ministry. The Genro had not much difficulty in finding Hara's successor; so I shall omit giving an account of how Takahashi was chosen. Immediately on seeing the newspaper extra reporting Hara's assassination, it dawned in my mind that the next Premier would be Takahashi. Immediately I wrote down my prognosis on a piece of paper, sealed the envelope into which it was put, and sent it to my life-long friend, Baron Goh, who is a sort of politician and at the same time my friend, requesting him not to open it until further notice. My friend who knows that I am living on borrowed years ever since my almost fatal illness toward the close of 1915, when newspapers reported my death, felt anxiety, thinking that the sealed letter might be something of the nature of a will. His mind was set at ease when I gave him the permission to open the letter on the installation of Premier Takahashi a few days thence.

Not only was Takahashi put into a position which may perhaps be characterized as false, as before said, but he is a man who, though a member of the Seiyukai,

has not cared a straw for party politics until the unexpected circumstance forced him to succeed Hara as Premier and also as leader of his party. The termination of the forty-fifth session of the Diet which closed on the twenty-sixth of March last, awaited the looming-up of the internal trouble within the Ministry. With the Washington Conference ended and the Diet closed, the political forces which had remained latent up to this moment, were ready to call off their unofficial truce. And Takahashi found himself with his hands and feet already tied by the very rope with which he was pulled up into the position of Premiership half a year ago.

Among the results of the last session of the Diet, a bill was passed, which, though insignificant in itself, might be of some interest to the country where prohibition is in force. The Juvenile Non-Drinking Bill that had been passed by the Lower House fifteen times previously, was every time rejected by the Upper House until the last session which saw the approval of both Houses. The Legislation which provides that any person under twenty years of age is not allowed to use alcoholic drinks came into force on and after April, 1922. This result is due to the untiring efforts of Mr. Nemoto, a member of the Lower House, whose zeal recalls in a striking manner that of Sir John Henniker Heaton, with which Heaton persevered in his efforts for postal reform in England. Both men have been voted bores in the Lower House and derided outside as men afflicted with utopic reform on the brain, who brought forward their respective schemes in season and out of season with scant respect for the com-

placency of the Administration. In regard to the work of the last session of the Diet, it may be added that a resolution for removing the police ban on women's attendance at political meetings and discussions, which has been pending for several years, also passed both Houses.

I now go back just a few months to speak of the death of Okuma and Yamagata. There was to be found no man who could control national life as did Yamagata and Okuma, each in his own way. In addition, we have to note that Hara, dead, has been the dominating influence of Japanese politics since November last. The disappearance of these guiding spirits has left the country in a state of aimless scrimmaging so far as parliamentary politics are concerned. The definite, well-founded course along which politics have hitherto moved was effaced, leaving the sea uncharted.

As to the institution of Elder Statesmen, Yamagata, the chief of the Genro and the most powerful one is gone forever. The death of Okuma with Yamagata living would not be of so much consequence, but Okuma living with Yamagata dead is at least an unknown factor. This much is, however, certain, that Okuma's death was a strong blow to the Kenseikai because of his popularity with the mass of people, which had been the greatest asset to that party now being led by his protégé Viscount Kato. Of the two remaining Genro, Matsukata is nearing ninety, and, although Saionji is younger, his past of long association with the Seiyukai throws a shadow on his qualification of being a super-party man, however much he

might strive to be impartial. How would a future Ministerial crisis be tided over? Who feel the pulse of the nation in prognosticating the coming Premier? What sort of instrument is going to replace the Council of Genro? Ever since the opening of this year (1922), such questions as these seem to have been uppermost in the mind of those having the nation's welfare at heart, without giving them any clew as to how the land lies, all the time comforting themselves in thinking that the earth revolves about its axis as it used to.

Although it was evident that the Takahashi Ministry could not last very long owing to cleavage among its Ministers, I was inclined to think that the change of Cabinet before I should leave the shores of Japan on the day which happens to be the Independence Day, was not within the realm of probability. As a matter of fact, however, while I was writing my lecture notes, I had the fortune and misfortune of witnessing a Cabinet change—fortune, because I was enabled to see with my own eyes what I have been dreaming; misfortune, because I had to rewrite a part of my notes.

Early in June last, Takahashi tendered the resignations of his entire Ministry to the Prince Regent. The immediate cause of resignation was his failure to reconstruct the Ministry. When a new Ministry is to be formed, the Throne calls upon one who, recommended by his close advisers, is to become Premier to form a Ministry. The Premier-designate has an unqualified liberty of selecting his Ministers, but once a Ministry is formed, the Ministers are, in form, individually responsible to the Throne. Such is a peculiarity of the Japanese Constitution. In spite of this, all goes well

under ordinary circumstances. The present case was an abnormal one of very rare occurrence. Owing to the almost unique circumstances explained before, on becoming Premier, Takahashi had to ask all his former colleagues to remain in office. On that occasion he had the liberty of reconstructing the Cabinet, which liberty was, however, restrained by outside circumstances. When in due course of time these circumstances disappeared, the liberty in question was found to be still under constraint owing to the very fact that he had to part reluctantly with it at the start. Takahashi wished the resignation of two of his former colleagues, which the two recalcitrant Ministers flatly refused. At that instant, my poor dear old friend Takahashi might have sorely reminded himself of the truth of the aphorism: "Defend me from my friends; I can defend myself from my enemies." Had Takahashi insisted on his wish, the course of events might have taken such a turn that responsibility, however slight, would be placed on the Throne. That was to be avoided at all cost. There was no other way left for Takahashi than to resign. The nation's will to raise the Throne ever higher above the level of practical politics and political struggles, reigns supreme forever.

The political world of Japan on the resignation of Premier Takahashi presented a singular appearance. Confining our attention to the elected Lower House, the majority Party, the Seiyukai whose Ministry just resigned, had still 282 seats intact out of the total of 464, which is a majority with a big margin. The Kenseikai which is the party next in size, had only 109 seats. The remaining 73, excepting perhaps a small

number to be counted on the fingers of one hand, were strongly opposed to the Kenseikai. Some say that the result of a general election in Japan is invariably favorable to the party in power and that, therefore, a new general election under the Kenseikai Government might give a totally different distribution. However, if history and statistics are worth anything, even a new general election would not work a miracle. These considerations should be carefully borne in mind in order to understand the subsequent course of events.

The men on whose shoulders fell the onerous task of finding a candidate for Premiership to be recommended to the Throne were, Genro Matsukata, Genro Saionji and Viscount Kiyoura, President of the Privy Council. Some say that Count Yamamoto, an ex-Premier and Viscount Hirata, the most favored protégé of the late Prince Yamagata were also consulted but they seem to have had but little influence. Saionji, who was at Okitsu, a seaside place about five hours' railway journey from Tokyo, was suddenly attacked by giddiness during the critical days and had to take at once to his bed. So he was unable to come to Tokyo and Kiyoura had to go to Okitsu to consult Saionji. In spite of such an inconvenience, matters seemed to have gone on smoothly without any hitch. Without delay, they found in Admiral Baron Kato the man they had been seeking. The decision arrived at was by no means unexpected. Already on the death of Hara, Kato was looked upon by many as a possible successor. Keen observers of politics saw in Kato the best material for Premiership. The only thing which they were unable to gauge was the power of political parties,

which, thanks to the efforts of Hara, and owing to the elimination of Yamagata, suddenly towered over all other forces which had hitherto been at work. So, by giving Kato the first trial, the men who chose him rightly felt the pulse of the nation.

Foreign dailies published in Japan which serve as a medium for interpreting things Japanese to the outside world are somehow apt to be oversuspicious. They are addicted to the tendency of searching for things beneath the surface where there is nothing to be found. They speak of a shifting of the center of power in cases where there is no other question than that of expediency. They seem to be incapable of getting rid of such a notion as clan spirit which is nowadays quite negligible even if it does exist. They go even so far as to ascribe to Kato the acquired character of a Satsuma clansman. They seem to forget that in the mind of an octogenarian or one nearing eighty, the fire of ambition does not burn brilliantly. They see in Kiyoura, who played the chief rôle, a new Genro. Such an interpretation is incorrect. Kiyoura had his hand in the business, because he is the President of the Privy Council. In the hypothetical case where Kiyoura was unavailable due to illness or any other cause, the Vice-President of the Privy Council would have acted in his place. It is true that Yamagata during his life time was the President of the Privy Council, but on such an occasion he acted as a Genro and not in his official capacity.

To be brief, the test experience of June, 1922, under the new political conditions caused by the death of Yamagata, seems to point to the following conclusions.

The days of the all-powerful Genro are gone forever. The Council of Genro as an institution for choosing a candidate for Premiership ceased to exist. A new institution which should take over the work of the Council of Genro is necessary. This new institution will include the remnants of Genro as long as they are available. It will include the President of the Privy Council, whoever may be the occupant of the position. The character of the new institution requires the number of men to be not less than two and not more than perhaps four or five. In the future when Genro are no longer available the remaining members are likely to be selected from men like ex-Premiers, Vice-Presidents of the Privy Council, and possibly Lord Keepers of Seals. The institution will never prove itself a hindrance to the progress of party government, simply because it cannot.

Japan may have still a long way to go before she gets real party government, but there is ground for believing that the gains made in this direction during the years Hara was in power have been so consolidated that they can never be effaced. At the same time there still persists the aspect in which political parties appear more like factions than anything else. Even the press which is generally against non-party government, admits the possibility, not to say desirability, of creating a non-party Cabinet in the present-day Japan. In this connection, a comment on the formation of the Kato Ministry by one of the most radical Japanese newspapers, which is reputed to know closely the inner workings of political parties, may be worth noticing. In part, it follows:

In Japan the political parties are hostile groups, and they make it their first business to injure the interests of each other. They do not concern themselves much about the announcement of their respective policies for the interest of the nation. They are so hostile to each other that there is but little room left for the smooth transfer of power from one to the other. An impassable chasm is being created between the political parties much to the distaste and the anxiety of the general public. Their antagonism often goes to the extremity of endangering the general tranquillity, causing serious fear and apprehension of thinking men. Here is the way opened for the choice of a non-party Ministry. Although it is regrettable that Japan cannot dispense with such a non-party Cabinet, this is inevitable under the circumstances. Before we curse such a Cabinet we must make an earnest effort for the improvement of the existing political parties.

I believe, what this extract says is more than true. The antagonism and contortion of the political parties recall the worst form of the feud and strife of feudal times. The cause of this may partly be attributed to the fact that of late there has been a tendency of undesirable characters creeping into the rank and file of political parties. Nor are some of the influential members exempt from just censure. The worst thing is that there is no immediate prospect of the mitigation of this spirit which is so eloquently described by the slogan: "My party, my party, and my party above all."

Before I go on further, I wish to say a few words on journalism in Japan. Due to the peculiar mentality of the Japanese people explained before, the men whose views ought to be well represented in the press are not only silent but pay little attention to what the press is saying. Even if they wish from time to time to

influence and inspire the press, they are more often barred by their own self-contradictory apathy from doing so. Meanwhile the press goes its own autocratic way, unfettered and unchecked. Fortunately, the thinking public knows what is to be taken seriously and what is to be cast away. From the tone and atmosphere in which it is written, it is not hard to distinguish an editorial written in earnest and one which is written merely to keep company with the buoyant spirit of mass meetings. Mischief is done once such an article is translated into English or any other foreign language, whereby all the delicate shades of difference of meaning are unavoidably obliterated. Still greater mischief is done when foreigners interpret our motives from articles of this kind without properly comprehending the psychology of the Japanese press.

When it is said that the press was unanimous in denouncing a non-party Cabinet, it appears rather formidable. But in order to see the thing in a true light, discrimination is necessary as to whether or not such a manifestation to be to taken at its face value. A comparison between the press outburst of 1913 against the Katsura Cabinet and the non-party government denunciation of 1922 is at once interesting and instructive. In January, 1913, the whole nation, including the press, was incensed with indignation for Katsura's conduct which was construed as embroiling the Throne into political struggles. On the other hand, throughout the denunciation press campaign of non-party government, in June, 1922, there was discernible a lukewarm, if not half-hearted, atmosphere implying that a non-party government, though theoretically to be

disapproved, is a lesser evil during a period of political transition, as the extract just quoted clearly shows.

It may be remarked in passing that not only a part of the Japanese press but a part of the press everywhere seems to fail to realize its civic responsibilities. A large part of the cause of the mental indigestion of the people is likely to be traced to the press, and particularly, as regards political matters. It is also not to be denied that sensational newspapers not seldom influence the more sober-minded press, for newspapers have their common financial problems. The newspaper's mode of presenting facts does seriously affect the way in which people make up their minds, especially in political matters. Journalism to-day is too much in the hands of young men of quick temper. It should be a profession of men, whether young or ripe, who are well informed and sensitive to the grave responsibility commensurate with the power which newspapers wield nowadays in helping people make up their minds. In old days, Japan used to be known to the West by her public men. Now it is the Japanese press which is regarded by most foreigners as Japan herself speaking. A prerequisite condition of truly understanding Japan is a study of the peculiar, and perhaps unique, psychology of her press.

It is said that Kato was at first inclined to refuse the offer of Premiership. On being assured of a favorable neutrality on the part of the Seiyukai, which is said to mean undivided and unqualified support, he finally accepted. With an alacrity characteristic of a man of his type and a firm grip of the situation in hand, Kato formed his Cabinet within twenty-four

hours of his acceptance. Admiral Baron Tomosaburo Kato, perhaps best known to the world at large among all the statesmen of Japan and known as a strong vindicator of peace, was formally installed on June 12, 1922, as the Prime Minister of the Island Empire of the East.

Conscious of the difficulty of seeing things which occurred but yesterday in the perspective of matured judgment, I shall confine myself to making a few observations which seem to be beyond all doubt.

No sooner than one morning saw Kato placed on the highest position in the realm, there appeared in the press a chorus of disapproval for his Ministry and its Seiyukai support. Newspapers abounded in such high-sounding expressions as "retrogression of constitutionalism," "utter disregard of public opinion and the spirit of the age," "germ of party government nipped in the bud," "clock of Japanese politics turned back," "digging the grave for political parties including Seiyukai," and the like. The Cabinet was first styled "Interim." On being apprised that every Cabinet is necessarily an interim Cabinet between the one preceding and that which follows, this epithet was thought too good for the Kato Cabinet, and the inventiveness of press genius was called upon to find more opprobrious predicates like "Ember Cabinet." The guiding spirit which pervades all the attacks and accusations seems to be contained in what they regard as a truism, that even an ordinary party Premier is to be preferred to a non-party Premier of rare ability, regardless of all the shortcomings and weaknesses of political parties. Amidst the whirlpool of these disapprovals it was refreshing to

find Mr. Inukai, leader of the Kokuminto party, whose integrity, whatever his defects may be, is admitted on all sides and who, moreover, is a through-and-through party man, welcoming the Kato Cabinet because of its purity from party prejudices, and inclined to support it in principle. It is to be remarked that all the press uproars subsided in a few days.

The fiery antagonism and the mutually destructive attitude of the quarreling political parties are of grave concern for the cause of constitutionalism and are causing the alarm of the anxious non-party public. If the non-party Kato Cabinet, by serving as a buffer or stop-shock, could mitigate, however slightly, this highly deplorable psychology, it would have indirectly done a great service to the cause of party government in Japan.

The first significant act of world-wide interest of the Kato Ministry was an unequivocal decision with no loopholes, to evacuate Siberia before ice closes the sea route by the end of October at the latest.

Some of the American press comments on the formation of the Kato Ministry were exceedingly gratifying to the Japanese people in more than one sense. Let me cite one or two instances. The *Tribune* expressed the hope that Premier Kato's stand *against the militarists* will bring him into closer touch with the aims of the civilian parties in Japan, thereby helping the element in Japan that is seeking the modernization of Japanese policies and a readier acceptance of the conceptions of world coöperation that sprang from the war. The New York *Herald* welcomed the appointment of Admiral Kato as an *opponent of aggressive*

militarism and because he is in favor of the improvement of Japan's international relations.

Hypothetically assuming that somebody other than Admiral Kato went to America as Japan's chief delegate to the Washington Conference, that Kato was quite unknown in America, and that one rosy morning in June last the American press was electrified by the telegram from Tokyo telling them of the formation of a new Japanese non-party Cabinet headed by a naval man called Kato, it would not be hard to imagine what sort of impression such news might have made upon an average American mind. It seems certain that the advent of an unknown admiral and baron into the position once occupied by the Great Commoner Hara not long ago would not be hailed in the Far West (America) as a victory against militarism. It cannot be helped that it is the form, and not the substance, of a thing which seizes the vision from a great distance across the mighty expanse of the Pacific Ocean. There are men of peace among those in uniforms with sabers and epaulettes, just as there are dangerous jingoes among generally peace-loving civilians. A non-civilian who unluckily became a Japanese Premier before he had been favored by a chance of going to Washington as a delegate to a conference like the one of last year, would have a just cause for envying the more fortunate course of the career of Admiral Kato.

At the time when Kato became Minister of Navy in 1914—that is only eight years ago—no newspaperman seems to have entertained the idea that he was one day to become the Prime Minister amidst the rejoicings of the taciturn public which saw in him the

best available talent for steering the ship of state. When Kato was appointed to head the Japanese Delegation, skepticism was rampant in the journalistic circle of Japan. Kato is a man of taciturnity who can talk and did talk whenever there is a real necessity. Now there are many men like Kato in Japan. They are the men who would never expose themselves to public view unless circumstances force them to do so and unless they think that they can serve the cause of their country by so doing. Yamakawa of the educational world and J. Inouye of the business circle are perhaps examples of men belonging to the same category. The press is not the reliable source of getting a glimpse of the existence of such men.

Before I close my account of the recent political development in Japan, I deem it only fit to throw a retrospective glance on what has been accomplished during the last decade.

That party government can exist only where there are two evenly balanced parties, each representing well understood principles and definite elements in the nation's life, may be theoretically correct. Although such a condition is desirable by all means, the modern tendency not only in Japan but all over the world, seems to point toward splitting of parties or abnormal preponderance of one party over all others as obtains in the present-day Japan, leaving the ideal condition far behind in the historical past. Even in Great Britain I wonder whether a time will ever come, which will recall the old days of Whig and Tory. So far as my meager knowledge goes, the only country which still retains this ideal condition is the United States.

That the splitting of the Republican party in 1912 had only ephemeral existence is a matter for congratulating Japan's neighbor across the Pacific. The stability of party conditions in America, it seems to me, may ultimately be traced to her mighty wealth and resources which are denied all other nations of the world, not excluding even Great Britain. By thus saying, however, I have no idea of belittling the wisdom and foresight of her patriots of the days of Independence.

It seems to me that in spite of ebb and flow—progress and retrogression—constitutionalism in Japan has made, on the whole, steady progress during the last decade, not so fast as some radical thinkers might desire, but reasonably fast, much to the credit of the nation, in view of the peculiar conditions and circumstances which are often overlooked by foreign observers. It was the rift in the lute caused by the inability of some of its members to see eye to eye with Viscount Takahashi that ultimately brought about the fall of the last Takahashi Cabinet. And contradictory as may appear on the surface, after all, the present Kato Ministry, like that of Hara, might carry a degree further the movement for a government responsible to the Diet. One thing which strikes us at this moment is that we do miss Hara ever more. The most recent tendencies have been toward widening the gap between the opposing parties and filling the fissure thus created with the acid of personal and factional quarrel. Hara was the one man who could have bridged over chasms between the opposing parties, for the creation of which he himself is partly responsible.

No one is a hero to his valet, and Hara living, though recognized by all as an able statesman, seemed to be not so great as he really was. Now that he is no more, in the face of nine months which have elapsed without him, Hara with his silvery white locks rises ever greater in our vision, like the snow-crowned Fuji, from the plane of political mediocrity into the region of true statesmanship, supremely distinct from his party surroundings, firm, strong, and serenely patriotic. And not only was Hara a patriot, but he was great in his simplicity. In the future he will stand out more in the greatness of his simplicity than has been the case in the past. The passing of such a life as his must, as already said, necessarily leave a gap behind.

I believe an American is born either a Republican or a Democrat. Such is not the case in my country. Perhaps only one out of every one hundred Japanese is born a party man or woman. Japanese parties have been thus far phenomenal aggregations in the vast expanse of a larger public, of which the non-party taciturn elements form a major part. Thus it very often happens that the silent assent or opposition of the non-party public are dictating the course of action of Japan as a nation while the eyes of foreign observers are harnessed and fixed on the clamorous protest of party mass. This will explain, at any rate partly, many enigmas which appear from time to time in the editorials of foreign dailies published in Japan. It is to be regretted that these editorials are the main source from which the writers of books concerning Japanese politics derive most of their materials. On the other hand, the party organizations in Japan, democratic in

theory and in their outward form, have, long before they attained maturity, already become selfish oligarchies worked by professional politicians.

Now no two men have the same quality. A has qualities which B does not possess. And what is true of men can likewise and indeed even with greater force be applied to nations. Furthermore, what is true of qualities is equally true of traditions. A's dogged insistence on B's acting and behaving in precisely the same manner as A has done or is doing, is a tyranny which recalls the old days of the decaying Romanovs.

For the healthy growth of constitutionalism in Japan, if it is destined to follow the footsteps of elder Occidental countries, a prerequisite condition is the assimilation of non-party public into party lines.

Needless to say, it is hard to foretell what Japan's future has in store. Lord Palmerston believed the Suez Canal would spell loss of India to Britain. Even the most optimistic in France never expected the return of Alsace-Lorraine. Few people thought the United States would enter the World War. Even the wisest of Japan's statesmen are baffled by the complexity of problems they have to solve. And yet this much we may say with some certainty. The Japanese people as a whole is fully prepared for meeting more than halfway all their inner conflicts, the troubles of a transition period and any difficulties or dangers which Japan shall have to confront.

I am fully conscious of inaccuracies in detail which are very likely to be found here and there in the above.

To give as correct a view of the dynamic whole as was in my power to do, was the goal toward which I have striven in the preceding exposition of the recent political development in Japan.

Lecture V

August 21, 1922

AN AVERAGE INTERPRETATION OF DEMOCRACY

Nowadays we hear the word democracy used far more often than in days gone by. It seems, too, that the more we hear of democracy the more the meaning of the word is subjected to evolutional variation in manifold ways. While we are told that the Russian democracy is struggling against Bolshevist tyranny, we hear the shriek, "Democracy or Shylocracy!" which is said to be a warning to those who are laboring to make the world safe for democracy, only to find themselves enslaved by capitalism.

A friend of mine once catalogued the meanings of the word "democracy" as follows: freedom; the rule of the majority; the rule of all; the representative system; affability; the rule of party cliques backed by plebiscites; the rule of the *demos*, that is, the population of a small local canton; the rule of the greatest common measure of opinion; and so on *ad infinitum*. He further added that, in fact, in one day the word has ceased to have any definite meaning at all and denotes just a vague sentiment of equality. And I believe he was right. Even a careful perusal of the third chapter dealing with the definition of democracy of Lord Bryce's illuminating work, "Modern Democracies," did

not give me any clew as to the exact meaning of the word.

Indeed, no word in the whole English vocabulary has puzzled me more than this word "democracy," and I believe there are many, particularly in my country, who share the same experience. One day curiosity led me to look into an old Webster's dictionary of the edition of 1864, an heirloom bequeathed by my grandfather, for the definition of this perplexing word. There I was astonished to see, side by side with the familiar Lincoln's motto, "government of the people, by the people, for the people," a definition which was new to me, namely a "republic." My astonishment, however, subsided agreeably by reading the following passage to be found in that interesting book of Lord Bryce: "It is the facts that matter, not the name. People used to confound—some persons still confound —a republic with a democracy, and suppose that a government in which one person is the titular and permanent head of the State cannot be a government by the people. It ought not to be necessary nowadays to point out that there are plenty of republics which are not democracies, and some monarchies, like those of Britain and Norway, which are." [1] The late Lord Fisher once made one of his characteristically bold assertions that "a republic is always peace-loving." A witty critic who aspired to be even more humorous than Lord Fisher exclaimed, "I suppose that accounts for the civil wars in South America!"

Of all the diplomatic representatives which America

[1] Vol. I, p. 22.

sent to her neighbor across the Pacific, Roland S. Morris is the one who, I believe, next to Townsend Harris, was most beloved by the people of the country to which he was accredited. Mr. Morris' genial personality, his broad-mindedness, and his good will toward my country are warmly—and, if I may presume to be able to divine another's thought, not unmingled with a sense akin to gratitude—appreciated by all of us who were favored by the chance of coming into personal contact with him.

In his maiden speech in Japan, which he delivered on the occasion of the welcome tendered him by the America-Japan Society on the day (November 30, 1917) which, by a happy coincidence, happened to be the sixtieth anniversary of Harris' arrival in Tokyo (then Yedo), he spoke of "the democracy of nations" which left a lasting impression on my mind.

Mr. Morris explained the phrase "democracy of nations," to mean that people are free to establish their own government in any form whatever. This gave me —and I believe I was not the only one—the impression that Mr. Morris felt driven, in view of the fact that the cry "safe for democracy" was at that time ringing round the world, into saying something about democracy, and feeling a slight hesitation in speaking of democracy to a Japanese audience took the happy expedient of discoursing on the democracy of nations.

Regardless of whether the form of government is a constitutional monarchy or a republic, it seems to me, all countries which survived the World War are democratic states. In this regard, I cannot do better than

to quote the following words uttered by a friend of Japan very soon after the termination of the War:

> While the tyrannies of the West have been toppled over one by one, the position of those monarchs whose thrones are founded on the affections of their peoples has only become more secure. If democracy is as yet less advanced among the Japanese than other people, their eyes are none the less open to certain essential facts whereon the stability of the realm is built, and in no country is a sovereign more deeply appreciated. That position has altered inevitably with the spirit of the age and has lost its divine attributes, but has made more than compensatory gain in humanism, and there can be no question that the Emperor of Japan is one who would rather be of his people than above them. The dual development of Kingship and democracy in the Island Empire marches on lines of good augury for the Japanese people and their Emperor.

A French philosopher who happened to know Japan better than most foreigners once told me that the true democracy was that of our beloved Emperor Meiji, shattering the chains of his people and those of ignorance and taking upon himself the burdens of all, saying:

> While sound those echoes thro' the night
> Of feet that toil and tire,
> How dare I revel in the light
> And comfort of my fire?

and again:

> Be bright the sun, or harsh the wind,
> Be nature sad or gay,
> Still moves this question in my mind—
> How fares my folk to-day?

The impression which the word "democracy" conveys to an average Japanese mind is that which may be inferred from the oft-quoted words of John Locke, "The majority, having the power of the community, may employ all that power in making laws and executing these laws; and there the form of government is a perfect democracy." This impression is not due to some unique peculiarity of the Japanese mind. I believe it is prevalent over all the world.

It seems to me that according as we view democracy versus aristocracy or bureaucracy or plutocracy or some other "cracy," we arrive at somewhat different conceptions of the word. Pushing political, social, and legal equality in the front view, democracy is very often defined as a state of society in which no hereditary differences of rank or privilege are recognized; in other words, a state of society without class distinctions made or favored by law or custom. This aspect of democracy gives predominance to the rights of all men born to an equal chance in life.

There is another aspect in which greatest prominence is given to the consideration of the actual working of democracy. Democracy is, then, defined as a state in which the people themselves exercise all legislative authority and confer all executive and judicial powers either by direct collective action or through delegated authority. The similar idea is expressed more concisely in very many different ways as the following examples show:

1. A form of government in which the power resides ultimately in the whole people, who conduct

it by a system of representation or delegation of powers.

2. A form of government in which the supreme power is in the hands of the people, and directly exercised by them.
3. The political system in which government is directly exercised or controlled by the people collectively.

Perhaps the shortest explanation is that of Blackstone, who said: "In democracy the right of making laws resides in the people at large."

In speaking of democracy, I believe, we must not lose sight of the, so to speak, pessimistic conception of it as a movement which is being pushed by an energetic minority. If a certain thing occurs, it will be because of the lack of interest on the part of the mass of the voters and of the campaign of an active minority. The people are so tired of politics and the promises of the candidates, which they never expect to see carried out, that they are not taking an interest in any issue and an energetic group might carry out almost any project. Under the condition that everybody is thinking and doing all the while fully believing that he is with the majority, there crop up chances for doubting the wisdom of the majority. I believe there are many instances where it is only a large number of people who have got tired of trying to think for themselves and have decided to accept somebody else's opinion. Perhaps the most pessimistic conception of democracy was entertained by the French philosopher just mentioned, who said:

In truth, there are two kinds of democracy, the ideal and true; one, that no people yet has known, that remains to be discovered; and the other, which most of the modern States practice under various forms. This latter kind of democracy can roughly be defined as a parliamentary or plutocratic individualism. Japan is already so far on the parliamentary and plutocratic way.

How democracy is understood and practised in such diverse ways in different countries and at different times, so ably discussed in "Modern Democracies," to which I have often referred, gave me food for profound reflections. In addition, I have been pondering over just a little of what I know of democracy in Great Britain and, at the same time, praying that the traffic in honors of which there was talk but recently would turn out a mere rumor. Further, I have also been thinking of the development, real or sham, of democracy in my own country and of the distortion of the conception of democracy in the Asian Mainland. Now what seems to me desirable is an attempt to reduce the various definitions and conceptions to the lowest common denominator and find the unity of average in diversity; in other words, to find the answer of a man without nationality in response to the query, What is democracy? An analogy may be found in Quetelet's conception of *homme moyenne.*

Let me now enumerate promiscuously just a few of the thousand and one considerations which happened to flash through my mind as I was thinking on a non-national conception of democracy.

I know that the democratic spirit of men in power does not mean the practice of democracy, if by democracy is meant the rule of majority, and that it is the

majority who must understand to bring it about. But now the fundamental question remains, "How are we to make the majority understand to bring it about?"

As every one knows, equality is the foundation of democracy. Indeed equality means democracy when it gets itself embodied in law. However, this very word "equality" admits of different interpretations. I will not touch upon that great problem of racial equality. One need only remind himself of the change of the French conception of equality which took place within a brief period shortly before the close of the eighteenth century.

The conversion of the civil service into the booty won by victories at the polls, is, I believe, called "spoils." In a milder form, this means that the man seeks the office instead of the office seeking the man. Now as regards the indispensable procedure called election, we have to think of that small group of persons called "the machine" side by side with a single person known as "the boss." Whether the good which democracy brings about for the general well-being of the greatest mass of the people, more than compensates, in all cases and under all circumstances, for the evil of the boss and the machine holding the keys to all the important offices, is a matter of grave doubt.

I believe the British House of Commons has still that enchanting spell of being a place in which any member, however humble his beginnings, has a chance of showing his or her talent and genius, if he or she possesses any, and has that attractiveness which is so fitly described as "the pleasantest club of the world." I wonder whether the same thing can be said of the

elected Houses of other countries. In this respect stands, in contrast to the British House of Commons, the American Congress, of which Lord Bryce says in his "Modern Democracies":

> Another cause may be found in the fact that Congress does not impress the nation by its intellectual power any more than by its moral dignity. Men who care for the welfare of the country as a whole—perhaps more numerous in the United States than in any other free country—do not look to it for guidance. The House scarcely ever enlightens them by its debates, and the Senate less now than formerly.[1]

It seems most likely that the Japanese Diet is destined to follow in the footsteps of the American Congress rather than follow in those of the British House of Commons. For the sake of democracy it is a matter greatly to be regretted that there is not a country in the world living under parliamentary government which has not shown symptoms, however slight, of the decline in the quality of its legislators.

With Aristotle, smallness was an essential condition of democracy. The cause that democracy, as the word is understood in America, found such a wholesome development in such a large country as the United States, as we actually see to-day, it seems to me, may ultimately be traced to her unlimited wealth and resources, as I shall try to explain more fully later on.

I now go on to give my own explanation of democracy. After meditating for a long while amidst the confusing and sometimes discrepant multitude of its conceptions, I came finally to formulating the following definition: Democracy is that state of existence of

[1] Vol. II, p. 63.

a nation in which equal opportunity is given to each individual, and which is so organized as to urge the individual to do his best in conformity with the unqualified maintenance of order.

I wish to lay special emphasis on the unconditional preservation of order—order, which is Heaven's first law. The mainspring of the final victory in the World War, fought in order to make the world safe for democracy, was the unity of command, which is in substance neither more nor less than the maintenance of order conducive to the highest efficiency.

I was most agreeably surprised to find myself forestalled by Pasteur, the eminent French patriot and one of the world's greatest scientists, who said: "The true democracy is that which permits each individual to put forth his maximum effort." Pasteur's definition, as translated by Dr. Walter Williams, Dean of the Faculty of Journalism, University of Missouri, into the speech of the common folk, runs:

> The true democracy secures to every man a chance to make the most and best of himself. It recognizes the equal moral worth of every man. To give practical effect to democracy thus defined, governments are instituted among men not as ends in themselves but as means to an end—to insure each man everywhere life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and the attainment of the fullest individual development in a social state.

Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University, wrote in one of his famous essays:[1]

> Jealousy of power honestly gained and justly exercised, envy of attainment or of possessions are characteristics of

[1] "True and False Democracy," p. 15 (edition of 1915).

the mob, not of the people; of a democracy which is false, not of a democracy which is true. False democracy shouts, Every man down to the level of the average. True democracy cries, All men up to the height of their fullest capacity for service and achievement. The two ideals are everlastingly at war.

Again it was no less a person than Napoleon who said:

"Reasonable democracy will never aspire to anything more than obtaining an equal power of elevation for all."

What is common to all the definitions I have been enumerating, what is, in fact, the essence of each, is I believe, the most rational and, at the same time up-to-date, conception of democracy. In this sense, democracy finds its safe, genial, blessed abode in the Island Empire of the East. Men whom J. Morris listed as "Makers of Modern Japan," and those now conspicuous in the nation's service are almost exclusively men who worked their way up from the very bottom. In Japan, democracy in the sense of not pulling every man down to a barren equality, but pushing every man up to a brave ideal, is in full bloom.

In order to forestall a possible criticism, it may not be altogether superfluous to add the following comment. Just as the encouragement of learning proved fatal to the feudal régime, by showing the enlightened people the incongruous position of the Shogunate in the Empire, so general education has been the principal cause of the decline of favors and privileges which, as it ought to be stated frankly, existed in Japan of the early days of the Meiji Era. Formerly, for instance, there were few admirals and generals outside the Sat-

suma and Choshu clans, but as cadet officers are taken by competitive examination, the Government could not prevent capable youths from being promoted. At first other officers than those of Satsuma and Choshu births or connections, to a certain extent, had to depend upon the good will of the latter for promotion, but the barrier has gradually been worn away and free competition has been opening the way for men of other clans to rise to the very top. This has also been the case in other lines of government service. Such is the power of general culture that highly educated and talented men are not, and need not be, content with being merely dependent.

Some may say that Napoleon's definition of democracy, "la carrière ouverte aux talents," is quite consistent with enlightened despotism and at variance with the etymology of the word—which is the rule of the free mass of a small totality. In defense of my position against this criticism, I have to say, in the first place, that etymologically, the application of democracy to such a large country as the United States is already self-contradictory. In this connection some may suggest the shortening, or even the annihilation, of time and distance by modern contrivances such as railroad transportation, telegrams, radiographic wonders, and the like. That these things merit our attention is not to be denied. However, the fundamental difficulty of averaging the mind of a huge mass of people, not to say the diversity in various conditions and the attendant difference of mental atmosphere so fittingly illustrated by those obtaining along the Pacific coast and in the New England States, remains

there as of yore. In the second place, I wish to recommend to the critic the perusal of that highly interesting work by Mr. H. L. Mencken, "The American Language," which gives an erudite account of the American variation of the English language, and of which the second edition, revised and enlarged, appeared last year (1921). It may further be observed that a round-table conference can just as well be held at a rectangular table or, indeed, at a table of any form whatever.

Lord Beaconsfield insisted that the vote was a privilege and not a right, and his aim was to include in the electorate the best of all classes, not the indiscriminate multitude. Obviously, the position could not be maintained, as the query: who is to select the best? would remain forever a query. Indeed, all reforms hitherto have been in the direction of extending the electorate. The process has apparently reached some point not far from its end in the United States and will reach the same point in Japan at a no distant date. So the next process must follow the path dictated by the idea that information must precede consultation. Until a man has education, a vote is a dangerous and worse than useless thing for him to possess. Since the mass electorate is inevitable, the only means of obtaining good government out of so unwieldy a machine is education. Assuredly actual democracy, however perfect, admits of improvement. But now how is democracy to be improved? The reply is education. The sublimation of motives is an educational process. The symbol of democracy is school. It is this consideration which has given rise to the conception of

the ideal of a world-wide educational government in which the man in the street is a well-informed, inspired, and discriminating part of his community. Now the realization of this ideal requires wealth and resources, which not all countries in the world possess. That democracy's hope is in education I believe all will admit. Perfection in this actual world is unattainable, but some scorn of self and some hate of wrong are essential for the smooth working of democracy. On the other hand, as a practical question, some scorn of self and some hate of wrong are only compatible with possessing more or less margin in the means of living which, I believe, is covered by the name of "high standard of living." Such considerations would show the validity of what I have said concerning the wholesome development of democracy in the United States.

Craving the reader's indulgence for a slight digression I wish to congratulate Williams College for the joyful news that she is to receive the sum of one million dollars as residuary legatee of the late Francis Lynde Stetson of New York, a trustee and life-long benefactor of Williams, and of which I was informed while I was writing these lines.

The extension of the electorate and the education of voters are the two processes of perfecting a democracy. I see no reason why the two processes should not go on side by side instead of one after the other, particularly in a country where one feels most acutely the lack of wealth and resources which are necessary for furthering the advancement of education. Moreover, in this respect, all countries of the world, not excepting even the most advanced ones, are still in a state of transition.

Such considerations would show the validity, even if just for the present, of my definition of democracy. In any case, one thing seems to be beyond doubt, and that is, that every nation has the right to adhere to its own conception of democracy and no nation has the right to demand that its conception of democracy should unconditionally be accepted by all other countries of the world.

Let me now once more refer to the maiden speech of ex-ambassador Morris in Japan, in which he spoke of the democracy of nations. After all, I may be wrong, but anyhow it seemed to me that the incident shows that a flashing impulse on the spur of the moment is not entirely free from the chance of *democracy* being associated with *republic* even in a mind as great as that of Mr. Morris. A similar phenomenon is to be observed in the mentality of Roosevelt, when he wrote to Senator Lodge on June 16, 1905: " . . . The better I am content with democracy, even if we have to include the American newspaper as one of its assets—liability would be a better term." Such observations show the imperative necessity for two nations, speaking different languages and trying to understand each other, of paying utmost care and attention to the difference, however slight, in the meaning of those words in both languages susceptible of delicate shades of meaning, whose significance are undergoing some sort of variation or change.

It may be asked whether my conception of democracy is shared by the large majority, if not all, of the thinking men of my country. I say decidedly, "No." Only to cite an example, an entirely different concep-

tion seems to be in the mind of my esteemed friend K. Onozuka. Let me first describe briefly what sort of a man Onozuka is. He is professor of politics at the Imperial University of Tokyo and is an idol of the best and most conscientious elements of the younger generation. Like Admiral Kato in the political world of Japan, he is the typical representative of Japanese men of reticence who are particularly numerous in the educational profession of my country. Onozuka's views on political matters command the serious attention of thinking men both of the older and the younger generation. In spite of this, his natural disposition, which detests showiness and shuns public gaze, has made him thus far impervious to the superficial vision of foreign dailies published in Japan. This will account for his name not being known to the outside world.

In Onozuka's lengthy article reviewing Lord Bryce's "Modern Democracies" very soon after its publication in 1921, and contributed to the monthly magazine *Kokkagakukai Zasshi,* is to be found his concluding remarks which I am going to quote presently. The English translation of the remarks made by Mr. Onozuka himself at my request follows:

1. The present work deals with democracies. Our country cannot yet be called a democracy, in the sense that the ultimate control of political power lies in the people at large. We do not doubt, however, that the trend of affairs both abroad and at home will sooner or later compel us to make our form of government assume the outward semblance of a democracy similar to that of most civilized nations. What the quality of the future democracy in Japan may be will largely depend on the political genius of our nation. If I do not err in my above conclusion, it can by no means be

said to be premature for us carefully to reflect on the experiences of our Western predecessors in democracy.

2. When we survey the present status of the world of thought of Japan, we see, on one hand, reactionary ideas of the extreme Right—ideas which, indeed, may have existed in England prior to 1688, and in France and other countries of the European continent prior to 1789, but which are now politically almost extinct—still maintaining an influential, if not a predominant, position. A remarkable piece of anachronism! On the other hand, however, we see the ever-expanding undercurrent of radical ideas of the extreme Left, coming from Europe and America.

3. Our political life cannot but be characterized as an oligarchy of the older type, so far at least as its main features are concerned. Various forms of the past generation, by sheer power of inertia, still maintain such a predominant position as can never be found among other civilized nations. Most of our politicians are immersed in their blind struggle for political power, or are only interested in the problems of the moment, thus lacking any insight into the ultimate welfare of the nation. There are signs, on the other hand, that the more impetuous of the discontented elements, who despair of any amelioration of the present conditions through legitimate methods, will go on to preach destruction of the present order, whatever the consequences may be. The older evils of an oligarchy are not yet gone, and newer evils of a democracy are already here!

4. Democracy is still, even in Europe and America, in an experimental stage. We cannot but feel that the adoption of democracy among us, who have for so many centuries been governed under an autocratic rule, is a pretty risky undertaking. But we are, so to speak, in the firm and unescapable grip of fate, and sooner or later we shall come to see democracy in this country. The friends of democracy must sincerely endeavor to reduce its evils to the minimum, and to develop its merits to the maximum. Even those who do not look upon the advent of democracy as desirable should rather do their utmost to preserve the

merits of the older civilization, so that they can be harmonized with and embraced in the coming civilization, than to attempt a negative struggle against the development of democracy. The present work, which is the result of cool and impartial study, is a valuable guide for the future of our country.

5. Our country is not yet, by any means, a democracy, but the merits and demerits of a democracy are already observable, to no small extent, in the government, the Parliament, the political parties, the press, etc., of this country. Thus, many of the remarks of our author could aptly be applied to our present conditions. Perhaps democracy among us will under foreign stimuli see comparatively rapid development (both in its strength and its weaknesses). Our social, political, and economic life will undergo the processes that Europe and America have gone through, which can, in the main, be looked upon as normal processes of human development. Radical onrush is usually attended with reactionary retrogression. We should therefore rather try to preserve our older civilization, and construct a newer one of a democratic and international type on its foundation-stone.

We should do our best to avoid a conflict between older and newer forces, which will only prove a mere waste of our precious energy. A careful study of the present work will, from this viewpoint, be highly instructive to our readers.

A careful perusal of the above extract will reveal Onozuka's conception of democracy, which is very much different from my own. Something like the golden mean of his conception and my own may safely be taken as the conception of democracy as it exists in the mind of the average man of present-day Japan. And in that sense I have used the word *democracy* in giving an account of the recent political development in Japan.

COMPARATIVE MILITARISM

Before I go on to speak of comparative militarism from a Japanese point of view, I would like to premise a few remarks on what I have been in the habit of calling *Rooseveltian frankness*. We hear nowadays more often of such expressions as "we will talk frankly," "frank exchange of views," and the like, than in bygone days. There are people who are so sanguinely pessimistic as to interpret the prevalence of such expressions as a proof that the world has gone from bad to worse. Primarily, frankness is a quality which does not admit of qualification or gradation, but frankness, pure and simple, in the realm of human intercourse, is something like a phantom which recedes ever so far as we venture to approach it. In the actual state of the present-day world, nobody seems to question the propriety or validity of saying "more frankly." Very often frankness at a certain instant spontaneously degenerates itself in a short time, giving rise to the necessity of greater frankness, which, in turn, soon deteriorates, and this process seems to be destined to go on *ad infinitum*. It may be compared to climbing a steep sand hill, whereby one step upwards is compensated by a sliding downwards of the body as a whole. As long as we cannot shake ourselves off what is commonly called human weakness, we are forced to admit different degrees of frankness.

I do not really know why, and, after all, it might be merely a dreamy illusion, but, somehow, I cannot help thinking of what may perhaps be called the law of conservation of human weakness in the realm of psychological activity, analogous to the law of conservation

of energy in the material world. The analogy seems to go still further and we may distinguish kinetic weakness, or weakness which is at once evident, and potential weakness, or weakness which remains latent for the time being and comes out when we least expect it. Human weakness manifests itself in very many varied forms—here in one form, there in another, somewhere else in still another form, and so forth; but what is equivalent to the sum-total remains invariable from time immemorial to the present day and forever. Philosophy, religion, civilization, and any human device, however ingenious, are utterly powerless to change this sum-total. All we can profitably do in this respect is to transform human weakness into such a form as is least injurious to the aggregate welfare of mankind.

What I have ventured to call the law of conservation of human weakness has been expressed in varied forms as the following examples will show: Humanity is always on the march; but it marches absent-mindedly without knowing whither it goeth along a path dictated by the happening of the hour, only to find itself once in a while on the same spot passed some time ago. It is the case of endless going along a vicious circle. Or again, all things in this world embody in themselves the seeds of their own decay if left to themselves. They need constant recuperation for maintaining even their *status quo*. One thing, however, remains unchanged and that is human nature, which is the law of the world we live in.

Taken all round, and as long as it is well-nigh impossible to shake off human weakness, we are forced

to admit the existence of a certain limit to the degree of frankness attainable in actual reality. I believe, such a limit was, indeed, often reached by Roosevelt in many of his utterances. As a typical example, I may quote the following from that highly interesting work, "Theodore Roosevelt and His Time":

When I [Roosevelt] asked Booker T. Washington to dinner I did not devote very much thought to the matter one way or the other. I respect him greatly and believe in the work he has done. I have consulted so much with him, it seemed to me, that it was natural to ask him to dinner to talk over his work, and the very fact that *I felt a moment's qualm on inviting him because of his color* made me ashamed of myself and made me hasten to send the invitation. I did not think of its bearing one way or the other, either on my own future or on anything else. *As things have turned out, I am very glad that I asked him, for the clamor aroused by the act makes me feel as if the act was necessary.*

I have not been able to think out any solution of the terrible problem offered by the presence of the negro on this continent, but of one thing I am sure, and that is that inasmuch as he is here and can neither be killed nor driven away, the only wise and honorable and Christian thing to do is to treat each black man and each white man strictly on his merit as a man, giving him no more or less than he shows himself worthy to have. I say I am sure that this is the right solution. Of course I know that we see through a glass dimly, and, after all, it may be that I am wrong; but if I am, then all my thoughts and beliefs are wrong, and my whole way of looking at life is wrong. At any rate, while I am in public life, however short a time that may be, I am in honor bound to act up to my beliefs and convictions. I do not intend to offend the prejudices of any one else, but neither do I intend to allow their prejudices to make me false to my principle.

Further on, Roosevelt expresses his own conviction by quoting the following passages from an editorial of the New York *World:*

> An American named Washington, one of the most learned, most eloquent, most brilliant men of the day—the President of a college—is asked to dinner by President Roosevelt. And because the pigment of his skin is some shades darker than that of others, a large part of the United States is convulsed with shame and rage.
>
> The man is a negro. Therefore in eating with him the President is charged with having insulted the South. This man may cast a ballot but he may not break bread. He may represent us in the Senate Chamber, but he may not join us at the breakfast table. He may educate us, but not eat with us; preach our Gospel, but not be our guest; enlighten our mind, but not entertain our bodies; die for us, but not dine with us.

One thing which struck me on reading the extremely interesting and instructive "International Relations" by Viscount Bryce was the conspicuousness by absence of the phrase "League of Nations." Curiosity allured me to look for the phrase in the index, which gives page 52 and pages 246 to 254. Throughout the whole volume there is one and only one instance where the phrase appears, namely on page 52. On going over the nine pages from 246 to 254 once more, I was struck not only by the total absence of the phrase but by the painstaking care with which he seemed to have purposely evaded mentioning explicitly "League of Nations" by roundabout expressions whenever he had to refer to it. With all my respect for the author as a man who knew America better than most Americans, I came to the conclusion that to speak out "League of

Nations" to an American audience after the Republican victory of 1920 does not agree with aesthetic taste. It required all the courage of Lady Astor to speak out these terrible words. I believe Lady Nancy spoke with Rooseveltian frankness.

In speaking of comparative militarism, for the sake of clearness, I deem it necessary to speak with Rooseveltian frankness.

In international relations, just as in the relations between individuals, there occur from time to time differences which cannot be easily reconciled. Sometimes refuge is sought in ascribing such differences to misunderstanding in order to avoid pushing the controversy to the extreme or to save the face of the contending parties. Such a misunderstanding may be designated as fake or, perhaps more appropriately, conventional. I believe there are instances whereby we may not unfitly speak of diplomatic misunderstanding. It is not of such a misunderstanding that I am presently going to speak, but a genuine misunderstanding—misunderstanding pure and simple—arising from innocent ignorance or unconscious lack of sympathetic consideration which each side ought to bestow on the psychological attitude of the other.

In the intercommunication and interpenetration of modern States, disputes, misunderstandings, claims and counter-claims are inevitable. They ought to be, and can be, settled amicably in the spirit of conciliation, compromise, and friendly give-and-take. As a prerequisite condition no efforts should be spared for minimizing the chance of the occurrence of misunderstand-

ing. There should be not only mutual understanding, but, in addition, a determination not to misunderstand. Such a task falls upon the shoulders of leaders, to be found in every nation, who will refuse to accept misunderstanding, who will always credit the other side with having some good reasons which have not as yet been made clear, and who will constantly go out of their way to find explanations and to exercise forbearance.

Anticipating your indulgence, I take the liberty of citing an example of misunderstanding, at once glaring and ludicrous, which is widely current among the students of the Imperial University of Tokyo. *Cognac*, needless to say, is an excellent kind of French brandy, so called because much of it is made near the town of the same name in western France. Now *konnyak* is the Japanese name given to the so-called kneaded devil's tongue, a favorite food in my country, made from the bulb whose scientific name is *Amorphophallus Riviera*. The two words are pronounced almost exactly alike. A certain professor, in the course of giving lectures on the history of the Spanish conquest of South America, was one day speaking about one of the iron-hearted Spanish adventurers, who used to drink cognac in order to intoxicate himself whenever he had to do some cruel deeds. The lecturer repeatedly uttered *cognac*, while his audience felt all the while at a loss in comprehending how the eatable *konnyak* could stimulate any man to the execution of cruel deeds. This is not a wild story, but a genuine fact. Corsica in Ohio must not be mixed up with its namesake in the Mediterranean.

If, whenever the American speaks of Japanese militarism, his hearer cannot help thinking of American militarism, the effective discussion conducive to mutual understanding is well-nigh impossible. The well-meaning big boy may not be conscious that he is aggressive, but his advice often sounds like a mockery to his small playfellow. If the big boy deigns to stoop just a little so as to see eye to eye his small playfellow compassionately, then this posture and the conciliatory atmosphere thereby created would contribute in no small measure toward reaching an agreement, and, indeed, far more easily than when the small boy is speaking to the waist of the big boy standing majestically erect.

At one time during the World War, when a substantial portion of the American press was clamoring for intervention by the United States in Mexico, to compose a war-torn country, President Wilson, if I am rightly informed, postulated in his classic strain that the Mexican people had as much right to fight as had the nations of Europe which were then at war. The primary problem for China, as China herself well knows, is to set her own house in order. And China will settle down somehow, as some of her shrewd statesmen say, provided she is left alone by other Powers for some length of time. The history of her long past amply testifies to this. At the same time, other Powers are sincerely desirous of China getting rid of her internecine strifes and mimic civil wars. One thing to be particularly noticed in this connection is the existence of outside atmosphere or tendency which seems to suggest, if not to prescribe, the manner in which China

should settle down. Meanwhile China might be pondering over the postulate just mentioned, or thinking somehow in a similar vein. The outside world says something and China may say just the same. And yet who can vouchsafe for the coincidence of the real significance of what they are saying. I myself, being an outsider, can only imagine, or at most argue by analogy, which is always a dangerous, even if not a fallacious, way of reasoning. All this would sound more or less enigmatical, as is naturally to be expected. Only I am bold enough to think that there is some ingredient of truth in it and that it furnishes another example of misunderstanding belonging to the same category as those already given.

It is trite to say that the greatest barrier in the mutually beneficial intercourse between Japan and the English-speaking countries is the language. Thanks to the disinterested labors of men like Williams, Hepburn, Brown, Verbeck, Satow, Aston, Mitford, Gubbins, Lay, Chamberlain, and others, a good start was made in the arduous task of removing this barrier. And since the days of these pioneers, big strides have been made in the direction of diffusing and disseminating the knowledge of English through all the strata of the Japanese people. There are optimists who go even so far as to think of Japan becoming in the near future a bi-linguistic country, the second language being English. Nevertheless, paradoxical as it may sound on first hearing, there is nowadays a far greater chance of misunderstanding due to the difference of language than in days gone by. In old days, both sides were psychologically prepared for the frequent occur-

rence of such misunderstandings and were always on the alert to spare no effort for clearing them up. Whereas nowadays the illusion is rampant that there is no such hindrance to the communication of thought and idea, and that, even if it does exist, it can be easily overcome. Unawares, we are liable to be caught in the trap of misunderstanding and stay there without our knowing all the time. That such an illusion is altogether unwarrantable may be illustrated by a few examples.

While the Washington Conference (1921) was in session, a series of articles from the pen of H. G. Wells appeared in the American press. These articles were cabled to the Osaka and Tokyo *Asahi,* which owned their copyright in Japan, and immediately appeared in their Japanese version on the pages of these newspapers. Within a few days, the English translation of the Japanese version appeared in several of the English dailies published in Japan. Now, when the original reached Japan, it was found to be so different from the English translation derived from the Japanese version, as to merit their republication. Let me narrate parenthetically my own personal experience which occurred only about two weeks ago (August 8, 1922). A lady asked me: "How do you like Williamstown?" As I have often said before, I answered instantly: "I do like it; I feel so homely here in Williamstown." With Rooseveltian frankness, my kind lady friend told me that *homely* means something quite different from what I had obviously in my mind. Again, toward the close of the Genoa Conference (1922), Tokyo received the London telegram which said: Genoa dis-

patches show that American financial interests there are less inactive on the Russian question than the Administration." Now a version of this in Japanese, as it appeared in the *Jiji* and translated into English as faithfully as is at all possible, runs: "The American financiers in Genoa are not so active with regard to the Russian question and more inactive than the Administration." Considering that the *Jiji* is one of the foremost dailies in Japan, particularly noted for accuracy in such matters, and, furthermore, observing that such occurrences are by no means rare, we are irrevocably led toward feeling the paramount influence which the language barrier still exercises in obstructing our mutual understanding. The only remedy for this which I can think of consists in returning to the cautious attitude of the bygone days and keeping ourselves aloof from arriving at hasty conclusions.

The *Taiyo* is one of the most respectable monthly magazines published in Tokyo. In the *Taiyo* of July, 1920, there appeared an article in Japanese entitled "American Militarism." To forestall any possible misunderstanding, I wish to state emphatically once for all that it is an article written about one year and a half previous to the convening of the Washington Conference and at the time when Japan felt most acutely that she was being unjustly singled out from among the Powers as militaristic. Americans might never have thought of their country as militaristic. In all cases, however, to see one's own self as reflected in the mirror of others is salutary, if not instructive. If the two sides reciprocally do the same, much of the misunderstanding likely to arise will be nipped in the

bud. It is highly desirable that these thoughts should be spoken, and spoken plainly and frankly. And thus we may hope to be able to contribute toward promoting the friendly relations between America and Japan, so happily consolidated by the Washington Conference.

An English translation of the said article is to be found in the *America-Japan* of December, 1920. I will now give a somewhat lengthy extract of this article, omitting those portions which are either nonessential or made obsolete by the course of events since this article was written and, particularly, by the beneficial results of the Washington Conference. For the full English version of the article, reference is to be made to the magazine just mentioned, which, I think, is easily accessible to any one who takes special interest in such matters.

Let us first consider what America is and has been. American history gives the following war records since her Independence:

From July, 1812, to March, 1815 (2 years and 8 months)—the Anglo-American War.
From November, 1817, to May, 1818 (6 months)—the First Florida War.
From March, 1822, to August, 1822 (5 months)—the Black-Hawk War.
From December, 1835, to August, 1842 (6 years and 8 months)—the Second Florida War.
From January, 1846, to February, 1848 (2 years and 1 month)—the Mexican-American War.
From February, 1861, to May, 1865 (4 years and 3 months)—the American Civil War.
From April, 1898, to July, 1898 (3 months)—the Spanish-American War.

From February, 1899, to August, 1901 (3 years and 1 month)—the Philippine War.

From June, 1900, to August, 1900 (2 months)—the Boxer Rising.

From March, 1916, to February, 1917 (1 year)—Invasion of Mexico.

From April, 1917, to November, 1918 (1 year and 7 months)—the World War.

During about one hundred and ten years she waged eleven wars, the time of which totals twenty years and eight months. She has fought once in every ten years and has been engaged in war for over one-fifth of a century. At the time of the American Civil War, one eighth of the whole population of America was engaged in military service, whereas in the Russo-Japanese War, only one fortieth of our whole population was engaged in military service.

Next let me glance at American diplomatic history. For the sake of simplicity, let me refer only to important events.

1. About seventy years ago, America, backing up the Americans in Texas, then a part of Mexico, after making them declare separation from Mexico, immediately annexed the state. Conditions in Mexico then were very precarious owing to civil war, and America, making an unjustifiable expedition to Mexico, compelled the latter not only to recognize the annexation of Texas, but also Arizona, New Mexico, and California, a far vaster territory than Texas.

2. In the second place, America urged the people of Cuba to revolt against Spain and challenged her to fight because an American warship happened to explode and sink from unknown causes in a Spanish port. America, within only about a hundred days, brought the great old nation to her knees. As the result of this war, America not only got Cuba, but also added the Philippines to her already vast dominion under the name of purchase, and later subjugated the honest natives of these islands who shortly before had risen against Spain for independence.

3. In a similar way America annexed important territory in the Pacific Ocean. That is to say, when England

and France oppressed Hawaii with force of arms, America first beguiled the ignorant natives with the aid of her missionaries, and about seventy years ago made them propose that the archipelago should be annexed to America at their request. Later on, the seizure of Guam was immediately followed by the annexation of Hawaii.

4. This territorial aggrandizement in the Pacific naturally led America to pay attention to the Panama Canal. It was fortunate for her that the Canal region belonged to a small and weak country, Colombia. She first instigated the Panama natives, giving support to them both from inside and outside, and made them independent of Colombia. America then immediately recognized the independence and secured a perpetual lease of the canal territory, over forty miles long and ten miles wide, as the compensation for her patronage. Then the canal was cut through the territory. In spite of the previous agreement with Great Britain to make it an international canal like that of Suez, America constructed a strong fortress, and holds it with arms.

The American continent at the time of the establishment of the United States of America was indeed a paradise for the native Indians who then numbered tens of millions. The Americans subjugated these ignorant Indians by means of arms, and, moreover, subjected them to tyranny and despotism, the result of this being the gradual disintegration of the copper-colored race to their present state. Next let us consider the case of the ill-treated negroes. They were first brought from a far-away land, Africa, in order to develop the industry of the United States. They have been therefore, in one sense great benefactors of American industry. They occupy such an important position that it is often said that if you should now take away the ten million negroes from America, her industries could not maintain their present normal conditions by any means. They at present, however, in spite of having due rights granted to them by the American Constitution, and greatly benefiting America instead of doing any harm, are treated with extreme racial discrimination.

What is very convenient for America is her Monroe Doctrine. She dares to meddle and interfere in the domestic affairs of Mexico and other small countries in Central and South America on the platform of this Doctrine. It happened several years ago that when Japanese immigration was about to develop in Mexico, America, putting in her oar, secretly gave the Mexican Government a warning to the effect that this would bring danger to Mexico, and obliged the latter to expel the immigrants from the country. And when the false rumor spread that Japan would lease Magdalena Bay, American newspapers, putting feathers on the wing of rumor, most busily engaged in the accusation of Japan. Regarding things pertaining to America and the American Continent, America always exaggerates and protests, even though they be ephemeral rumors and idle stories.

Thus, you will see, the first question is whether America has any qualification to call others "militaristic." At the time of its Independence, America was nothing but a small country on the eastern coast of North America with a population of only 2,500,000, which within only one hundred and forty years enlarged its territory by its artifices so that it now covers all the favorable temperate-zone territory on the North American continent, and, for its future high jump, has secured foothold in Central America and in the Pacific Ocean. Its population has increased forty-four fold since the time of the signing of the Declaration of Independence. In spite of this rapid increase, the proportion of the population within its territory is only thirty-one per square mile at present, owing to its more rapid expansion of dominion. And yet it does not only reject immigrants from other countries but also disturbs, and is jealous of, other immigrants coming to neighboring countries. Japan, on the contrary, for twenty-five hundred years, has been satisfied with its old dominion, which is smaller than some states in America, the density of whose population is 356 per square mile, the proportion being eleven or twelve times greater than that of America. Moreover, the scarcity of staple products

made it necessary for her to look for the way out of this difficulty by emigration toward the east, which was checked at once, and when Japan tried to develop economically in the west, it was immediately hindered. Such is the present condition of Japan.

To sum up, judging from past and present conditions in America, we cannot help doubting whether American anti-militarism and anti-aggressivism are practiced, much as they are demanded from others; or whether the "righteousness, freedom, and equality" of which America speaks so loudly are absolute and real.

So far is an extract from the article which appeared in the *Taiyo* about one year and a half ago. In order to forestall any contingent misunderstandings, I wish to say unequivocally that I am far from approving all the statements contained in this article. Nor do I even approve all that is embodied in the extract which I have just quoted. Nevertheless, the gist of some part of the article stripped of its somewhat childish coloring and of incidental inaccuracies, is the thought which happened, particularly in days prior to the Washington Conference, to cross from time to time the mind of some of the thinking Japanese who are genuinely interested in maintaining and increasing good relations between the United States and Japan, and who are in a better position than others to know the rich potentialities for good these relations contain.

Japan has been frequently, and particularly in the foreign press, accused of being belligerent, a warlike nation, and consequently a menace to the peace of the world. Let me now analyze how far such an accusation can be justified by undeniable facts.

At this juncture I should like to quote the words of

Lord Bryce, which express fittingly my own thought, and which are to be found in his "Modern Democracies."

> Such aggressive tendencies as belonged to the United States policy two generations ago have disappeared. . . . No State possessed of gigantic power has shown in recent years so little disposition to abuse it.[1]

Japan has a record for peace that may well be the envy of other nations. For two hundred and fifty years before the advent of Commodore Perry, Japan was at peace with the outside world, and, what is, I believe, not less remarkable, with herself. During the seventy years Japan came in contact with the West, there have been two internal wars and three, or perhaps four if we include the Boxer Rising, external ones, all comparatively brief, altogether taking up hardly one twelfth of her seven decades of world intercourse. Thus, viewed statistically, her record compares favorably with those of any other of the great Powers of the present day.

As to the civil wars, it may be observed that they were quickly forgotten in the new national life, far more quickly than North and South were perfectly reconciled after the American Civil War. By thus saying, however, it must not be understood that I am so credulous as to believe wholly the story that it took decades before North and South were sufficiently one to encourage a president to visit every state in the Union. That the civil war in Japan of 1877 took place in order to avoid an external war would hardly need any comment. As to the China-Japan War of 1894-95

[1] Vol. II, p. 159 (edition of 1921).

and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, it has been often said that they were the wars forced upon Japan, to whom was left no other choice than to fight. However, merely asserting dogmatically that such was the case is of little avail in deciding whether they were really defensive wars for Japan or not. To make this point clear, it is necessary to go into a close and unbiased examination of the background of these wars.

Let us first study a little the state of affairs in the Far East during a period covering a few decades previous to the outbreak of the China-Japan War. The question, "What is China?" raised by one of the French delegates at the Washington Conference, has not been, so far as I am aware, answered to the satisfaction of all concerned. However intricate and perplexing the question may appear even now, it was far more difficult to answer in the days of which I am speaking than at the present moment. In the days of China's undisputed hegemony in Asia, the border region between China and the outside world was fitted with vassal states, tributary provinces, all sorts of dependencies, quasi-protectorates, buffer states and what not. During the period now under review the nebulous character of her border was more or less rectified. On the southwest, Burma, Siam, Annam, and Tonking, one by one, ceased to be dependent on China and independent towards all other nations, while on the northeast, Russia, seizing the opportunity when China had been beaten to her knees by England and France in 1860, secured the cession of the long strip of seacoast from the mouth of Amur to the Korean

frontier, which was then called the Usuri region but is now known by the name of the Maritime Province of Siberia.

The source of the complications between China and Japan previous to the war of 1894-95 is to be traced to the ambiguous and not seldom fluctuating interpretation by China of the status of several regions lying between the two countries. In 1873, a number of Loochoo islanders had been shipwrecked on Formosa and some killed by the semi-savage aborigines. As Formosa was claimed as part of China's domain, the Tokyo Government at once sought redress from Peking. As the Chinese Government showed no disposition to perform her plain duty by punishing these acts of cruelty, Japan was obliged to take the law into her own hands by sending the punitive expedition of 1874. Immediately thereupon China claimed that in sending this punitive expedition to Formosa Japan invaded Chinese territory, and lodged a protest which would probably have involved the two countries in a war had not the British Minister in Peking intervened. A peaceful solution was found in the payment by China of a small indemnity covering the expenses of Japan's expedition.

The Formosan affair, insignificant in itself, had an important collateral bearing upon the relation between China and Japan, inasmuch as it consolidated before the eyes of the world Japan's ownership of the Loochoo Islands. In spite of this, when Japan in 1876 extended to the Loochoo Islands the system of local government already in force in Japan proper, China formulated an unreasonable protest, which fortunately

fell through after perfunctory negotiations lasting several years.

One of the most difficult problems which confronted Japanese statesmen soon after the Restoration of 1868, was the relation of China and Japan toward Korea. While China was anxious to cling to her shadowy claim over Korea, she was not anxious to accept the responsibility for acts committed by the truculent and quarrelsome Koreans. On the other hand, in view of Russia's unceasing aggression, Korea's fate was a matter that concerned Japan's life.

An intense excitement in Japan caused by an unexpected attack by the Koreans upon a Japanese steamer asking for coal and provisions in 1875, gave an impetus to the dispatch in January, 1876, of an expedition after the pattern of Commodore Perry's. And Japan drew Korea out of international isolation and signed with the Peninsular Kingdom a treaty acknowledging the latter's independence. About the same time China nominally annexed the so-called neutral territory on the frontier. In 1880 Chemulpo was opened to Japanese trade. The Chinese statesmen refrained from declaring Korea a dependency of China, nor did the Peking Government make any protest when Japan, the United States, Great Britain, and other Powers concluded treaties on the basis of an independent Korea. And yet China clung tenaciously to the fiction of ultimate dependency and intermediate sovereignty. This attitude, at once anomalous and dubious, on the part of China, was the source of almost unbearable annoyance and humiliation for Japan. Again and again Japan's patience was sorely

tried and pushed on to the precipitous verge of the breaking point.

In order to put an end to such a precarious situation as above depicted, in March, 1885, Japan sent Count (afterwards Prince) Ito to China to effect an arrangement with the Peking Government. Ito was fully conscious of the difficult nature of the task confronting him. China, at that time, looked upon Japan as a contemptible upstart who, discarding the venerable customs originally copied from herself, imitated Western manners apishly. Indeed, as Captain Brinkley, who accompanied Ito in an unofficial capacity, says in his fragmentary reminiscences, Japan was a renegade in Chinese eyes, and her pretensions in Korea seemed mere impertinence. Besides, China was fully conscious of the solid fact that she possessed a navy very much stronger than that of Japan. Li Hung Chang, the famous Viceroy, who was often called the Bismarck of the East and looked upon as the greatest statesman in the Orient, was appointed Chinese plenipotentiary to negotiate with Ito. Li was willing enough to recognize Korea's independence. That proposition was mainly of academic value in his eyes. But as to any arrangement for explicitly placing Japan on an equal footing with China in Korea, he repelled the idea. And this incongruity in Li's mental attitude was repulsive to Ito's more logical sense of consistency. So the rupture of the negotiations appeared to be imminent, and it was only at the eleventh hour that a short but pregnant Convention was signed by them at Tientsin on April 18, 1885. It consisted of only three articles: first, that both countries should withdraw

their troops from Korea; secondly, that no more officers should be sent by either country to drill the Korean army; and, thirdly, that if at any future time either country should send troops to Korea, it must first inform the other country.

For nine years after the Tientsin Convention, there was apparent peace in Korea. In the spring of 1894 I was shocked by the news of the assassination at Shanghai of my friend Kim-Ok-Kium, the leader of the Korean revolution of 1884, whom I came to know during his leisurely years of exile in Japan. Happening outside Korea, as it did, this event was still the primordial cause of the important occurrences that followed during the summer of 1894 in Korea, and which culminated in the mutual declaration of war between China and Japan on the first of August.

A few years previous to the outbreak of the war, China sent to Japan her fleet under the command of Admiral Tin. It was a demonstration more of strength than of courtesy. The fleet included the *Ting-yuen* and the *Chin-yuen*, two sister battleships of 7,400 tons built at the Stettin dock-yard of Germany. They were the flower and pride of the Chinese navy, and were, indeed, the most formidable warships afloat in Eastern waters at that time. Japan had nothing of the kind, the heaviest she possessed being cruisers of 4,200 tons. The fleet visited Yokohama, Kobe, and Nagasaki in succession, and, after having struck terror into the heart of the Japanese people, returned to its home waters. To this day I have still a vivid memory of the nightmare of Tokyo being bombarded by the big guns of the *Ting-yuen* and the *Chin-yuen*.

All that has been written concerning the war and its consequences was written with Japan's victory as an accomplished fact before the eyes of the writer. This will partly account for the light in which the nature of the war as to whether or not it is a defensive one appears to a casual observer. The true and unbiased judgment on this point can only be passed by reverting to the pre-war state of mind at a time when the issue was merely a matter of conjecture. But to unlearn anything we do know is far more difficult than to learn something which we do not know.

At first, the war seemed to foreign observers to be the contest of a pigmy with a giant. Although it was conceded among military authorities that the Japanese, with their superior alertness, might gain some success at the outset, still there was a general belief in the enormous latent power of China, which would awake in time of need. Not only was China a lion asleep, but she had done enough in the struggle with France to justify the opinion that she possessed considerable military power and a great capacity of endurance. Her navy was assuredly superior to that of her antagonist. In Port Arthur she possessed a well-equipped naval station, and Wei Hai Wei was scarcely in any way inferior. The consensus of opinion pointed, therefore, to the view that the superior mass and the overwhelming resources of China would in time nullify any of her handicaps and that the result would be indecisive, if not favorable to her. Such being the case, Japan entered upon the war with no light heart and because no other choice was left to her without endangering her existence as an independent nation in

view of Russia's aggressive policy in the Far East. I hope the fact that the China-Japan War was a defensive war for Japan to start with, and, at any rate, not a war of Japan's seeking, has been made sufficiently clear.

Although peace and conciliation were the abiding purpose of Count Ito and other Japanese statesmen then at the helm of the nation's destiny, they would have been more than human had they failed to take advantage of Japan's signal victory as an accomplished fact. Candidly we have to admit that the original terms Japan had put forward as the condition of peace were exceedingly harsh, and this might have acted retrospectively to throw a shadow on her motive in entering upon the war. Now, a few days after his arrival in Shimonoseki, Li Hung Chang, the Chinese plenipotentiary at the peace negotiations, was shot in the cheek by a fanatic. This unfortunate accident stirred Japan with an impulse to atone by some concession for the breach of the laws of hospitality. The original harsh terms were mitigated to a considerable extent. Viewed in the historical perspective, even the terms of peace finally imposed on China might appear onerous, but considering the completeness of the Japanese victory, they could hardly be called excessive. There still remains one more consideration which has an important bearing on this point. And that is the probability that at the moment of signing the treaty of Shimonoseki, Li Hung Chang, of whose skill in the art of secret diplomacy there can be no doubt, had some good knowledge for believing that the most important clause relating to the cession of the Liao-tung

Peninsula would never be enforced. Be that as it may, the terms of peace of the Shimonoseki Treaty, cardinally mitigated by the retrocession of the Liao-tung Peninsula, were certainly very moderate.

Next let us turn to the background of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. In this case, my task is comparatively easy, as most of the facts which I should like to recapitulate are surely so well known to you that they need not be reiterated.

It is a curious coincidence perhaps worth noticing that just about the same time Japan was opened to foreign intercourse was fought the Crimean War, which sealed Russia's long-coveted access to the Mediterranean through the Bosporus. Ever since that time Russia has been following the unceasingly aggressive policy, which had for its ultimate object ice-free access to the Pacific Ocean by making the Sea of Japan a Russian lake.

Nikolaievsk, the scene of the massacre of March-May, 1920, when 720 Japanese were killed, situated on the Amur near its mouth, was founded in 1851 and served for a temporary naval base and as a stepping stone for further acquisitions toward the south. As said before, Russia got from China the Maritime Province of Siberia in 1860. Immediately thereupon, Russia shifted her naval base to a point ten degrees south from Nikolaievsk, namely, Vladivostok. In 1861 Russia, taking advantage of Japan's internal dissensions, suddenly seized the Island of Tsushima, which might have remained in Russia's hands had not Great Britain intervened. In 1875, in order to avoid future complications with Russia, Japan surrendered her title

to Saghalien on the plausible pretext of exchanging it for the Kurile Islands, which had never been owned by Russia but had always belonged to Japan. Had, in addition, Russia acquired an effective control of Korea, her dream of making the Sea of Japan a Russian lake might have been almost realized.

As my collegemate Okakura, whose early death is deeply lamented by all who knew him, so picturesquely describes in his "The Awakening of Japan," Korea lies like a dagger ever pointed toward the very heart of Japan. Korea in the possession of Russia, or even a weak and corrupt Korea which might fall any time an easy prey to the Russian Eagle, would place Japan's destiny in the hands of the unscrupulous "Colossus of the North." Japan could not accept such a fate. That the Russo-Japanese War was not only a defensive war for Japan but Japan's struggle for her very existence as an independent nation is too obvious to require either elucidation or explanation.

The period from the close of the China-Japan War to the opening of the Russo-Japanese is to be looked upon for us Japanese as the days of "reclining on firewood and tasting liver," in the words of an old saying. Side by side with our just aspiration to redress the wrong done us by Russia, we had to think of the further encroachment of our northern neighbor across the Sea of Japan. We had to prepare for the inevitable struggle from which there seemed to be no way of escape. Whatever may be the outcome, of which we had then no clear perception, we were determined to stake everything, as no other choice was left to us. The victory gained by Japan over Russia belongs to an entirely

different category from her victory over China. That it has been hailed as a brilliant victory was no more than an effusion of momentary impulse of the dumfounded world. The victory was only local and Russia as a whole was untouched. Seen in a matter-of-fact way and in the light of historical judgment, it would have been more appropriate to say that the Russo-Japanese War ended in a draw somewhat favorable to Japan. What pained Russia was the loss of prestige in Europe, having been defeated by such a small Oriental country as Japan, even locally. It is but natural that Russia should be bent on taking revenge. Nor can Russia be blamed for this too severely. Unfortunately, the spirit of revenge is the common possession of mankind. Even men of Pasteur's caliber, living in the realm of science, which knows no boundary, are not immune to the passion of revenge. It is well known that the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 half killed Pasteur and he said that henceforth every one of his books shall have written across them, *"la revanche, la revanche."*

The peace restored by the Treaty of Portsmouth had the nature of truce. It was clear from the outset that Russia would not consent to occupy the place assigned to her by the Treaty of Portsmouth, and she would promptly prepare for a war of revenge. It is true that Russia signed with Japan in July, 1906, a convention pledging the contracting parties to respect all the rights accruing to one or the other under the Portsmouth Treaty. In spite of the assurance of continuous peace between the two Powers stipulated by this treaty, we had to think of Russia's cynical dis-

regard for its plighted words in the days of the decaying Romanovs. Russia was doubling the track of her Siberian Railway and was also building a second line along the Amur, while Japan had to execute her railway plans on the Asiatic continent in order to counteract Russia's preponderating influence steadily gravitating towards the East. Meanwhile, the anti-Japanese movements arising out of Japanese immigration into California had been developing on the other side of the Pacific. That neither the California trouble itself nor the jingoistic outburst on both sides of the Pacific could possibly lead to an armed conflict between the Great Republic and the Island Empire of the East was clear not only to the thinking public in Japan but to any one really familiar with the trend of Japanese sentiment. What we most feared was that this chimera, though absolutely unthinkable, might encourage in China a dangerous mood tending towards fostering an unquiet feeling. Anxious years for Japan rolled by, Japan feeling all the time indescribable uneasiness beyond the comprehension of the authors of so many foreign books promiscuously written after a hasty tour through the Orient. Japan had to be prepared for emergencies not only for the sake of her own safety, but, Japan being the upholder of peace in the Orient, for maintaining order in eastern Asia.

So far is one aspect of Japan's attitude toward her oft-criticized militarism during the closing years of the Meiji era. In order to do justice to myself, let me now give the other aspect of the same. As is well known, during the Russo-Japanese War, much to the amazement of the outside world, no noisy and vulgar

clamor, no self-laudation, no triumph over a fallen enemy, but grateful calm and serene satisfaction reigned throughout the length and breadth of the country. This may partly be accounted for by the nature of some of our victories, which far exceeded our most buoyant expectations. A sudden change of tone and temper, however, manifested itself in the popular outburst which awaited the return of Baron (afterwards Marquis) Komura, Japan's chief plenipotentiary at the peace negotiations, from Portsmouth, with no indemnity and but one-half of Sagahlien in his pocket. The explanation of this sudden change is to be sought in the human weakness which often shows itself on the abrupt removal of excessive self-restraint. The sincere, though not ostensibly enthusiastic, greeting which awaited the homecoming of Japan's delegates to the Washington Conference in the beginning of 1922 stands in vivid contrast to the stormy reception accorded to poor Komura toward the end of 1905. It was high time for Japan to be reminded of her ancient adage, "If victorious, tighten your helmet's cords." All the laudations and glorifications so lavishly bestowed by the outside world, not only upon Japan's achievements during the Russo-Japanese War, but on all that she was able to accomplish in such a short time since the Restoration of 1868, gave rise to a severe tension to the moral fiber which had hitherto tied up the self-restraint of the Japanese people. For, after all, we Japanese are but human, like every other people. Without our knowing we were dragging toward a mental attitude which deserved our being characterized as militaristic or being called "swelled head." Frankly,

we admit the reasonableness of such an accusation which the spirit of justice forbids us to refute. Looking back to the days when such an accusation was by no means unfair, ever more do we conceive the wisdom of recalling human frailties in the hour of exaltation.

Now, in Japan as well as in the United States, just as in every other country, there are jingoes, evildoers, extremists, alarmists, agitators, and the like. In refuting something which cannot be disproved, sometimes refuge is sought in ascribing it to the doings of these kinds of men. Such is an affront to the spirit of candor and frankness. It is to be plainly admitted that at one time or the other during the closing years of the Meiji era and the beginning years of the Taisho, Japan was militaristic in a certain sense. Never was she, however, militaristic in the same sense as the pre-war Germany dreaming of world domination was militaristic. The mistaken notion that Japan is militaristic to the core is just about as far away from the truth as the truth is separated from the assertion that Japan is not at all militaristic. In regard to Japan's doings in Manchuria, it may be observed that every act of Japan was subjected to an exceptionally severe scrutiny, and other nations behaved as though they expected her to live up to a quixotic standard of superhuman ideal. China's mood, which greatly complicated the situation, is also to be taken into due consideration. Just imagine Mexico magnified two and a half times in area and twenty times in population and the United States compressed in area on the ratio of twelve to one and diminished in population by about

twenty per cent and stripped of the surplus part of the heavenly gift of its overabundant natural resources, there you will have a vivid image of the Far Eastern situation. Activity which oscillates between lethargic lassitude and spasmodic eruption very often taxes the patience of responsibility almost to a breaking point. A little United States with a giant Mexico just across the line would view Japan's predicament with genuine sympathy. In passing, it may be observed that, even granting that Japan is militaristic in a certain sense and to a certain degree, such an insinuation as that there is no reason why the fate of the independent Philippines should be left to the will of the strong country which is covetous of the fertile soil and profitable commerce of the islands, is far more than the Japanese militarism deserves and is so monstrously absurd that it becomes verily comical.

I now pass on to the period of the World War. The national character of the Japanese people which manifested itself in the course of going through the ordeal of the Russo-Japanese War has been the object of so much praise that there appeared in time a regrettable tendency which, if unchecked, might have led to the illusion that such is a unique possession monopolized by the Japanese people. The World War revealed that the noble qualities which we have been unconsciously proud of are shared by the people of most of the countries at war in an equal, if not in a surpassing, degree. This is the most wholesome lesson which we derived from the World War. Even the most irrepressive and the most vehement of our jingoes could not remain indifferent to this conviction of the nation as a whole.

The true feature of the circumstances under which Japan entered the World War was made clear to the public on the death of Marquis Okuma, which occurred last January (1922). At the Cabinet meeting held on the fourth of August, 1914, that is, on the same day when Great Britain declared war on Germany, Japan's attitude was decided upon unequivocally, the British fear of danger having been communicated to the Japanese Government a day or two previously. In arriving at this decision, it was the voice of two civilians, namely, Premier Okuma and Viscount Kato, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, that was dominant. Among the so-called militarists, the consensus of opinion at the outbreak of the war was that France is no match for Germany, England decrepit, Belgium negligible, and Paris will be within a few months in the hands of triumphant Germany.

The vital clause of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance provided that should the territorial rights or special interests of either power in Eastern Asia be threatened, the two allies would unite in their defense. If Japan had been disposed to taking a strict interpretation of her obligations it would have been none too difficult to assert that the presence of German raiders in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the existence of a German base on the coast of China did not seriously affect the territorial rights of Britain, and that only when her possessions in Asia were attacked would Japan have to intervene. However, such an idea is only an outcome of subsequent reflection. No such idea occurred to us in those days, nor was there time for such an idea gaining ground. There are some foreign critics who

say that Japan's own interests, in addition to her formal obligations, prompted her to enter the World War. Plausible as this observation may seem in the light of *fait accompli* of vanquished Germany, it is far from the truth, as would at once become clear if the Japanese mentality, at that instant awe-stricken with a dream of Germany emerging out of the war victorious evermore powerful and arrogant, is taken into consideration.

Scarcely three weeks had passed since the outbreak of the war, when Japan, on the memorable twenty-third of August, 1914, declared war on Germany. And that day Japan staked her existence as a nation, just as Belgium did precisely three weeks previously. In the case of Belgium, the danger was at once impending, while, in our case, the danger was seen in the perspective of no distant future.

Count von Rex, then German Ambassador in Tokyo, on being given his passport, was accompanied to the steamer, which was to carry him away from the land to which he was accredited, by a private secretary of our Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was sent by the Minister to see the Ambassador off. Count von Rex would not even shake hands with his companion on parting. He merely gazed on the hand the secretary offered. Motionless and voiceless stood the stately figure of the Count outlined against the azure sky of the bay of Tokyo. It was a sight which would remain in the eyes of the secretary as vivid as if it occurred but yesterday all through his life. It was not his mouth but his eyes which said: "You dwarfs! You do not know what you are now doing. Days are not far off when you shall repent." I will never forget the days when the

Japanese nation as a whole felt so keenly the truth embodied in an old saying that the prospective torture hanging all the time before one's eyes is far more painful than actually going through the torture.

The ultimatum which Japan sent to Germany on August 15, 1914, was sometimes construed by foreign observers at the time of its issuance as though it were a paraphrase of the note handed to Japan on April 25, 1895, by Russia, supported by Germany and France. Indeed, there is a similarity in the wording of the ultimatum and the note, but that is a mere coincidence, pure and simple. If such an impression wraps the implication that Japan issued the ultimatum in order to avenge the past wrong done by Germany, it is again very far from the truth. That although the note was handed to us by Russia, the chief instigator of this move was Germany, was clear to us from the start. Like individuals, no nation can be free from passion for revenge. To this day we cannot forget our fellow-feeling for a little cuckoo that sings with a bleeding throat, roused on the bright morning of May 13, when we had to say that Japan yielded to the dictates of magnanimity and accepted the advice of the three powers.

Seen in the historical perspective of calm judgment, however, the wrong done to Japan by Germany on that occasion was by far too small to merit an idea of implacable revenge. Even if such an idea did occur to Japan at the time, it was mitigated, if not entirely obliterated, by the result of the Russo-Japanese War. Even if the remotest idea of revenge on Germany survived so late as 1914, it must have become utterly negligible in view of the anticipation of the terrible

counter-revenge which a triumphant Germany would assuredly inflict upon Japan. Japan declared war on Germany in 1914 solely and purely in order to remain true to the spirit of her obligations. That the course which led to Japan's taking such a momentous step shows no trace of the influence of the so-called militarists, though an undeniable fact, seems to have hitherto escaped the notice of those critics who are wont to blame Japan for the militaristic coloring of her conduct in international affairs. It is true that even facts can be distorted by the manner of presenting, but in this instance there is no margin for distortion.

No sooner had the World War broken out, than wild gossips and conflicting tattles as to the final outcome of the war were rife all over the world. As far as Japan was concerned, we were too earnest for indulging in chats and gossips. Like thunder following a flash, we had already taken an irrevocable step, by remaining solemnly true to our word of honor, which might, after all, prove to be of greater consequence for our national safety than the declaration of war against Russia in 1904. It was sheer anxiety in the thrilling days following the surrender of Tsingtao, that drove us to conjecture, by no means in a pleasant mood, the eventual outcome of the war. Military experts and men of learning, in the absence of any better prophets, were naturally looked upon as those who were just a trifle better qualified than the average people for prognosticating the future course of destiny. Due regard being paid to the consideration that such a prediction can never rise even to the level of weather forecast, the consensus of opinion among them was that the war would

end in a draw favorable to Germany, if not in a German victory. It was about this time and some time afterwards that the insinuation of Japan being pro-German was rampant among foreign observers. The motive of such an insinuation was not always a lack of sympathy or even enmity on the part of these observers; in most cases it was nothing but lack of insight and true understanding of Japanese mentality.

Nothing can be more absurd and farther from the truth than the accusation of Japan's being pro-German. How is it at all possible that Japan, who staked her all by making war on Germany and was already under surveillance of German wrath and vengeance, could wish for a German victory. Even to this day we cannot entirely shake off the dismal remembrance of the weary days, particularly during the first half of the war period, when the more thoughtful among our countrymen were incessantly attacked by the nightmare of the German fleet bombarding Osaka and German flying machines hovering over the sky of Tokyo. Indeed, our fear of Germany dates back to the day when, with the flimsiest excuse in the world, she extorted, nominally the lease, but as a coarse fact the possession, of the fine port of Kiaochow. Ambitious Germany, then dreaming of world domination, possessing a strong naval base just across the Yellow Sea, was more a menace to Japan, capable of making a stand against aggression, than to China herself. Ever since Japan's eyes were being dazzled by the glare of shining armor and the mailed fist was protruding right under her very nose. Truly, it is a wonder that such a monstrously ridiculous idea as Japan being pro-Ger-

man should have ever occurred to any one in this whole wide world.

Silence—silence which covers the consciousness of having done one's duty—was the dignified response to the accusation of Japan being pro-German at the time when such an accusation was made. Now that all this is an episode of the past, there will be no harm in explaining the cause of this silence. In the first place, we thought that such an accusation was too preposterous to merit repudiation. The second cause may ultimately be traced to the unique characteristic of Japanese mentality, which has been called taciturnity. Japan should have been praised instead of being censured for daring to go so far in the face of a peril which appeared to her then so highly probable, if not almost certain.

The aforesaid forecast is no more or less than a matter-of-fact view. It had absolutely nothing to do with our own desires and wishes. Besides, it was by no means a wild guesswork, even when seen in the light of accomplished facts. I will not go so far as some people who said that this war was a gambler's throw. But the very fact that it did last so long, contrary to the expectation at the start of everybody, not excepting even Lord Kitchener, seems to prove that the conflicting forces were very evenly balanced. Germany might have behaved better so as to give neither provocation nor chance for American participation. Germany might have been all the time feeling to the core the truth of the admonition:

> Of all sad words of tongue and pen,
> The saddest are these: It might have been.

We cannot help seeing things too much in the light of accomplished facts, and that this tendency grows rather than diminishes year after year for a certain length of time is equally unavoidable. However, some day a future historian will discern the element of chance in the course which the World War took and which luckily led to the final victory of the Allies. Had the course of world events taken a different turn, this very moment Japan might be paying dearly for no other offense than that she remained true to her word of honor in days gone by. She can only thank Providence for the peace and tranquillity she is now enjoying.

Japan was also blamed for the fact that of all the German prisoners scattered over the world, those who lived their days of captivity in Japan were the most fortunate ones. A few of the most bigoted among those who blamed Japan went even to the length of going about prisoners' camps in order to collect proofs of Japan treating German prisoners too leniently. The truth is that Japan treated German prisoners neither better nor worse than she treated her 72,000 Russian prisoners in the past, true to the spirit of the poem composed by her beloved Emperor Meiji on the breaking out of war with Russia:

> The foe that strikes thee, for thy country's sake
> Strike him with all thy might.
> But while thou strikest,
> Forget not still to love him.

Nor is such an exclusive possession of the Japanese people. She has come only up to the level of the consideration and generosity with which the United States

treated her Spanish prisoners in spite of the cry: "Remember the Maine."

Another point which gave food to the unwarrantable suspicion of Japan being pro-German is the misinterpretation of the attitude of Japanese men of learning. I believe it was Pasteur who said: "Science has no country of its own; but the man of science ought to have a country of his own. Mr. Wilson must have had somewhat similar idea when he wrote in 1894: "Truth is without geographical boundary, but there can be national selection of truth." The moment the ninety-three German philosophers and scientists issued on the outbreak of the war the world-famous manifesto, they trespassed the limit, within which only science knows no geographical boundary, and forfeited the super-national immunity which men of learning enjoy. Here I can speak with the authority of personal knowledge. We were fully alive to this distinction which commanded our constant attention. Like the rest of the world, we admire Goethe and Schiller, Wagner and Beethoven, Leibnitz and Humbolt, Gauss and Weber, Virchow and Koch, Momsen and Ranke, and other great men who happened to be born in Germany. What we cannot possibly understand is why we alone should be singled out and defamed as being pro-German because of this admiration which is shared by all the world.

The reason for my exposing myself to the highly probable censure of wearisome superfluity in refuting the charge of Japan being pro-German called forth during the war may now be briefly stated. In the first place, because this aspect of the question which rep-

resents the Japanese point of view has never been, so far as I am aware of, made clear, notwithstanding that so much has been said and written charging the wartime Japan with pro-German sentiment. In the second place—and this is the most vital consideration—because this erroneous conception of Japan's pro-German sentiment seems to have been so deeply implanted in some credulous mind that its mischievous influence persists more or less to this day, even after the Washington Conference, at which Japan's sincere intention and integrity of purpose were thoroughly made known and which ought to have dispelled all such misconceptions and misunderstandings. Against malignance and persiflage, I am at a loss for what to say. The persistent influence just spoken of would largely account for the shibboleth: "Japan a second Germany" of those who mean well for Japan.

The present-day Japan may be militaristic, but she is far less militaristic than some of the European continental countries. Hereby both the visible and the potential militarisms are to be considered conjointly. [The classification of militarism into the visible or kinetic and the potential or latent will be dealt with in an article to be entitled "The True Significance of Militarism," which I have in mind to write on some future occasion.] If militarism means the paramount influence which men belonging to military profession exercise in directing the foreign policy of a nation, Japan was militaristic only in the days of General Kawakami. My friend General Tamura, who made all the preparations for the Russo-Japanese War and died just before it broke out, had the chance of becoming a

second Kawakami but he died too early. The only man who came nearly up to the standard of General Kawakami was General Kodama, who conducted the Manchurian campaign in the Russo-Japanese War, but he, too, died before there was time for making his influence felt in shaping Japan's foreign policy. The Yamagata domination of recent years is an unquestionable fact, but it was the domination of Genro Yamagata and not of Marshal Yamagata. In this connection, it is to be observed that the civil war of 1877 was a struggle between the militarism of Saigo and the antimilitarism of Yamagata and that Yamagata was the father of the army and, at the same time the father of the municipal autonomy which, as Lord Bryce says, is the mainstay of representative government. If an impartial foreign critic recalls the career of men like the Duke of Wellington and General Grant before he thinks of Marshal Yamagata, there will be a greater chance of his arriving at a right conclusion. A comparative study of the lives of such men and that of Prince Yamagata would help him a great deal in piercing through the cloud of prejudices and biases and seeing the Yamagata domination in its true significance.

Lecture VI

August 23, 1922

The Aims of Japan

When I was asked in May last to give a course of lectures at the Institute of Politics, it was suggested that I might speak on some such subject like the aims and policies of Japan. On the spur of the moment, somehow, I was wedded to the notion that policy refers to the present and the immediate future. If so, I have not the slightest qualification of speaking on the policies of Japan, simply because I, a nonentity living in seclusion far from the track of daily occurrences and in the bliss of sweet solitude, whose sole aspiration is to return to the womb of Mother Earth as naked as he came out of it, do not know anything about what men now in power have in their mind. On the aims of Japan as conceived by the thinking men of my country, so far as they do not come into too close contact with the happening of the hour, I may be able to say something which I hope might prove to be not wholly uninteresting.

Any one accustomed to addressing gatherings differing in nationality knows how unconscious, but very real, is the reflex influence of one's audience. I shall try, as best as I can, to free myself from this influence in exposing my views on the aims of Japan. Here

again I shall speak with Rooseveltian frankness, and by so doing, I do firmly believe that I am only paying my profound respect to the spirit and purpose of the Institute of Politics.

The international mind and the cosmopolitan mood have appeared from time to time in ages past on the psychological horizon, and now on the horizon of international affairs, however, with a promise which baffles our most farsighted vision. There is no doubt that cause and effect move in circles; but the actual course of events appears to a mortal to follow spirals or some more complicated forms of space curve, thus illustrating in a striking manner the discrepancy between theory and practice, which, in turn, shows the limit of human vision and wisdom. All the peace movements should have for their object the strenuous endeavor to transform the present-day world, where hate is stronger than sympathy, into the better world of to-morrow, where sympathy is stronger than hate. Sympathy reigning supreme with hate entirely eliminated, is, I believe, called a paradise. However desirable such a state of mind and affairs might be, those who are after some tangible results must be prepared for giving up the pleasure of indulging in the Circean dream of ethereal ideal.

Ever more I do admire the moral courage of Roosevelt with which he challenged an idealism which the less courageous would feign to approve and let go its own way. It seems that Roosevelt was after the effective and practical means of ensuring the peace of the world for the reasonable duration of time prescribed by the limit of human wisdom and foresight. Indeed

those who attempt too much and venture to go too far should be reminded of the veritable truism: No mortal is infallible nor omniscient; human weakness is coexistent with, and coextensive to, the human society.

There are men and women who make the supreme sacrifice for their country and for the sake of their ideals. Why should not capitalists give all they have inherited or accumulated, not to say their lives? But the golden days when it becomes clearly manifest that capitalists will be disposed to invest their capital for no earthly reward but the moral consciousness of doing good and when the world commerce will be carried on for the sole purpose of even distribution of foodstuffs and other daily necessaries, seem to recede ever so far into the realm of fairy tales.

In one of the presidential declarations of Roosevelt will be found a passage which merits our present attention. It reads: "It is a mere truism to say that every nation which desires to maintain its independence must ultimately realize that the right of such independence cannot be separated from the responsibility of making good use of it." Again, there is a short posthumous article containing just a little over seven hundred words, which appeared in the Kansas City *Star*, January 13, 1919. I believe, this is a memorable, precious document which will shine ever more as years roll by, illustrating an old Japanese saying:

> A bird sings most melodiously just before it dies;
> A man speaks his best on the eve of his passing away.

In this article, Roosevelt said with his characteristic frankness and impartiality: "The American people do

not intend to give up the Monroe Doctrine. Let civilized Europe and Asia introduce some kind of police system in the weak and disorderly countries at their threshold." Perhaps the most notable passage in this most remarkable document which appeared during the most critical period of human history is the sentence which reads: "Finally, make it perfectly clear that we [Americans] do not intend to take a position of an international Meddlesome Matty."

Nothing has been more disheartening in the post-bellum conditions than the haste to forget the recent past and to become absorbed as of old in the idle talk of undigested platitudes concerning internationalism, nationalism, patriotism, and the like. The greatest of all wars, propounding the most momentous of all problems which concern mankind, has become a topic inviting languor and listlessness. I think, the true conception of internationalism and its bearing on patriotism are at once intricate and of far-reaching consequences and ought not to be spoken of or discussed at random in a lighthearted way. They should be studied in the spirit which manifests itself in such works as, for instance, John Oakesmith's "Race and Nationality; An Inquiry into the Origin and Growth of Patriotism," and W. B. Pillsbury's "The Psychology of Nationality and Internationalism." The study of the subject on a scientific basis has only just begun. Meanwhile utmost care and precaution should be given to that aspect of internationalism, which possesses the chance and potentiality of degenerating into mob lawlessness. In my opinion, while narrow patriotism is to be detested by all means, the true internationalism can only be

built on the foundation of sane and genuine patriotism. In this connection I should like to recall Roosevelt's cry: "Americanism, Americanism pure and simple." I need hardly add that it was this cry which made the world safe for democracy.

What has been said thus far is to serve as a prelude to my explanation of the aims of Japan.

Very soon after the termination of the Russo-Japanese War, Okuma said:

> Now that peace has crowned the gigantic efforts which Japan made in the war with Russia, the effect upon herself is that she will be able to make further progress along the paths of civilization, and the true spirit of her people will have more scope to unfold itself. Japan has never been an advocate of war, and will never draw her sword from its sheath unless compelled to do so by the pressure of foreign powers. She fought to secure peace, and not for the sake of making war. She was glad to lay down her arms as soon as peace was obtainable, and to devote herself to the promotion of interests of a nobler kind. The eminence of Japan is ascribable to no mere mushroom growth; it has its roots in her long past, and her progress is to be explained by causes which will be obvious to any one who cares to study her history assiduously. The late war was not one of race against race, or of religion against religion, and the victory of Japan points to the ultimate blending into one harmonious whole of the ancient and modern civilizations of East and West.

The late greatly lamented K. Okakura is a collegemate of mine, two years senior in graduating from the institution, which has since grown into the present flourishing University of Tokyo. It may be observed in passing that in Japan one puts his family name first and then his second name which is equivalent to what

is known as Christian name in Occidental countries. In writing the name of a Japanese, sometimes this order is preserved and sometimes, following Western usage, not. This has not seldom given rise to some amusing, even comic, incidents which may perhaps find their parallel in the photogravure section of the New York *Times* of last Sunday (August 20, 1922) showing the portrait of my daughter-in-law now in Geneva as the picture of the young wife of my own self. The matter, though trivial in itself, may serve as an illustration of the large chance of mistakes and misunderstandings occurring in these days of cosmopolitan haste. Okakura wrote *Okakura-Kakuzo*, whenever his name was to appear in English. This fact, again trivial in itself, might show Okakura's strong aversion to contingent mistakes, however unimportant, and, none the less, to wanton Occidentalization at the expense of something which is characteristically Oriental.

Okakura was a man such as is rarely found among the Japanese, who understood and knew the West without losing an iota of what he knew and felt of the East. He traveled extensively in the Asian mainland. He was the one man who may justly aspire to speak collectively for Asia. There are two books written by him in English. The one is "The Awakening of Japan," published in 1905 by the Century Company, and the other "The Ideals of the East with Special Reference to the Art of Japan," published in 1920 by E. P. Dutton and Company. In my opinion, they are the two best books ever written in English by a countryman of mine.

Although the latter work deals with a subject which

has no direct bearing on what I am going to say, I wish to quote the opening paragraph of this remarkable book, which follows:

> Asia is one. The Himalayas divide, only to accentuate, two mighty civilizations, the Chinese with its communism of Confucius, and the Indian with its individualism of the Vedas. But not even the snowy barriers can interrupt for one moment that broad expanse of love for the Ultimate and Universal, which is the common thought-inheritance of every Asiatic race, enabling them to produce all the great religions of the world, and distinguishing them from those maritime peoples of the Mediterranean and the Baltic, who love to dwell on the Particular, and to search out the means, not the end, of life.

This book closes with a phrase which has since become world-famous: "Victory from within or a mighty death without."

Okakura's "The Awakening of Japan" may be looked upon as a detailed commentary on what Okuma said immediately after the signing of the Portsmouth Treaty, which I have just quoted. My incipient thought was to quote some extracts from this tiny booklet which has taken hold of my fascination and profound admiration ever since my eyes fell on its opening page for the first time. Very soon I found that, had I followed my own inclination, I would have to quote the entire volume, excepting perhaps the preface and a few pages containing matters covered by my previous lectures. So, I had to give up my original idea of quoting and recommend to the reader the careful perusal of the whole booklet, which I am sure he will never regret.

Japan's victory over Russia was an inconclusive vic-

tory. It was more of the nature of truce than a victory. None the less, this victory, though insignificant in itself, particularly when viewed in the light of the dazzling Allies' victory in the late war, is, seen from a different angle, one of the most momentous events which concern the future destiny of Asia and indirectly of the entire world—of mankind as a whole. In trying to explain what I have in mind, I cannot do better than to quote from Sir Rabindranath Tagore's lecture on the Message of India to Japan delivered six years ago (1916) at the Imperial University of Tokyo, and to which I myself had the good fortune of listening with absorbing interest. Tagore said in part:

> We forgot that in Asia great kingdoms were founded, philosophy, science, arts and literatures flourished, and all the great religions of the world had their cradles. Therefore it cannot be said, that there is anything inherent in the soil and climate of Asia that produces mental inactivity and atrophies the faculties which impel men to go forward. For centuries we did hold torches of civilization in the East when the West slumbered in darkness, and that could never be the sign of sluggish mind or narrowness of vision.
>
> Then fell the darkness of night upon all the lands of the East. The current of time seemed to stop at once, and Asia ceased to take any new food, feeding upon its own past, which is really feeding upon itself. The stillness seemed like death, and the great voice was silenced which sent forth messages of eternal truth that have saved man's life from pollution for generations, like the ocean of air that keeps the earth sweet, ever cleansing its impurities.
>
> One morning the whole world looked up in surprise, when Japan broke through her walls of old habits in a night and came out triumphant. It was done in such an incredibly short time that it seemed like a change of dress and not

like the slow building up of a new structure. She showed the confident strength of maturity and the freshness and infinite potentiality of new life at the same moment. The fear was entertained that it was a mere freak of history, a child's game of Time, the blowing up of a soap bubble, perfect in its rondure and coloring, hollow in its heart and without substance. But Japan has proved conclusively that this sudden revealment of her power is not a short-lived wonder, a chance product of time and tide, thrown up from the depth of obscurity to be swept away the next morning into the sea of oblivion.

And Japan, the child of the Ancient East, has also fearlessly claimed all the gifts of the modern age for herself. She has come in contact with the living time and has accepted with an amazing eagerness and aptitude the responsibilities of modern civilization.

This it is which has given heart to the rest of Asia. Japan has taught us that we must learn the watchword of the age in which we live, and answer has to be given to the Sentinel of Time, if we must escape annihilation. Japan has sent forth her word over Asia, that the old seed has the life germ in it, only it has to be planted in the soil of the new age.

Let me now write down the contents of Okakura's "The Awakening of Japan." The Night of Asia; The Chrysalis; Buddhism and Confucianism; The Voice from Within; The White Disaster; The Cabinet and the Boudoir; The Transition; Restoration and Reformation; The Reincarnation; Japan and Peace. To a penetrating mind of philosophical inclination, this would give the same impression which an average man would get from the explicit words, just quoted, of the Indian poet of Nobel prize reputation. It is trite to say that this thought is shared not only by the thinking men of India but also by the majority of thinking

men in China, though in a somewhat shy way, who rise high above the horizon of internecine strife and corruption which make China appear so awkward to the Western eyes—not to say of the thinking men of smaller countries clustering round these two great countries powerful and commanding in days long, long gone by.

The most matter-of-fact version of the same thought is given by Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig in his address which he delivered in June, 1919, on the occasion of his installation as Lord Rector of St. Andrew University. Therein he made a serious attempt to express his profound reflections on the causes of wars and the means by which they may be overcome. With all the conviction of the man who knows the horrors of war, perhaps more than anybody else, and with the sincerity of one who, like General Pershing, knows how to keep himself aloof from the seduction of crafty diplomacy and corrupt politics, he recommended freedom for all races as the only means of preventing war. Sir Douglas Haig's opinion is particularly instructive and worthy of our most serious attention as he sees what I have been trying to explain from the diametrically opposite point of view. His address follows in part:

> We have all been told the magnitude of the World War which is now drawing to a close. If, however, we wish to avoid a repetition of such catastrophes we must be prepared actively to prevent them, and must know what course to pursue.
>
> Although for a while they may lie dormant, the passions from which war springs are not yet caged in the heart of man. The seeds of future conflict are to be found in every

quarter of the globe, only awaiting the right conditions, moral, political and economical, to burst once more into activity.

The unequal standards of living, and wide differences of civilization existing to-day in different parts of the globe, the economic pressure which must result therefrom, and the racial and color antipathies likely to accompany the development of the latter, all force me to the conclusion that struggles still more terrible are in store for this earth unless wise and decisive action is taken to remove the causes.

Among the existing possibilities of strife there is, in the first place, the problem which newspapers and novel-writers have made known to the general public under the name of the "Yellow Peril," and thereby, in the interests of sensationalism, have robbed it of its very real claims to serious consideration.

Our experience with the Chinese labor in France has shown us that in all classes of routine work, both skilled and unskilled, Chinamen can labor as efficiently, if not more efficiently, than the best European workmen, and with a persistence without rival. They are content with a far smaller wage, accustomed to less food, and expect fewer comforts.

The fact that, properly handled, they can easily be led and trained to new tasks makes them the more formidable as competitors, provided that the directing brains can be found to organize their work.

This enormous recruiting ground for labor, the exploitation of which has scarcely begun, exists side by side with great mineral resources. In China vast coal fields exist, sufficient to provide with ease coal to meet the needs of the whole world for a thousand years.

The Chinese must eventually demand a place in the European labor market, competing with our highly-paid labor and our infinitely higher standards of living. How is that problem to be solved?

Then, again, there is India, with a population of over

300,000,000 souls dependent upon us for their future, and already beginning to turn towards social, industrial, and political development. How are the natives of India to be controlled when the educational system in that country has expanded and carried them a stage further on the upward road, along which, even now, we are endeavoring to guide them?

I hold that this tremendous problem is only capable of solution by giving to all races, however insignificant, what we proudly regard as British freedom and justice, and thereby in the course of many years leveling them up to our own standards of life.

Only by raising all other civilizations to the level of ours can we make it possible for us and them to live side by side in peace. Only in this way can the international rivalry be brought and confined within the limits of peace. Only thus can the terrible pressure of economic competitions be prevented from driving whole continents into war.

This sane advice of Sir Douglas Haig stands in vivid contrast with William Randolph Hearst's narrow-minded proposal of a white league of nations which, if I am rightly informed, was made on his arrival in London not long after the ennobling address of Marshal Haig, and which can only lead to the world-wide unrest and eventually to the utter destruction of the civilizations of both the East and the West. It would be folly to aver that suspicion and distrust of other nations have disappeared either in the West or in the East. Unfortunately there are many men all over the world who are trying to take advantage of these suspicions and distrust, and whose motive is incomprehensible to a man of honor and rectitude. While I am writing these lines I cannot help recalling a poem of Emperor Meiji:

Like the moon
Whose light falls everywhere,
Would my mind be;
Free towards all
And no bias know.

In my previous lecture, I mentioned the existence of two magazine articles written or dictated by Hara within one year of his death. One of them is entitled: "Harmony between East and West." An English translation under a slightly modified name: "Fusion of Oriental and Occidental Cultures as a Basis of Permanent Peace," is to be found in *America-Japan,* published in January, 1921 (Vol. I. No. 6, pp. 78-80). The other is headed: "Pre-Requisite Conditions of Permanent Peace." Its English translation has received various names such as "Reflections on Lasting Peace" and "The World View of the Japanese People in the Face of the Washington Conference." It was published about two months before his assassination, describing his attitude and that of Japan represented by himself toward the problems facing the Washington Conference. An English version is to be found in the *Living Age* published on January 7, 1922 (Vol. 312, No. 4044, pp. 7-11).

Not only did Hara work hard for the healthy growth of constitutionalism in Japan, but his was the hand destined to turn the nation's gaze anew to loftier visions. I have been thinking all the time of quoting from his articles just mentioned in explaining my views on the aims of Japan, not because these articles give a glimpse of what the great Commoner Premier of Japan had in his mind, but because what is said in these arti-

cles marvelously—almost miraculously—coincides with that which I should have liked to say. However, the lack of time at my disposal does not allow me to do as I have been thinking of doing. So I have to refer the reader to an English translation of the original, which, I believe, is easily accessible.

It is the mentality of the East so eloquently told by Tagore and the recognition by the West of Japan's capability of translating her words into deeds, that gives Japan the right and privilege of acting as the leader on the side of the East in the titanic work of the harmonization of the East and the West. Meanwhile let us remind ourselves of some of the disquieting symptoms such as, on one side, a thoughtless talk of a white league of nations already spoken of and, on the other side, the Pan-Turanism movement which seems to be far more deep-rooted than appears on the surface. It is a well-known fact that toward the end of May last (1922) a congress of Oriental peoples was held in Genoa behind closed doors. I was told that there were present delegates from the Lebanon, India, Persia, Afghanistan, Turkey, Armenia, and Mesopotamia. It seems to me that some of the resolutions passed are really worthy of sympathetic consideration, while some others possess the possibility of leading to anarchy and desolation.

While other nations have equally shown that spirit of idealism, it is upon the United States which emerged as the strongest and richest of the Great Powers out of the World War, that history will focus hope in the future. Next to the United States stands Japan, to which Asia, if not the world, looks up for leadership

in the great task of the fusion of Oriental and Occidental cultures as a basis of permanent peace.

The titanic forces which have been working overtime during the World War and after, have made the whole world molten. History shows, however, that such fluid conditions do not continue for any great length of time. The crucial question is: "In what molds shall the new world solidify itself? Shall they be as of old the molds of materialism and selfishness, or shall they rather be the molds of idealism, altruism, and coöperation?" It is while the whole world is still in a molten state that supreme efforts, on the part of comparatively the most favored nations like the United States and Japan, should not be spared for making the world take form in the mold of idealism and coöperation.

The finest and richest results in coöperation have come not where different nations and races have compromised, or obscured, or minimized that which is good and real in their differences, but where these have been made tributary to, or have been taken up in, a larger whole. International collaboration cannot be perfected until there is brought into it the glory and honor of all nations—until the specific characteristics of each have been not submerged, but brought forth in their individual perfection in a harmonious entirety. To proclaim the brotherhood of men and yet to stand aloof from each other is the most bewildering contradiction in human life and is not conducive to the construction of a perfect whole. The history of the last century, seen in a historical perspective shows, broadly speaking, the East fearing the force of the

West, while the West remained oblivious to the ideal of the East. There were instances where the ideal of force was met by the force of ideal. In the constructive period through which we are now passing, one must get rid of the psychology that any civilization other than his own is unworthy even of study.

The United States and, next to her, Japan, are, I believe, the two nations best qualified for the herculean task of the fusion of Oriental and Occidental cultures as a basis of permanent peace. Thinking in this vein, I cannot help recalling the first event of importance in Japan's foreign relations, which occurred in 1872. A Peruvian ship, named *Maria Luz*, with Chinese slaves on board, entered the harbor of Yokohama. These Chinamen were subjected to most cruel treatment, and one of them, escaping from the ship, reported the fact to the Japanese authorities and asked for protection. The ship was seized and the Chinamen were released. This affair became a matter of dispute between the Japanese and the Peruvian Governments. It was an irony of chance that the dispute was referred to the arbitration of the Czar who decided in favor of Japan. This incident, insignificant in itself, occurring on the heel of the assassination of Abraham Lincoln (April 14, 1865), to whose memory was dedicated a stately marble temple in Washington on Memorial Day this year (1922), seems to harbor more than a passing interest. Japan of 1872, then a nonentity among the nations of the world, unhesitatingly and faithfully followed the American ideal personified by Lincoln in the emancipation of slaves. In the new endeavor of

America followed by Japan for harmonizing East and West, history will assuredly repeat itself.

As a practical step toward attaining the end in view, we may think of various peace organizations which are so numerous in the United States. I have in mind such organizations as are typified by the "Commission on International Justice and Goodwill" of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, of which my esteemed friend Sidney L. Gulick is secretary. I brought with me an up-to-date list of the peace organizations in Japan, which will be given as an appendix when my lectures appear in book form at no distant date. The coöperation of the peace organizations in the United States and those of my country would serve as a nucleus of the ennobling yet formidable work of the harmonization of East and West.

There still remains the basic question: Can East and West be harmonized? Rudyard Kipling said in 1889:

Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet,
Till Earth and Sky stand presently at God's great Judgment Seat;
But there is neither East nor West, Border, nor Breed, nor Birth,
When two strong men stand face to face, tho' they come from the ends of the earth! [1]

I feel extremely puzzled in my futile endeavor to know how Kipling came to know or prognosticate that never the twain shall meet. Some say that Kipling was right if he meant the Oriental and the Occidental minds. I,

[1] "Ballads and Barrack-Room Ballads," p. 3, edition of 1895, or "Rudyard Kipling's Verse 1885-1918," p. 268, edition of 1919.

for one, doubt it. Is not that which brought about the Treaties of Washington a meeting of Eastern and Western minds? Is not there a constant meeting of Eastern and Western minds to-day in every avenue of thought and endeavor?

When it is said that men like Mr. Wellington Koo and my friend Mr. R. Negishi understand America or Europe, the answer of the skeptic is that they have ceased to be the sons of the East and that they do not understand the Orient. Well, there may be some truth in what the skeptic says. But is it not just the frank admission that there is no insuperable barrier on the part of the East rightly understanding the West?

Sometimes it is said that the East does not understand why the West is not satisfied with what it has got and that the West does not understand why the East is so dissatisfied with the present-day conditions which reflect the aggressive past of some Occidental countries. As long as the West sits haughtily and majestically while the East is grumbling within herself, there seems to be not much hope of mutually understanding each other. If only the West will condescend to meet the East—I will not say halfway between—just a small fractional way between, there seems to be no reason why they should not meet. All that is essential to assure the permanency of peace between East and West is good will which is a social necessity and mutual understanding which can be cultivated.

Tagore says that poetic imagination is a shy bird and that it builds its nest in seclusion, away from the eyes of the multitude. It is quite imaginable that a shy bird amidst the clamorous vulgarities of common

sense loses its power of rational thinking. In his highly interesting address on "Poetry and Patriotism," delivered at the Imperial University of Tokyo on June 5, 1920, Professor Henry van Dyke raised the question, "What is poetry?" and answered: *Poetry is the emotional interpretation of nature and life, through the imagination, in musical language.* At a small evening party in which Professor van Dyke was the guest of honor, I happened to sit next to him. I said to him: "I am perhaps the most unpoetical person in this world. It might not be proper for me to say such things, but if you allow me, I should like to suggest a slight modification in your definition of poetry. My own definition is: *Poetry is the effusion of feeling, through the imagination, in musical language.*" We talked over the matter for a long while but were unable to come to an agreement. Now, after the lapse of a little over two years, it dawned in my mind that there might be a slight difference in the very conception of poetry in the East and the West. And after all, both he and I may have been correct, each in his own environment. Be that as it may, if poetry is just an effusion of feeling or if the poetic imagination is a shy bird, there will be no need of taking the oft-quoted words of Kipling seriously. What I cannot understand is why these words are so often inserted in places where rational reasoning should remain supreme.

I, for one, am inclined to believe that East and West would meet. Nevertheless, I am equally opposed to the dogmatic assertion that East and West shall meet as well as to the dictatorial allegation that East and West shall not meet. In the present state of the

intercourse of nations, it is at least premature to say anything definite on this vital question. All we should do at the present moment is to try to the best of our ability to make East and West meet, and, if that cannot be done, to make them approach each other as closely as is in our power to do. And in that serenely noble task the two neighboring countries facing each other across the Pacific which pride themselves in their historic friendship, should work hand in hand. In closing this cursory interpretation of the aims of Japan, I cannot do better than quote the following poem of Emperor Meiji:

Easy it seems
And yet how hard
In this our world,
To show in deeds
Man's true Humanity!

Lastly I thank from the bottom of my heart the distinguished audience which it was my good fortune to address for the attention they have kindly bestowed on my lectures.

APPENDIX

The following is an extract from the up-to-date (June, 1922) list of peace organizations in Japan, prepared by Isamu Kawakami, General Secretary of the International Service Bureau in Japan, at the author's request through Baron Sakatani.

PEACE ORGANIZATIONS IN JAPAN

THE JAPAN PEACE SOCIETY

President, Baron Sakatani, Haramachi, Koishikawa, Tokyo; *General Secretary*, Isamu Kawakami, office of Peace Society, National Y.M.C.A., 10 Omote Sarugaku-cho, Kanda, Tokyo.

Not carrying on active campaign, but is a recognized influence in relation to other organizations at home and abroad.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS ASSOCIATION IN JAPAN

Honorary President, Prince Tokugawa; *Chairman*, Viscount Shibusawa; *Vice-Presidents*, Baron Sakatani, Dr. J. Soyeda; *Honorary General Secretary*, Setsuzo Sawada, office, 1 chome, Uchiyamashita-cho, Kojimachi, Tokyo.

Carrying on a vigorous educational campaign on behalf of the fundamental ideas of the League of Nations, though not insisting on the adoption of the present League as it stands; has been very active during the autumn in a nation-wide educational campaign for disarmament.

THE ASSOCIATION CONCORDIA (Social, Religious, and International problems).

Honorary Secretary, Professor Anezaki, Imperial University, Hongo, Tokyo.

Holds monthly lectures, social and conference meetings; wel-

comes prominent foreign visitors; publishes the results of studies of current social, ethical and educational problems.

INTERNATIONAL SERVICE BUREAU IN JAPAN

Chairman, Baron Sakatani; *Vice-Chairmen,* D. Tagawa, M.P.; J. McD. Gardiner; *General Secretary,* Isamu Kawakami, office, National Y.M.C.A., 10 Omote Sarugaku-cho, Kanda, Tokyo.

Under supervision of the Japan Peace Society, the League of Nations Association in Japan, and an associated American Committee; carries on continuous investigations of international questions and serves as a bureau of information for workers in other organizations, for newspapermen and for speakers and writers on urgent problems of the day.

JAPAN COUNCIL, WORLD ALLIANCE OF CHURCHES FOR INTERNATIONAL FRIENDSHIP

Vice-Chairman, Rev. K. Kodaira; *General Secretary,* Mr. T. Tsuga, National Y.M.C.A., 10 Omote Sarugaku-cho, Kanda, Tokyo.

Shares office with International Friendship Committee of the Federated Missions; has half time of *General Secretary,* Mr. Tsuga; is making a good beginning toward helping Christian leaders in taking more definite responsibility toward international peace.

INTERNATIONAL FRIENDSHIP COMMITTEE OF FEDERATION OF CHRISTIAN MISSIONS

Chairman, Mr. Gilbert Bowles, 30 Koun-cho, Mita, Shiba, Tokyo; *Executive Secretary,* Rev. K. S. Beam, National Y.M.C.A., Tokyo. Has half time of *General Secretary,* Mr. Beam, who has been set aside for this work at the request of this committee by the American Board Mission. The Committee assists the Japan Council of the World Alliance, acts as a bureau of information, and as far as possible, keeps in touch with missionaries in Korea and China and with international friendship workers in home lands.

WOMEN'S PEACE ASSOCIATION OF JAPAN

Chairman, Mrs. Hide Inouye; *Business Secretary,* Miss Kiyo Suda, Women's University, Koishikawa, Tokyo.

Organized last year. Most of the active leaders are Christians, though the association is not conducted as a Christian organization; has not affiliated with any women's peace association abroad, but welcomes correspondence and cooperation with all women's organizations of similar purpose.

AMERICA-JAPAN SOCIETY

President, Viscount Kaneko; *Secretaries,* Otohiko Matsukata, W. L. Keene, office, 21 Mitsubushi Building, 5 Marunouchi East, Tokyo.

Largely representative of American and Japanese business interests; is the counterpart in Japan of the Japan Society of New York; publishes monthly periodical in English.

AMERICO-JAPANESE RELATION COMMITTEE

Committees are leading bankers, financiers, scholars, and business men. Investigates the relation between America and Japan, and aims at the better understanding of the two peoples; is the counterpart in Japan of the Japan America Relation Committee in New York and California. Viscount Shibusawa is the chairman.

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